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Recent Decisions
BENEFIT OF CHANGE OF LAW WILL BE GIVEN TO DEFENDANT
WHO PROPERLY PRESERVED PROMPT PRESENTMENT
RULE VIOLATION - McClain v. State
In McClain v. State' the Court of Appeals of Maryland addressed the issue
whether the exclusionary sanction adopted in Johnson v. State2 should be given
"limited" retroactivity. In Johnson, the court had held that the judicially
imposed prompt presentment rule3 was mandatory, and that confessions
obtained in violation of the Rule should be excluded at trial.4 In McClain the
court held that this exclusion of unlawfully obtained confessions should apply to
a case on direct review in which the defendant had preserved for appeal the
issue of a prompt presentment violation. 5 Basing their decision on the principle
that equal justice requires that similarly situated defendants have the same law
applied to them on appellate review, the majority reasoned that denying the
defendant in McClain the benefit afforded the defendant in Johnson would be
"unjust and unfair."6 The court therefore remanded the case for a new trial in
which any confession taken in violation of the prompt presentment rule would
have to be excluded.7
James McClain was convicted on November 8, 1977, of first-degree murder8
by a jury in the Criminal Court of Baltimore City. He was sentenced to life
imprisonment, and the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the conviction.9 The
intermediate appellate court acknowledged that McClain's confession" had
1. 288 Md. 456, 419 A.2d 369 (1980). On remand, the Baltimore State's Attorney's
office dropped charges and the defendant was freed. See notes 149 to 150 and
accompanying text infra.
2. 282 Md. 314, 384 A.2d 709 (1978). See notes 109 to 120 and accompanying text
infra. For criticism of the Johnson decision, see Reynolds, The Court of Appeals of
Maryland: Roles, Work and Performance - Part II: Craftsmanship and Decision-Making,
38 MD. L. REV. 148, 181-84 (1978).
3. MD. D.R. 723 a. This rule currently reads: "A defendant who is detained pursuant
to an arrest shall be taken before a judicial officer without unnecessary delay and in no
event later than 24 hours after arrest. A charging document shall be filed promptly after
arrest if not already filed." See notes 94 to 104 and accompanying text infra.
4. 282 Md. at 325, 384 A.2d at 715.
5. 288 Md. at 470, 419 A.2d at 375.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 407 (1957).
9. The decision was affirmed in an unreported opinion. McClain v. State, No. 867
(Md. Ct. Spec. App., filed Aug. 9, 1979).
10. McClain actually confessed to the murder three times. First, after taking a lie
detector test, he gave a polygraph examiner a written confession. Later he confessed to a
detective, who put McClain's statement in writing. (McClain signed this statement.) Other
detectives then obtained a more detailed written statement from McClain. Although
arguably more than one confession existed, both the McClain majority and dissent
referred to McClain's "statement," 288 Md. at 460, 472, 419 A.2d at 370, 376, and did not
consider whether more than one confession may have existed. Dicta in Johnson suggests,
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been obtained in violation of Maryland's prompt presentment rule," but held
that this issue had not been properly preserved for appeal. 2 The court reasoned
that although McClain had noted the breach of the prompt presentment rule in
his appeal, his primary argument both at his suppression hearing and at trial
had been that his statements were inadmissible because they were
involuntary.13
The Maryland Court of Appeals reversed. Judge Smith, writing for the
majority, held that McClain had properly preserved the prompt presentment
issue for appellate review. 4 The court explained that although the defendant
had focused his argument on the voluntariness' 5 issue, he had mentioned,
nonetheless, that his confession had been obtained in violation of the prompt
presentment rule.' 6 The majority observed that because Johnson was decided
after McClain's trial, "[it certainly was not incumbent upon trial counsel to
object on the ground that on April 6, 1978, we would decide Johnson as it was
decided."' 7 Thus, the majority held that Johnson had "limited" retroactivity.
The exclusionary sanction adopted in Johnson for confessions obtained in
violation of the prompt presentment rule would apply to cases which had not
however, that the court will adopt a derivative evidence rule in such cases, and perhaps
that is why the McClain court did not consider the confessions to be separate. Johnson v.
State, 282 Md. 314, 327, 384 A.2d 709, 716 (1978). See also 8 U. BAL. L. REV. 562, 579
(1979).
But see Kennedy v. State, 289 Md. 54, 421 A.2d 1376 (1980). In Kennedy, the
Court of Appeals held that the Johnson rule did not exclude statements made by a
defendant after he was presented to a magistrate, even if he was not questioned about
those crimes before his initial presentment. "[A] statement is admissible which is made by
one in lawful custody after he has been brought before a judicial officer as required by
M.D.R. 723 a .. " Id. at 69, 421 A.2d at 1383.
11. MD. D.R. 709 was the prompt presentment rule in force in Maryland at the time
of McClain's trial. Rule 709 a provided that:
A defendant shall be taken before a conveniently available judicial officer without
unnecessary delay and in no event later than the earlier of (1) twenty-four hours after
arrest or (2) the first session of court after the defendant's arrest upon a warrant, or,
where an arrest has been made without a warrant, the first session of court after the
charging of the defendant. Such charging shall take place promptly after arrest.
The Court of Appeals subsequently amended the Maryland District Rules and Rule 709 a
became Rule 723 a. For purposes of discussion in this article, the rule referred to will be
Rule 723 a. For a more comprehensive discussion of Maryland's prompt presentment rule
and' its history, see notes 94 to 104 and accompanying text infra.
12. McClain v. State, No. 867 (Md. Ct. Spec. App., filed Aug. 9 1979).
13. Id.
14. 288 Md. at 462, 419 A.2d at 371.
15. See note 114 infra, for rule regarding the admissibility of a confession under the
"voluntariness standard." Under that standard, which was in effect prior to the Johnson
decision, a violation of the prompt presentment rule was but one factor to be considered in
analyzing the "voluntariness" of a confession. For a discussion of the standard and
subsequent changes, see notes 114 to 120 and accompanying text infra.




been finally decided by April 6, 1978,18 if the issue had been properly preserved
for appeal.1 9
The court mentioned Wiggins v. State20 and State v. Hicks2 as two cases in
which that court had discussed the retroactivity of its decisions and had
analyzed Supreme Court guidelines on retroactivity. 22 The majority, however,
distinguished McClain from the mainstream of retroactivity cases because it
involved neither a collateral attack on a prior judgment nor a case on direct
review in which the issue had not been preserved for appeal. 3 The court
commented that McClain had raised the issue of a prompt presentment rule
violation at trial and was simply seeking to have the law as decided in Johnson
applied to his case. 24 Thus, the majority framed the issue in the McClain case as
whether a change in law should be applied to a case on direct appellate review. 25
The court supported its reasoning with a list of string cites 26 to Supreme
Court and Court of Appeals of Maryland cases supporting the proposition that
"a change in law will be given effect while a case is on direct review. .27
18. The Johnson decision was issued on this date.
19. 288 Md. at 470, 419 A.2d at 375. It is interesting to note that in Shope v. State, 41
Md. App. 161, 396 A.2d 282 (1979), the Court of Special Appeals had held that Johnson
would apply to a case before that court on direct review. The court reversed and remanded
the case because the prosecution had used an inadmissible confession. 41 Md. App. at 171,
173, 396 A.2d at 288, 289. Review of that decision, which was rendered before the Court of
Appeals' decision in McClain, was not sought.
20. 275 Md. 689, 344 A.2d 80 (1975).
21. 285 Md. 310, 403 A.2d 356 (1979).
22. 288 Md. at 462, 419 A.2d at 371. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's formula
for retroactivity analysis, see notes 56 to 72 and accompanying text infra.
23. 288 Md. at 463, 419 A.2d at 372.
24. Id.
25. Id. Since McClain did not involve a federal constitutional question, the majority
considered the case to be purely an issue of state criminal procedure. Id. at 470, 419 A.2d
at 375. The majority therefore considered itself free to follow the legal principles
enunciated by dissenting justices in major Supreme Court retroactivity decisions which
the Maryland court found persuasive.
See, e.g., MD. CONST. art. IV, § 18(a), which authorizes the Court of Appeals of
Maryland to promulgate rules having the force of law governing "practice and procedure
in and the administration of the . . . courts." See also notes 131 & 135 and accompanying
text infra.
26. See 288 Md. at 464, 419 A.2d at 372. The Court of Appeals' predilection for string
cites has been criticized: "[An extensive string citation fosters a belief that the court has
not given its full attention to the problem because it is difficult to believe that it has read
and analyzed all the cases cited in this fashion." Reynolds, supra note 2, at 156. The
author contends that, besides overabundant citation, other predominant faults of the
Court of Appeals include the indiscriminate use of authority and a propensity for
adjudication by quotation. Id. at 152.
27. 288 Md. at 464, 419 A.2d at 372. This proposition was dictum in United States v.
Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (ICranch) 102 (1801). Nonetheless, this dictum was cited and
heavily relied upon by the majority in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965), the first
case in which the Supreme Court rewrote and reformulated retroactivity doctrine. Critics
have attacked the Linkletter majority for its use of the dictum in Schooner Peggy. See, e.g.,
Haddad, "Retroactivity Should Be Rethought": A Call for the End of the Linkletter
Doctrine, 60 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 417, 431 (1969). Haddad contends that the Linkletter
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Judge Smith emphasized that although the Court of Appeals has followed the
Supreme Court's formula on retroactivity where mandated, 28 the Maryland
court has never "refuse[d] to apply a new rule to a case on direct review pending
at the time of the formulation of the new rule in which the issue of the new rule
was raised. ' 29 The majority in McClain also quoted at length from Justice
Harlan's dissent in Desist v. United States,31 the first case in which the Justice
refused to apply prospectively a controversial constitutional decision involving
criminal procedure. 31 Although Justice Harlan admitted that previously he had
agreed to apply many of these holdings prospectively in order to limit their
application, 32 he abandoned that approach in Desist, and instead pleaded with
his brethren that: "'Retroactivity' must be rethought. '33 In addition, the
McClain majority quoted from Justice Harlan's opinion in Mackey v. United
States,34 in which the Justice expounded upon the reasons behind his change of
position:
[T]he Court in deciding these [retroactivity] cases seems largely to have
forgotten the limitations that accompany its functions as a court of law. For
the retroactivity doctrine announced today bespeaks more considerations of
policy than of legal principle. Treating direct and collateral review as if
they were of one piece seems to me faulty analysis, ignoring, as it does, the
jurisprudential considerations that differentiate the two kinds of adjudica-
tory functions. As a court of law we have no right on direct review to treat
opinion "is well worth studying as a classic in the misuse of precedent." Id. at 425. He
suggests that the Court misused precedent because it depended too heavily on a
commentator who made this same mistake in Comment, Prospective Overruling and
Retroactive Application in the Federal Courts, 71 YALE L. J. 907 (1962). Haddad, supra, at
432 n.152.
28. See text accompanying note 90 infra.
29. 288 Md. at 465, 419 A.2d at 372-73.
30. 394 U.S. 244, 256 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
31. In Desist, the majority held that the exclusionary rule applied in Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), would be applied only on a prospective basis. Critics of
Supreme Court decisions on retroactivity have suggested that the Court prospectively
applied some of its controversial decisions involving criminal procedure to make these
holdings more palatable to members of the judicial system and the general public. For
instance, Justice Harlan noted that the retroactivity doctrine was the "product of the
Court's disquietude with the impacts of its fast-moving pace of constitutional innovation
in the criminal field." Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 676 (1971) (Harlan, J.,
concurring and dissenting). See also Note, Retroactivity, 4 MEM. ST. L. REV. 521, 529 (1974)
(footnotes omitted) [hereinafter cited as Retroactivity]:
[W]hen the Court entered areas of criminal law which were previously left to the
states, the traditional concept of retroactivity became intolerable. If some method of
limiting the retroactive impact of its decisions had not been devised, it is likely that
the Supreme Court would have been deterred from these areas.
32. 394 U.S. at 258 (Harlan, J., dissenting). See text accompanying note 77 infra.
33. Id.




one case differently from another with respect to constitutional provisions
applicable to both.35
The majority also discussed opinions written by Justices Douglas, Marshall,
Stevens, and Powell which supported Justice Harlan's views.36 To conclude its
reasoning, the court in McClain cited Justice Cardozo's majority opinion in
Great Northern Railway v. Sunburst Co.37 to support the proposition that the
Court of Appeals, as Maryland's highest court, has supreme authority to choose
state common law.38 Finally, the court rationalized its decision to apply the
Johnson exclusionary remedy to the McClain case because, to behave otherwise,
would make "fish of one and fowl of the other. It simply does not comport with
the American tradition of equal justice under the law." 39 The opinion ended
with a caveat that the McClain holding would apply only to other cases "arising
under similar facts and circumstances.
'
"40
In a lengthy dissent, Chief Judge Murphy agreed that the issue of a
violation of the prompt presentment rule was properly preserved for appeal.4
He stressed, however, that the majority had compounded the error the Maryland
court first made in Johnson when it employed an exclusionary rule as a sanction
35. Id. at 701 (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting) (emphasis added). Commenta-
tors have also observed that the technique of applying decisions purely prospectively
increases a court's power:
Historically, the prospective-only technique has been used as a means of altering
rules of law which are badly in need of change, without causing injustices by
disappointing expectations based upon the existence of the old rules. Simply stated,
the technique is designed to increase a court's freedom of action.
Haddad, supra note 27, at 439 (footnote omitted).
36. 288 Md. at 468-69, 419 A.2d at 374-75.
37. 287 U.S. 358 (1932). In Great Northern Railway, the Court held that the issue of
the retroactivity of a new state common-law rule is an issue for the state courts only, and
that the Constitution does not mandate a retroactive or prospective effect.
38. 288 Md. at 470, 419 A.2d at 375. Great Northern Railway was also cited in
Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 625 (1965), and has been criticized by a commentator
as being a poor precedent for the Linkletter decision:
[Tihe Court [in Linkletter] erroneously relied upon cases which did not involve a
court's confrontation of one of its own overruling decisions in deciding a case which
arose prior to the overruling decision. Rather the "precedents" turned upon the duty of
a federal court to recognize intervening changes brought about by the signing of a
treaty, the amending of a statute, or the overruling of a state precedent by a state
court. ...
The extent of a federal court's duty to follow the law created by recent state
decisions, new treaties, or new statutes is irrelevant to the issue of whether a court
may afford its own decisions prospective-only treatment. The use of these cases to
suggest that there is a significant limitation upon a court's power to make new law for
the future only marked the highpoint of the misuse of precedent in the Linkletter
opinion.
Haddad, supra note 27, at 432 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
39. 288 Md. at 470, 419 A.2d at 375.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 472-73, 419 A.2d at 376-77 (dissenting opinion).
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for violations of the prompt presentment rule.4 2 The dissent recited in detail the
lurid facts of the McClain case, emphasizing the "factual guilt" of the
defendant.43 Chief Judge Murphy then traced the history of the prompt
presentment rule in Maryland and other jurisdictions4 4 and concluded that
although the Johnson issue was strictly procedural, the Maryland court should
have used the modified Linkletter-Stovall formula 45 in its retroactivity analysis.
After applying the Linkletter-Stovall retroactivity test, the dissent concluded
that the McClain situation did not warrant a retroactive application of
Johnson.46 The dissent also argued that McClain was indistinguishable from
Hicks, a case in which the Maryland Court of Appeals had refused to apply a
sanction retroactively.47 Finally, Chief Judge Murphy warned that the majority
42. Id. at 471, 419 A.2d at 3(75-76. Interestingly, Chief Judge Murphy stated in
dissent in Johnson: "That the Court's holding [in Johnson] will be afforded a retroactive
effect, at least to 1971 when M.D.R. 709 a was first enacted, is more than likely, thus
spawning a plethora of post conviction applications to overturn convictions long since
final." 282 Md. at 350, 384 A.2d at 729. Judge Smith, who wrote the majority opinion in
McClain, joined Chief Judge Murphy's dissent in Johnson.
43. 288 Md. at 473, 419 A.2d at 377 (dissenting opinion). In stressing the gory facts of
the baby-killing in McClain, the dissent apparently accepted without question the
reliability of McClain's confession. This attitude is particularly ironic in light of the
subsequent dismissal of McClain's case by a state prosecutor who contended that there
was insufficient evidence to prosecute the case without the confession. See note 149 and
accompanying text infra. In emphasizing its refusal to give a "factually guilty" defendant
the benefit of a retroactive application of an exclusionary rule, the dissent is following the
lead of some Justices in the Supreme Court. For instance, Justice Rehnquist wrote for the
majority in United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975), that the "'reliability and
relevancy'" of the evidence illegally obtained from the defendant's car "[was] unques-
tioned." Id. at 539. See also Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 674-75 (1971); Desist
v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 250 (1969). The dissenting opinion in Johnson repeated
this theme: "The action taken by ,th[is] Court will result in the exclusion of highly
probative and reliable evidence and will most assuredly have a devastating impact on the
administration of criminal justice in Maryland." 282 Md. at 342, 384 A.2d at 724. But see
the dissenting opinion of Justice Black in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 653 (1965):
"It certainly offends my sense of justice to say that a State holding in jail people who were
convicted by unconstitutional methods has a vested interest in keeping them there that
outweighs the right of persons adjudged guilty of crime to challenge their unconstitutional
convictions at any time."
44. 288 Md. at 473-77, 419 A.2d at 377-79. See notes 94 to 121 and accompanying
text infra.
45. Id. at 483-84, 419 A.2d at 382. The Linkletter-Stovall test instructs courts, in
determining whether a rule should be given any retroactive application, to consider the
rule's purpose, any reliance by law enforcement authorities on old rulings, and the effect
that a retroactive application of the rule would have on the administration of justice.
Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 (1967). The Burger Court has since modified this
formula by creating a hierarchy among the components of the test and by occasionally
discarding the test altogether. See notes 66 to 72 and accompanying text infra. The
dissenting opinion in McClain argued that the majority had applied the original tripartite
Linkletter-Stovall analysis and not that as later modified by the Burger Court.
46. 288 Md. at 479-80, 419 A.2d at 380.
47. Id. at 483-84, 419 A.2d at 382. In State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 403 A.2d 359
(1979), the Maryland Court of Appeals held that the sanction of complete dismissal of
charges for a violation of Maryland's trial scheduling rule would be applied prospectively
19811
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had "unwisely and unnecessarily 'locked' itself into the Linkletter test in future
",45
cases ....
In order to put the McClain decision into perspective, it is helpful to
examine the relationship between the change of law doctrine and the concept of
retroactivity. At common law, all overruling decisions were given retroactive
effect.49 That result logically derived from the Blackstonian theory of the
origins of the law, which contended that all rights were founded in natural and
fundamental law.5" Because these rights had always existed, judges merely
"discovered" law; therefore, overruling decisions had to be applied
retroactively.51 The Austinian 52 or positivist school of thought took issue with
the hardships created by Blackstonian philosophy, arguing that the retroactive
application of decisions caused unfair surprise and inhibited judges from
overruling previous decisions.53 The Austinians acknowledged that Supreme
Court law was judge-made and constantly evolving; cases therefore could
justifiably be accorded purely prospective treatment.54 Modern commentators
have contended that the Warren and Burger Courts, although purporting to
ignore these origin-of-law theories, have essentially adopted the Austinian point
of view.
5 5
only. However, the situation in Hicks can be distinguished from that of McClain. The
sanction central to Hicks was much more drastic than that in Johnson. Dismissing
charges altogether generally should present a more serious problem to reconviction than
excluding an illegally obtained confession. Additionally, despite the fact that both the
majority and dissent in McClain categorized the issue as being purely procedural, it can be
argued that the prompt presentment rule should be viewed as a quasi-constitutional
protection of the defendant's rights. See notes 136 to 143 and accompanying text infra.
48. 288 Md. at 484, 419 A.2d at 382. The dissenting opinion did not explicitly note the
recent modifications to the retroactivity doctrine by the Burger Court.
49. Ostrager, Retroactivity and Prospectivity of Supreme Court Constitutional Inter-
pretations, 19 N.Y.L.F. 289, 291 (1973); Sabo, Retroactivity in Criminal Procedure: The
Supreme Court as Monday Morning Quarterback, 24 U. MIAMI L. REV. 139, 139 (1969). See
generally GRAY, THE NATURE & SOURCES OF LAW 218-40 (2d ed. 1921). See also Mr. Justice
Holmes' dissent in Kuhn v. Fairmond Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 372 (1910): "Judicial
decisions have had retrospective operation for near a thousand years."
50. 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 69 (5th ed. 1976). See generally Rossum, New
Rights and Old Wrongs: The Supreme Court and the Problem of Retroactivity, 23 EMORY L.
J. 381, 386 (1974); Retroactivity, supra note 31, at 521.
51. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 49, at 70.
52. This camp of philosophers was named for John Austin, whose teachings were
compiled in LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE (two volumes) and PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE;
see generally HALL, FOUNDATIONS OF JURISPRUDENCE 21-35 (1973).
53. Ostrager, supra'note 49, at 292.
54. Rossum, supra note 50, at 388; Retroactivity, supra note 31, at 521. "Austin's
views have met general acceptance." GRAY, supra note 49, at 222.
55. Rossum, supra note 50, at 390; Note, Retroactivity of Criminal Procedure
Decisions, 55 IOWA L. REV. 1309, 1323 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Criminal Procedure
Decisions]. The authors of these articles urge the Burger Court to reconcile the
Blackstonian and Austinian theories of origins of law and rewrite retroactivity doctrine.
Their central argument is that the Supreme Court has erred in developing retroactivity
doctrine because the Court has ignored these philosophies. Passim. For an excellent
discussion of the evolution of the Supreme Court's thinking on the subject of retroactivity,
see Beytagh, Ten Years of Non-Retroactivity: A Critique and a Proposal, 61 VA. L. REV.
1557 (1975).
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Before 1965, the Supreme Court gave purely prospective effect to only three
types of cases: legislative divorce cases, bond issuance cases, and cases which
created criminal offenses. 56 The Court radically departed from that treatment in
Linkletter v. Walker,57 in which the majority refused to apply the Mapp v. Ohio5"
exclusionary rule retroactively to a prisoner petitioning for habeas corpus. In
Linkletter, Justice Clark admitted that Mapp had been applied retrospectively to
cases before the Supreme Court on direct review,5 9 but focused upon the
differences that existed between cases on direct review and those involving
collateral attacks.60 In Stovall v. Denno,61 the Court further refined the
retroactivity formula enunciated in Linkletter by employing a tripartite
analysis. Courts were told to consider these factors: "a) the purpose to be served
by the new standards, b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement
authorities on the old standards, and c) the effect on the administration of
justice of a retroactive application of the new standards."6 2 In Stovall the Court
also expressly stated that no distinction should be made between habeas corpus
cases and those before the Court on indirect review, 63 thus following Johnson v.
New Jersey,64 which had ignored the distinction, and completely discarding that
aspect of Justice Clark's analysis in Linkletter.65
56. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 624 (1965). See also Haddad, supra note 27, at
426.
57. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
58. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). In Mapp, the Supreme Court held that the fourth
amendment's guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures applied to the states
through the fourteenth amendment. The Court then applied an exclusionary rule to
evidence which the state had obtained illegally.
59. 381 U.S. at 622 n.4. Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964); Fahy v.
Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85 (1963); and Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
60. 381 U.S. at 622. See Haddad, supra note 27, at 438. See also Justice Harlan's
concurring and dissenting opinion in Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 696 (1971)
(plurality opinion): "Linkletter v. Walker . . . the wellspring of the current retroactivity
doctrine, took as its point of departure the very distinction between direct review and
collateral attack which I have argued is crucial to any analysis in this field, a distinction
which the Court now firmly discards." But see Haddad, supra note 27, who considers the
direct review-collateral attack distinction "unfounded," id. at 438; Ostrager, supra note 49,
at 301: "[T]his distinction is often unwarranted. A habeas corpus proceeding which is
instituted after an overruling decision has been rendered may involve no more
retroactivity than a case in the appellate process or the overruling decision for that
matter."
61. 388 U.S. 293 (1967). The Court held that the prior Wade and Gilbert decisions
regarding pretrial right to counsel would be applied only on a prospective basis.
62. Id. at 297.
63. "We also conclude that . . . no distinction is justified between convictions now
final, as in the instant case, and convictions at various stages of trial and direct review.
We regard the factors of reliance and burden on the administration of justice as entitled to
such overriding significance as to make that distinction unsupportable." Id. at 300-01
(footnote omitted).
64. 384 U.S. 719, 721 (1966). The Johnson majority held that Escobedo and Miranda
would not be applied retroactively to cases pending before the Court on direct review.
65. See text accompanying notes 59 & 60 supra.
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The Supreme Court, led by Chief Justice Burger, has altered significantly
the Linkletter-Stovall test.66 In 1969, the majority in Desist v. United States67
created a hierarchy among the three components of the test. Justice Stewart,
writing for the majority, dutifully recited the three-prong test, but added:
"Foremost among these factors is the purpose to be served by the new
constitutional rule."6 The Burger Court also has stated that cases involving
double jeopardy and jurisdictional guarantees do not lend themselves to the
Linkletter-Stovall retroactivity analysis.6 9 For example, in Robinson v. Neil,70
the majority granted full retroactivity to a decision 71 which held that successive
prosecutions by a city and state should be barred on double jeopardy grounds.
Justice Rehnquist wrote for the majority: "We do not believe that this case
readily lends itself to the analysis established in Linkletter. Certainly, there is
nothing in Linkletter or those cases following it to indicate that all rules and
constitutional interpretations arising under the first eight Amendments must
be subjected to the analysis there enunciated."72
66. The Burger Court's modifications of the Linkletter-Stovall test raise the very real
question whether a single Supreme Court test for retroactivity exists, or whether that
formula has been reduced to myriad sets of rules. Some critics and commentators suggest
that the Burger Court has created the latter situation. See, e.g., Justice Harlan's
observation: "In the four short years since we embraced the notion that our constitutional
decisions in criminal cases need not be retroactively applied . . . we have created an
extraordinary collection of rules to govern the application of that principle." Desist v.
United States, 394 U.S. 244, 256-57 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citation and footnote
omitted). Justice Harlan then listed these rules and discussed when they did or did not
apply, according to majority opinions. See also Retroactivity, supra note 31, in which the
author states that the Court's retroactivity doctrine "has brought such confusion, and has
been so difficult for lower courts to apply that it should be abandoned in favor of a more
realistic test." Id. at 529 (footnote omitted). Accord, Beytagh, supra note 55 at 1605-06.
67. 394 U.S. 244 (1969).
68. Id. at 249. See generally Recent Development, Retroactivity and Exclusionary
Rule: When Do the Policies Underlying the Exclusionary Rule Warrant its Retroactive
Application? United States v. Peltier, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 317 (1975). But see Haddad,
supra note 27, at 434: "[Tlhe real objection to the purpose-reliability test is that the
Supreme Court has disregarded it where a majority of the Court dislikes the result which
its application would yield."
69. See, e.g., United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715 (1971). In
Coin & Currency, the Court held that a guarantee of subject-matter jurisdiction would be
applied retroactively. But see Gosa v. Mayden, 413 U.S. 665 (1973), in which the Court
refused to give retroactivity to its jurisdictional decision in O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S.
258 (1969).
The Maryland Court of Appeals has devised its own threshold test for when the
Linkletter-Stovall retroactivity test applies. See text accompanying note 90 infra.
70. 409 U.S. 505 (1973).
71. Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387 (1970).
72. 409 U.S. 505, 507 (1973). Perhaps the Court was led to this conclusion because the
Linkletter-Stovall test has been ignored without explanation or discussion in some cases
involving retroactivity. See, e.g., North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969). See also
Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 437 n.1 (1970), where the discussion of the Linkletter-
Stovall test was confined to one footnote.
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The Court, as led by Chief Justice Burger, has contended that the
Linkletter-Stovall test is clear and comprehensible. 73 However, critics have been
quick to note that Supreme Court modifications of the test have left lower courts
confused and without guidelines on the retroactivity issue,7 4 especially consider-
ing the wide variety of opinions espoused by individual Justices on the subject.
For example, Justice Douglas had disagreed with the Court's approach to
retroactivity from its inception. 75 He repeatedly emphasized the ad hoc and
arbitrary nature of the Court's retroactivity formula and the resulting injustices
it perpetrated.76
A careful consideration of such injustices prompted Justice Harlan, a
staunch opponent of many of the Court's criminal procedure rulings, to reverse
his stance on retroactivity. He explained this change in a dissenting opinion in
Desist:
I have in the past joined in some of those opinions (granting prospective
effect to criminal procedure holdings) . . . I did so because I thought it
important to limit the impact of constitutional decisions which seemed to
me profoundly unsound in principle. I can no longer, however, remain
content with the doctrinal confusion that has characterized our efforts to
apply the basic Linkletter principle. "Retroactivity" must be rethought.
77
Harlan expounded upon this theme in a concurring and dissenting opinion in
Mackey v. United States.78 His major criticism was that the Court was behaving
73. "The contours of the retroactivity inquiry have been clearly delineated in
numerous decisions over the last decade." Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47, 51 (1973).
74 See, e.g., id. at 62 (Marshall, J., dissenting):
I see little point in forcing lower courts to flounder without substantial guidance in
the morass of our cases, by informing them that they are to apply a balancing test,
when in fact it invariably occurs that the balancing test results in holdings of
nonretroactivity. Furthermore, it demeans this Court to pretend to consider a variety
of factors if, no matter how those factors are arrayed, the result is predetermined.
See also Beytagh, supra note 55, at 1596-1612; Ostrager, supra note 49, at 304-05, 307;
Rossum, supra note 50, at 403.
75. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 640 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting; joined by
Douglas, J.).
76. Justice Douglas wrote in dissent to United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 543
(1975): "I adhere to my view that a constitutional rule made retroactive in one case must
be applied retroactively in all . . . . It is largely a matter of chance that we held the
Border Patrol to the command of the Fourth Amendment in Almeida-Sanchez rather than
in the case of this defendant. Equal justice does not permit a defendant's fate to depend
upon such a fortuity." See also Daniel v. Louisiana, 420 U.S. 31, 33 (1975) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting); Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47, 58 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Desist v.
United States, 394 U.S. 244, 255 (1969) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
77. 394 U.S. 244, 258 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
78. 401 U.S. 667, 675 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting).
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like a super-legislature in its retroactivity analysis."9 He urged his brethren to
adopt neutral principles of law and to follow these principles when fashioning a
retroactivity test.
8 0
Justice Marshall echoed some of these themes in his discussions of
retroactivity doctrine. Marshall first criticized the Court's retroactivity formula
in a concurring and dissenting opinion in Williams v. United States.s1 He
supported Justice Harlan's distinctions between cases on direct review and those
on collateral attack, 2 but continued to uphold the basic three-prong test. 3 In a
dissent in Michigan v. Payne,8 4 however, Justice Marshall evinced a growing
discontent with the Court's retroactivity theory, arguing that the Court was
really applying no test at all but was instead lumping cases into three
categories. Marshall classified these three categories as consisting of cases in
which the trial court lacked jurisdiction; cases in which the Court applied a rule
that affected the finding of guilt or innocence; and all other cases which
involved criminal procedure.8 5 Marshall contended that the Court predeter-
mined the retroactivity issue by assigning cases to one of these categories rather
than objectively analyzing the issues. The Justice observed that cases within the
first two categories were always given retroactive effect, while cases assigned to
the last category were given prospective effect only.8" He urged the Court to
develop neutral principles and to apply them honestly to cases, rather than
continue the "charade of carefully balancing countervailing considerations when
deciding the question of retroactivity."8 7
Prior to McClain, the Supreme Court's retroactivity analysis was discussed
by the Court of Appeals of Maryland in its opinions in Wiggins v. State8 8 and
79. Id. at 677-79. Some commentators have argued that conservatives, seeking to
restrain the Court through the prospective application of its controversial decisions, have,
in fact, increased that tribunal's power. See Haddad, supra note 27, at 439:
[Clonservatives and prosecutors who urge the use of the prospective-only technique as
if it were a concession to their interests surely are not unaware that this technique
has increased the Supreme Court's freedom to dictate wide-sweeping and detailed
standards made binding upon both the federal and state governments in new decisions
of constitutional scope.
80. 401 U.S. at 681.
81. 401 U.S. 646 (1971) (Marshall, J., concurring and dissenting).
82. Id. at 665-66.
83. Id. at 666.
84. 412 U.S. 47 (1973).
85. Id. at 61-62 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 61. One might argue that the Supreme Court is applying neutral principles
when it classifies cases as Justice Marshall suggests, and then decides the retroactivity
issue on the basis of those classifications. But the Court can hardly be commended for
unprincipled or inconsistent analysis. In some cases the Linkletter-Stovall test is recited
and applied, while in others the test is simply ignored. See note 72 supra.
88. 275 Md. 689, 344 A.2d 80 (1975).
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State v. Hicks.89 In Wiggins, the majority devised its own threshold test after
evaluating Supreme Court cases:
We glean from the Supreme Court cases that there are three circumstances
in which a retrospective application is mandated, (1) where the old rule
affected the integrity of the fact-finding process, (2) where no trial was
constitutionally permissible, and (3) where the punishment is not constitu-
tionally permissible. In the absence of one of those three circumstances,
then the three-pronged Linkletter test is applicable.
90
The Court of Appeals discussed retroactivity doctrine again in Hicks, and held
that the severe sanction of dismissal of charges for violations of Maryland rules
on trial scheduling would be applied on a purely prospective basis.91 In a per
curiam opinion, 92 the court noted that Hicks did not involve an issue that
mandated retroactivity and that the Linkletter-Stovall test was therefore
applicable. After executing a Linkletter-Stovall analysis, the court concluded
that the sanction of dismissal of charges should apply "only to future criminal
prosecutions and only to those pending cases where .. . there have been no
appearances of counsel or first appearances of defendants pursuant to Rule
723." ' The Hicks opinion implied that the sanction could be invoked in a case
on direct review only if those demanding criteria were met. The court did not
discuss what law should be applied on appellate review or distinguish between
cases on direct review and those of collateral attack.
In contrast to the Hicks sanction of complete dismissal of charges for
violations of the trial scheduling rule, the Court of Appeals in McClain applied
only an exclusionary rule sanction to confessions obtained in violation of the
prompt presentment rule. As the court commented in Johnson, Maryland courts
have long recognized a common law duty to present a putative defendant to a
magistrate promptly.94 This common law requirement was codified in Baltimore
89. 285 Md. 310, 403 A.2d 356 (1979). The first Maryland case after Linkletter in
which the Court of Appeals discussed new Supreme Court retroactivity doctrine was
Schiller v. Lefkowitz, 242 Md. 461, 219 A.2d 378 (1966).
90. 275 Md. at 701, 344 A.2d at 87.
91. 285 Md. at 338, 403 A.2d at 371.
92. The per curiam opinion was issued after the state filed a motion for reconsidera-
tion, asking the court to re-evaluate its holding in State v. Hicks. The motion was denied.
285 Md. at 334, 403 A.2d at 368.
93. 285 Md. at 338, 403 A.2d at 371.
94. The Johnson majority noted that the Court of Appeals had long "held that police
officers were under a common law duty 'to convey the prisoner in a reasonable time and
without unnecessary delay before a magistrate.'" 282 Md. at 319, 384 A.2d at 712. The
Johnson court cited Kirk & Son v. Garrett, 84 Md. 383, 35 A. 1089 (1896), and Twilley v.
Perkins, 77 Md. 252, 26 A. 286 (1893), to support this proposition. In Kirk the Court of
Appeals stated:
From the earliest dawn of the common law a constable could arrest without a warrant
when he had reasonable grounds to suspect that a felony had been committed; and he
was authorized to detain the suspected party such a reasonable length of time as
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City9 5 and in Montgomery County. 96 In 1971, the Court of Appeals promulgated
the Maryland District Rules,97 which through Rule 709 imposed the prompt
presentment requirement statewide. 9s This rule, which as proposed closely
followed Rule 5(a)9 9 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, was modified to
provide guidelines instead of the vague federal standard of "unnecessary
delay."1 ° ° Hence, it repudiated federal cases in which the McNabb-Mallory
doctrine 01 had excluded statements obtained when a magistrate was simply
unavailable. 10 2 In 1977 the district rules were comprehensively amended, but
Rule 709 became Rule 723a without substantial change.1 °3 The Court of Appeals
most recently modified the prompt presentment rule by a Rules Order in 1979,
which condensed Rule 723a and dropped the implied definition of "unnecessary
delay."'
10 4
would enable him to carry the accused before a magistrate. And this is still the law of
the land.
84 Md. at 405, 35 A. at 1091. Both Kirk and Twilley, however, involved civil cases in
which the plaintiffs were suing for false imprisonment. Thus, the Kirk statement arguably
is dictum and may serve as a poor precedent for the Johnson court's statement that
Maryland has long recognized some form of a prompt presentment rule. See generally
Kauffman, The Law of Arrest in Maryland, 5 MD. L. REV. 125, 130-31 (1941).
95. MD. ANN. CODE art. 26, § 115 (1957) (repealed 1972); CODE OF PUB. Loc. L. art. 4,
§§ 742, 916 (1938) (Baltimore City) (repealed 1961).
96. MD. ANN. CODE art. 52, § 97(h) (1957) (1968 Repl. Vol.) (Montgomery County)
(repealed 1972).
97. The Court of Appeals promulgated these rules pursuant to Art. IV, § 18(a) of the
Maryland Constitution. See note 25 supra. The Maryland District Rules first became
effective on July 5, 1971.
98. See note 11 supra for the language of Rule 709.
99. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a). This rule now reads:
An officer making an arrest under a warrant issued upon a complaint or any person
making an arrest without a warrant shall take the arrested person without
unnecessary delay before the nearest available federal magistrate or in the event that
a federal magistrate is not reasonably available, before a state or local judicial officer
authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 3041.
For a discussion of the sanctions imposed for violations of this rule, see notes 109 to 112
and accompanying text infra.
100. 2 G. LIEBMANN, MARYLAND DISTRICT COURT LAW AND PRACTICE § 941, at 142
(1976). The implied definition of "unnecessary delay" was: "and in no event later than the
earlier of (1) twenty-four hours after arrest or (2) the first session of court after the
defendant's arrest upon a warrant, or, where an arrest has been made without a warrant,
the first session of court after the charging of the defendant." Section 709 a was deleted by
a Rules Order effective July 1, 1979. For the text of the current prompt presentment rule,
see note 3 supra.
101. See notes 109 to 112 and accompanying text infra. Under the McNabb-Mallory
doctrine, the Supreme Court applied an exclusionary rule to statements obtained in
violation of the federal prompt presentment rule. Congress subsequently overruled this
doctrine.
102. 2 G. LIEBMANN, supra note 100, § 941, at 142-43 (1980 Repl. Vol.).
103. The Rules Order was issued on May 4, 1979, and the amendments became
effective on July 1, 1979.
104. See note 3 supra for text of MD. D.R. 723 a.
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The Court of Appeals remarked in Johnson v. State ub that the basic
purpose of the prompt presentment rule "is to insure that an accused will be
promptly afforded the full panoply of safeguards provided at the initial
appearance."1 6 Earlier, Justice Frankfurter had elaborated on this topic in the
lead opinion in Culombe v. Connecticut:10 7
Recognizing the need to protect criminal suspects from all of the dangers
which are to be feared when the process of police interrogation is entirely
unleashed, legislatures have enacted several kinds of laws designed to curb
the worst excesses of the investigative activity of the police. The most
widespread of these are the ubiquitous statutes requiring the prompt taking
of persons arrested before a judicial officer; these are responsive both to the
fear of administrative detention without probable cause and to the known
risk of opportunity for third-degree practices which is allowed by delayed
judicial examination.10 8
Although the rationale for the prompt presentment rule is the same in different
jurisdictions, courts have disagreed violently about the appropriate sanction to
impose for violations of the rule. The Supreme Court adopted an exclusionary
rule sanction, known as the McNabb-Mallory rule for confessions obtained prior
to the arraignment of a defendant.0 9 The Court then held that this mandatory
sanction, which was later applied to confessions in violation of the federal
prompt presentment rule, did not apply to violations of state prompt present-
ment rules as a matter of due process." 0 Many federal court judges did their
best to vitiate rather than implement the McNabb-Mallory rule."' Finally,
105. 282 Md. 314, 384 A.2d 709 (1978).
106. Id. at 321, 384 A.2d at 713.
107. 367 U.S. 568 (1961) (plurality opinion).
108. Id. at 584 (footnotes omitted).
109. See Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957); McNabb v. United States, 318
U.S. 332 (1943). In McNabb, the Court suppressed confessions which had been obtained
prior to the arraignments of the defendants. McNabb, however, was decided before the
federal rules were promulgated. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure were
promulgated by a Rules Order dated December 26, 1944. The Court later applied the
McNabb doctrine to the federal prompt presentment rule in Mallory. There the Court
relieved a defendant of the burden of proving the causal connection between illegal
detention and coercion by creating a conclusive presumption. See generally 8 MooRz's
FEDERAL PRACTICE - Criminal Rules 5.02 [1] - [3] (2d ed. 1980); Hogan & Snee, The
McNabb-Mallory Rule: Its Rise, Rationale and Rescue, 47 GEo. L. J. 1 (1958); Note,
Admissibility of Confessions Obtained Between Arrest and Arraignment: Federal and
Pennsylvania Approaches, 79 DICK. L. REV. 309 (1975).
110. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 601 (1961) (plurality opinion).
111. Federal judges often stretched the McNabb-Mallory doctrine to its limits or
simply ignored it, since implementation of the rule hinged on a court's interpretation of
"unnecessary delay." See, e.g., United States v. Quarles, 387 F.2d 551, 555 (4th Cir. 1967);
United States v. Ladson, 294 F.2d 535, 538 (2d Cir. 1961); United States ex. rel. Chennault
v. Smith, 366 F. Supp. 717, 724 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
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Congress partially eliminated the doctrine by passing Title II of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.112 Even before this federal
legislation, however, most state courts, including Maryland's, had rejected the
McNabb-Mallory sanction for violations of state prompt presentment rules
113
and instead imposed a less harsh "voluntariness" standard to evaluate the
admissibility of confessions." 4 Under this test, a violation of the prompt
presentment rule was merely one factor to consider when analyzing the
voluntariness of a confession.
The Maryland Court of Appeals firmly rejected the exclusionary rule
sanction for violations of a legislatively-promulgated prompt presentment
rule in the 1949 case of Cox v. State."' In 1965, the Court of Appeals reaffirmed
112. 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1968). Pertinent aspects of the rule read:
(a) In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States or by the District of
Columbia, a confession . . . shall be admissible in evidence if voluntarily
given ....
(b) The trial judge in determining the issue of voluntariness shall take into
consideration all the circumstances surrounding the giving of the confession,
including (1) the time elapsing between arrest and arraignment of the defendant
making the confession, if it was made after arrest and before arraignment ....
(c). . . [A] confession . . . shall not be inadmissible solely because of delay in
bringing such persons before a magistrate ...if such confession is found by the trial
judge to have been made voluntarily ... and if such confession was made or given
by such person within six hours immediately following his arrest or other
detention ...
Thus, a violation of the federal prompt presentment rule is now but one factor to be
considered in determining the voluntariness of the confession.
Judicial interpretation of this statute has left certain questions unsettled. Some
courts maintain that the McNabb-Mallory doctrine is still extant and applies to
confessions taken after the six-hour limit specified in the statute. See United States v.
Montes-Zarate, 552 F.2d 1330 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 947 (1978). But see
United States v. Edwards, 539 F.2d 689 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 984 (1976). The
majority of courts, however, ignore the rule, implying that the legislation has completely
eliminated the doctrine. See, e.g., United States v. Warme, 572 F.2d 57 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 1011 (1978); United States v. Shoemaker, 542 F.2d 561 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1004 (1976).
113. See Taylor v. State, 238 Md. 424, 209 A.2d 595 (1965); Abbott v. State, 231 Md.
462, 190 A.2d 797 (1963); Cox v. State, 192 Md. 525, 64 A.2d 732 (1949). The Court of
Appeals observed in Cox: "'It is perfectly clear under the authorities that the mere fact of
arrest does not constitute duress, or render a confession made while under arrest
inadmissible, if voluntarily made.'" 192 Md. at 537, 64 A.2d at 737 (quoting Courtney v.
State, 187 Md. 1, 6, 48 A.2d 430, 432 (1946)).
114. The test for admissibility was succinctly stated in Abbott:
The rule regarding the admissibility of a confession is that the State must prove that
it was freely and voluntarily given and that it was not the product of force or of a
promise, threat or inducement whereby the accused might be led to believe that there
would be a partial or total abandonment of prosecution. . . .[Wihether the
confession was freely and voluntarily made necessarily depends on the facts and
circumstances in each case.
231 Md. at 465, 190 A.2d at 799 (citations omitted).
115. 192 Md. at 536, 64 A.2d at 737.
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the voluntariness standard for confessions in Taylor v. State,16 reasoning that if
the legislature had wished to impose such a severe sanction for violations of the
prompt presentment rule, it would have included the exclusionary remedy as
part of the ordinance." 7 In Johnson v. State,"' however, the Court of Appeals
imposed an exclusionary rule sanction for violations of the judicially-
promulgated prompt presentment rule," 9 thus overruling contrary precedents
sub silentio. The Johnson majority acknowledged that most states did not
employ such a sanction,' 2 ° but concluded that the voluntariness test did not
adequately enforce the mandatory prompt presentment rule:
To say that an unlawful postponement of the initial appearance may be
merely a factor in assessing the admissibility of a statement, is to imply
that an unnecessary delay may be overlooked entirely if other indicia of
voluntariness exist. Under this analysis, even a gross violation of the
presentment requirement can be disregarded altogether. . . -Despite its
relatively popular acceptance, therefore, the voluntariness standard is a
hopelessly inadequate means of safeguarding a defendant's right of prompt
presentment. 121
In McClain v. State, where the Court of Appeals was presented with the
issue of deciding what retroactive effect it should give Johnson, the court
applied retroactively the Johnson exclusionary rule sanction in a very limited
manner. The majority held that Johnson would apply to cases on direct review
only if the issue of a prompt presentment rule violation had been properly
116. 238 Md. 424, 209 A.2d 595 (1965).
117. Id. at 432, 209 A.2d at 599. Note that the language of the prompt presentment
rule in Taylor was much weaker than the language of the prompt presentment rule
promulgated by the Court of Appeals. The rule in Taylor contained "[n]o time limit ...
as to when it is compulsory that an arrested person be taken before one of the judges." Id.
Compare this with the flexible but explicit wording of the prompt presentment rule in
force at the time of McClain's arrest: "without unnecessary delay and in no event later
than the earlier of (1) twenty-four hours after arrest or (2) ...the first session of court
after the charging of the defendant." See note 11 supra. See also note 3 supra for the
language of the current prompt presentment rule.
118. 282 Md. 314, 384 A.2d 709 (1978).
119. Id. at 325, 384 A.2d at 715.
120. But note that Pennsylvania is another jurisdiction which has imposed an
exclusionary rule sanction for violations of the prompt presentment rule. See Common-
wealth v. Davenport, 471 Pa. 278, 370 A.2d 301 (1977); Commonwealth v. Futch, 447 Pa.
389, 290 A.2d 417 (1972). Accord, State v. Benbo, 174 Mont. 252, 261-62, 570 P.2d 894,
900 (1977). Delaware has also applied an exclusionary sanction in some circumstances. In
cases where detentions last less than the statutory maximum of twenty-four hours, the
length of illegal detention is but one factor to be considered by the court. Webster v. State,
59 Del. 54, 213 A.2d 298, 301 (1965). But confessions obtained during a detention that
exceeds the twenty-four hour limit are automatically excluded. Vorhauer v. State, 59 Del.
35, 212 A.2d 886, 892 (1965).
For a discussion and criticism of this recent state trend to embrace new versions
of the McNabb-Mallory exclusionary doctrine, see Comment, The Ill-Advised State Revival
of the McNabb-Mallory Rule, 72 J. CRiM. L. & CRIM. 204-42 (1981).
121. 282 Md. at 325, 384 A.2d at 715 (citations omitted; emphasis added).
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preserved for appeal. 122 Thus, by implication, Johnson's exclusionary sanction
would not be applied to a defendant whose case was final on the date Johnson
was announced, 123 or to a defendant whose counsel had not objected to the
violation of the prompt presentment rule at trial.
Despite Chief Judge Murphy's lament that the McClain majority erred in
not mechanically following the Supreme Court's Linkletter-Stovall retroactivity
analysis, the McClain result appears to be fairer and better reasoned than many
of the Supreme Court's decisions involving the retroactivity of holdings. First,
the Court of Appeals appeared to have tackled the problem anew rather than to
have blindly followed the Supreme Court's steps. The Maryland court's implicit
differentiation between cases of collateral attack and those on direct review
produced a more equitable result than several Supreme Court decisions in
which a majority of the Court refused to apply holdings retroactively to cases
before the Court on direct review. 124 Moreover, when the Supreme Court applies
122. 288 Md. at 463, 470, 419 A.2d at 372, 375.
123. April 6, 1978.
124. See, e.g., United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975); Williams v. United States,
401 U.S. 646 (1971) (plurality opinion); Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969);
Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967). In these cases, which were before the Court on
direct review, a majority chose to deny retroactive application of previous holdings
involving criminal procedure.
But it should be noted that the Court of Appeals' decision in McClain does not
even attempt to give "equal justice" to the prisoner collaterally attacking the identical
issue of a prompt presentment rule violation. Many have argued that any difference in
treatment between defendants on appeal and prisoners petitioning on habeas corpus
penalizes those who live in a jurisdiction that speedily disposes of cases. Justice White
took pains in Williams v. United States to point out the problem with Justice Harlan's
distinctions between cases of direct review and those of collateral attack:
Let us assume that X and Y are accomplices in a murder and that they are tried
separately in the state courts. For any one of several reasons... X's case proceeds
slowly through direct review while Y's conviction is quickly affirmed. Assume further
that after X's conviction is affirmed by the State's highest court, this Court holds that
a practice employed in both the X and Y trials violates the Constitution. Both X and
Y come before this Court at the same time seeking to have the new rule applied to
their cases - X on direct review and Y by way of collateral attack ...
Under Mr. Justice Harlan's approach X automatically receives the benefit of the
new rule. . . . Y may or may not receive the benefit of the new rule, the result
depending on whether the new rule is designed to correct a practice that has come,
over time, to shock our Brother's conscience. Under our approach today, the results as
to X and Y would be consistent, as they should be.
401 U.S. 646, 657-58 n.9 (1971) (plurality opinion). Justice Black's dissent in Linkletter v.
Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 641 (1965), also complained:
Linkletter must stay in jail; Miss Mapp, whose offense was committed before
Linkletter's, is free. This different treatment of Miss Mapp and Linkletter points up at
once the arbitrary and discriminatory nature of the judicial contrivance utilized here
to break the promise of Mapp by keeping all people in jail who are unfortunate
enough to have had their unconstitutional convictions affirmed before June 19, 1961.
See also Justice Marshall's comment: "The only difference between Pearce's case and
Payne's, then, is that the former moved up to this Court more quickly than the latter."
Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47, 60 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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its decisions prospectively, defendants whose cases were chosen to announce the
new holding benefit from the decision, while defendants who are before the
Court on direct review are generally denied identical relief 1 25 The only
distinction between the two cases is "sheer coincidence";1 26 no principled
difference' 27 exists between the two. The Supreme Court has attempted to
defend this practice with an Article III argument, but has yet to explain
adequately why a Katz should benefit from a new holding while a Desist should
not, when the only apparent difference between the two defendants is that the
Katz case reached the Supreme Court first.' 28 Justice Harlan attacked the
Court's procedure as dishonest and as a dangerous expansion of the powers of
judicial review: "Simply fishing one case from the stream of appellate review,
using it as a vehicle for pronouncing new constitutional standards, and then
permitting a stream of similar cases subsequently to flow by unaffected by that
new rule constitutes an indefensible departure from this model of judicial
review."'129 Critics have commented that the Supreme Court's approach to
retroactivity increases that tribunal's power because the Court is behaving more
like a legislature passing laws with specific effective dates than like a court of
law administering justice. 3 ° The Court of Appeals' treatment of retroactivity in
McClain, in comparison, implies a greater respect for the limitations of judicial
review and the boundaries of a court's power.
Chief Judge Murphy's criticism of the McClain majority for failing to follow
the Linkletter-Stovall guidelines ignores several fundamental differences be-
tween the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals of Maryland. First, because
state courts bear the burden of handling the vast majority of criminal cases,
they are entrusted with the responsibility of fashioning and implementing their
own rules of criminal procedure, subject to the restraints of due process, equal
125. The injustice of these decisions is starkly illustrated by Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S.
293 (1967), in which the Court held that the defendants in Gilbert and Wade would benefit
from the holdings in their cases regarding identification, but that such relief would be
denied in Stovall, a case in which the defendant had been sentenced to death.
126. Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 255 (1969) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
127. See Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV.
1 (1959). The author's central argument is that courts must function as courts of law and
not as quasi-legislatures. To function as a court of law, Wechsler argues, a court must be
entirely principled:
A principled decision ...is one that rests on reasons with respect to all the issues in
the case, reasons that in their generality and their neutrality transcend any
immediate result that is involved. When no sufficient reasons of this kind can be
assigned for overturning value choices of the other branches of the Government or of a
state, those choices must, of course, survive.
Id. at 19.
128. See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301 (1967); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347 (1967).
129. Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 677, 679 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring and
dissenting).
130. Haddad, supra note 27, at 439; Ostrager, supra note 49, at 307; Wechsler, supra
note 127, at .9.
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protection, and other constitutional guarantees. Thus, the Court of Appeals, as
the supreme authority on issues of state criminal procedure,' 31 does not have to
apply blindly the Linkletter-Stovall formula to non-constitutional procedural
issues. Second, when creating retroactivity doctrine or deciding the retroactivity
of decisions, the Supreme Court is acting within the constraints of federalism
and hence must respect the balance of power between the state and the federal
courts within our judicial system.1 32 This concern is evidenced by the Court's
frequent discussion of the burden placed on the states' administration of justice
when a Supreme Court holding is retroactively applied. 133 Indeed, Justice
Harlan worried that the Supreme Court's retroactivity doctrine had already
eroded the power of state courts and that the Supreme Court had usurped too
much control. He observed that the Linkletter-Stovall retroactivity formula,
reduced [all other courts] to the role of automatons. . . .No longer do the
inferior courts - and, in the constitutional realm, all courts are inferior to
us - bear responsibility for developing or interpreting the
Constitution. . . .Although it is necessary for the proper functioning of
the federal system that this Court possess the last word on issues of federal
Constitutional law, it is intolerable that we take to ourselves the sole
ability to speak to such problems.'
34
There is no need for the Court of Appeals of Maryland to exercise such
self-restraint. Finally, the dissent in McClain fails to consider that since the
Court of Appeals promulgated the state's current prompt presentment rule, the
methods of enforcing that rule might best be left to the Court of Appeals'
discretion.' 35 It is apparent from both Johnson and McClain that before the
exclusionary rule was adopted, police had very little incentive to follow the
prompt presentment rule, even though it has been a court rule for over ten
years.
Although both majority 136 and dissent 137 ignored the subtleties of the issue
in McClain and quickly labeled the prompt presentment rule issue as purely
procedural, some commentators disagree. They argue that prompt presentment
rules protect fourth, fifth, sixth, and sometimes even eighth amendment
131. See Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 587 (1961) (plurality opinion); Smith v.
Warden, 477 F. Supp. 500 (D. Md. 1979).
132. See generally Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 430 (1979) (footnote omitted):
"The essence of federalism is that states must be free to develop a variety of solutions to
problems and not be forced into a common, uniform mold."
133. See, e.g., United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 541-42 (1975); Michigan v.
Payne, 412 U.S. 47, 56 (1973); Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 251-52 (1969).
134. Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 680 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring and
dissenting).
135. But see 1981 Md. Laws ch. 577, in which the General Assembly legislatively
overruled Johnson v. State, 282 Md. 314, 384 A.2d 709 (1978). See note 151 infra.
136. 288 Md. at 470, 419 A.2d at 375.
137. Id. at 483-84, 419 A.2d at 382.
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rights.13 Those critics maintain that prompt presentment rules without
sanctions become nullities, 139 and contend that sanctions for violations of
prompt presentment rules preserve the accusatorial criminal justice system and
prevent it from becoming inquisatorial. 4 ° In the Johnson opinion, the Court of
Appeals itself suggested that the prompt presentment rule was quasi-
constitutional and hence needed a strong sanction. The majority observed that
Rule 723 "bolster[s] in substantial fashion several fundamental constitutional
guarantees .. ,,141 Judge Smith further elaborated:
[T]he initial appearance affords a defendant considerably more than a
supplementary warning of his right to counsel. Additional protections
include the right to be notified of all charges brought by the State, and the
right to a hearing on the defendant's eligibility for pretrial release and
court-appointed counsel. What is more, defendants arrested without a
warrant are entitled to a constitutionally mandated probable cause
determination. 142
However, this theme was not reiterated in McClain; both majority and dissent
dismissed the issue as purely procedural with little discussion.
14 3
Perhaps the majority deemphasized the quasi-constitutional aspects of the
prompt presentment rule in order to justify their refusal to use the modified
Linkletter-Stovall analysis. Under that formula, the court would have analyzed
the purpose of the Johnson exclusionary rule. If the purpose did not clearly
mandate retroactivity or prospectivity, the court would then have weighed the
factors of justifiable reliance and the burden on the administration of justice.
However, even if the majority had employed this analysis, they might have
reached a conclusion different from that propounded by the dissent. The
dissenting opinion in McClain stressed that the deterrent purpose of the
exclusionary rule1 44 compelled a prospective application of Johnson. But this
138. See Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 639 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Justice Frankfurter's opinion for the plurality in Culombe noted: "[Tlhe risk is great that
the police will accomplish behind their closed door precisely what the demands of our legal
order forbid: make a suspect the unwilling collaborator in establishing his guilt." Id. at
574-75. See also Hogan & Snee, supra note 109, at 23; 8 U. BALT. L. REV. 562, 565-66
(1979).
139. See Hogan & Snee, supra note 109, at 25. Compare 8 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE,
supra note 109, 5.02[2], at 5-15: "The constitutional provisions to which Mallory is most
closely related, however, are the privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth
Amendment and the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment."
140. See Hogan & Snee, supra note 109, at 25.
141. 282 Md. at 322, 384 A.2d at 714.
142. Id. at 332, 384 A.2d at 719.
143. See 288 Md. at 470, 419 A.2d at 375; id. at 483-84, 419 A.2d at 382 (dissenting
opinion).
144. Ever since modern retroactivity doctrine was first created, the Supreme Court has
separated the constitutional right involved from the remedy, and has focused on the
remedy when applying the Linkletter-Stovall test. In other words, the Court analyzes and
discusses the purpose of the remedy, the reliance by law enforcement officials on old
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overemphasis on the deterrence rationale behind the exclusionary rule ignores
other premises supporting the sanction. 145 These factors were discussed in
Johnson:
remedies, and the handicap on the administration of justice that a retroactive application
of the new remedy would cause. For examples of such analyses by the Warren Court, see
Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 728-33 (1966); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618,
630-40 (1965). A majority of the current Court also has yet to apply an exclusionary rule
retroactively. Like the dissent in McClain, most of the present Justices emphasize the
deterrence rationale behind the exclusionary rule and assume that that rationale does not
support a retroactive application of the sanction. For instance, Justice Stewart has
written:
Foremost among these [Linkletter-Stovall] factors is the purpose to be served by the
new constitutional rule. This criterion strongly supports prospectivity for a decision
amplifying the evidentiary exclusionary rule. . . . [AIl of the cases . . . requiring
the exclusion of illegal evidence have been based on the necessity for an effective
deterrent to illegal police action. . . . The misconduct of the police . . . has already
occurred and will not be corrected by releasing the prisoners involved.
Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 249 (1969) (footnotes and citations omitted). See also
United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 536 (1975); Williams v. United States, 401 U.S.
646, 653-54 (1971) (plurality opinion).
Justice Harlan took issue with the Court's custom of separating the right
involved from the remedy for purposes of retroactivity analysis and argued that the
majority, by doing so, sidestepped thorny constitutional issues: "[Tihe judgments below are
affirmed, without reaching the merits of the underlying questions presented." Mackey v.
United States, 401 U.S. at 675, 676 (1971) (plurality opinion).
Justice Brennan's criticism of this technique has been even more pointed. He has
argued that the Burger Court is using retroactivity analysis to eliminate the exclusionary
rule from the judicial system.
The Court's opinion [in United States v. Peltier] depends upon an entirely new
understanding of the exclusionary rule in Fourth Amendment cases, one which, if the
vague contours outlined today are filled in as I fear they will be, forecasts the
complete demise of the exclusionary rule as fashioned by this Court in over 61 years of
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. . . . An analysis of the Court's unsuccessfully
veiled reformulation demonstrates that its apparent rush to discard 61 years of
constitutional development has produced a formula difficult to comprehend and, on
any understanding of its meaning, impossible to justify.
United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 551 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnote and
citations omitted). Cf. Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388,
415-18 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
145. Although the Supreme Court has denied retroactivity to fourth amendment
exclusionary rules because of its belief that the primary purpose of such rules is
deterrence, the Johnson exclusionary sanction arguably involves other rights. Justice
Brennan discussed a similar situation in a concurring opinion in Williams v. United
States, when he stated that "[e]xclusion of statements impermissibly coerced is not merely
a device to deter government agents from improper conduct in the future. Exclusion of
coerced testimony is part and parcel of the privilege against self-incrimination." 401 U.S.
646, 662-63 (1971) (plurality opinion). One could even argue that statements excluded
because of Johnson affect the "integrity of the fact-finding process" and therefore mandate
a retrospective application. See text accompanying note 90 supra. The fact that statements
deemed involuntary were excluded under the old voluntariness standard, however,
removes much of the force behind this argument.
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Not only is such a rule calculated to deter unlawful detentions and to
preserve the integrity of the criminal justice system, but it is likely to
assure more certain and evenhanded application of the prompt present-
ment requirement and will provide to trial courts, the bar and law
enforcement officials greater guidance as to the permissible limits of
custodial interrogation prior to an initial appearance.
146
Although the dissenting opinion in McClain thought otherwise,'4 7 the reliance
factor should be the weakest argument against retroactive application of the
Johnson exclusionary rule. The court in Johnson did not alter the prompt
presentment rule itself; it merely changed the sanction for violations of that
rule. A prompt presentment rule has existed in Baltimore City for over forty
years. 148 Hence, any police reliance was unjustifiable, unless law enforcement
officials are to be allowed to rely on their custom of breaking a longstanding law
with impunity. The Linkletter-Stovall analysis should only weigh good faith
reliance. The potential burden on the administration of justice, therefore, might
well be the most convincing argument against a retroactive application of
Johnson. If the Court of Appeals had decided to make Johnson fully retroactive,
the burden of prosecuting defendants without using their "voluntary" confes-
sions could have been enormous. Because the Court of Appeals carefully limited
Johnson's retroactivity to the narrow fact situation presented in McClain,
however, perhaps the effect of the decision on the administration of justice will
be narrowed to the McClain case itself.
Notwithstanding this limitation, some critics vociferously contend that the
Court of Appeal's holding in McClain is a miscarriage of justice because the
decision "freed" a confessed murderer. Although the court remanded the
McClain case for retrial, the Baltimore State's Attorney's office dropped charges
on February 6, 1981, after stating that, without the confession, the prosecution
had no case. This caused an uproar from the press and the general public,' 4 9
146. 282 Md. at 328, 384 A.2d at 717 (citations omitted).
147. "Law enforcement officials undoubtedly relied on our past rulings holding that
delay in presentment was merely one factor to consider in determining whether a
statement was voluntary." 288 Md. at 479, 419 A.2d at 380.
148. See text accompanying note 95 supra.
149. "William A. Swisher, the city state's attorney, yesterday termed the [McClain]
case a 'travesty of justice' . . . . The prosecutor acknowledged that 'the public doesn't
really understand this legal mumbo-jumbo' and would be upset about Mr. McClain's
release." The Sun, Feb. 7, 1981, § B, at 1, col. 5. "Queen Victoria Williams (a relative of
the murder victim) . . . was upset when she learned Thursday, that Mr. McClain would
be released. 'It's a dangerous thing they're doing.... It's not bringing the baby back. I
don't like it.'" Id. at 2, col. 4. See also The Sunday Sun, Feb. 22, 1981, § B, at 1, col. 4:
Others, however, including a few defense lawyers, contended that city prosecutors
at least could have tried to get the McClain case to a jury, even without the excluded
confession. After all, they claimed, the man had been the babysitter that night. And
there was a torn picture of the baby's mother with another man found on top of the
baby's body.
"I have no doubt that if the state's attorney had not decided to grandstand,"
complained one seasoned court observer, "he probably could have gotten a conviction
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who protested that justice for McClain perpetrated an injustice to society. 150 The
theme apparently underpinning their criticism was that the Johnson case was
erroneously decided, and that the McClain court exacerbated its earlier error by
applying the Johnson rule to exclude McClain's confession. If Johnson was
wrongly decided, however, it is that decision, and not necessarily the decision in
McClain, that should be changed. The McC!ain majority should not be criticized
for trying to decide honestly how to apply the Johnson rule to McClain's
situation. Nor should the majority be criticized for applying the neutral
principles of equal justice and change of law on appellate review, rather than
bowing to public pressure and applying a decision prospectively simply to avoid
controversy. If McClain killed the child, as he told police he did, he should be
convicted and incarcerated, but only in accordance with constitutional and
procedural guarantees. The police should have played by the rules in building a
case against McClain. The fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination
instructs that society has no right to procure confessions in a matter that
relieves the police of their burden to perform adequate investigation. It should
be noted, however, that the issue whether the Court of Appeal's decision in
Johnson should be overruled is now moot, since the Maryland General
Assembly passed a bill in its 1981 session which legislatively overturned the
Johnson decision and restored the "voluntariness" standard. 15 '
In conclusion, in McClain the Court of Appeals took to heart the dissenting
opinion of Justice Harlan in Desist and rethought the issue of retroactivity by
applying its own interpretation of the neutral principle 5 2 of equal justice. The
Maryland court implicitly distinguished cases on direct review from those
involving collateral attack and gave "equal justice" to the former by applying
the benefit of a change in law to all defendants whose cases were not final on
April 6, 1978 (the date Johnson was decided). The McClain approach appears
preferable to that of the Supreme Court, whose analysis has in essence created a
which probably would have been affirmed" by the appeals court. "While it might have
been a close case, they could have tried."
150. Such criticism echoes Justice Cardozo's attack on the exclusionary rule: "The
criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered .... A room is searched
against the law, and the body of a murdered man is found .... The privacy of the home
has been infringed, and the murderer goes free. ... People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21,
23-24, 150 N.E. 585, 587-88 (1926). It is also reminiscent of the McClain dissent and the
faction of the Supreme Court which tends to emphasize the "factual guilt" of a defendant;
see note 43 supra.
151. 1981 Md. Laws ch. 577 provides:
A confession of a criminal defendant may not be excluded from evidence solely
because the defendant was not taken before a judicial officer within a specified time,
and failure to comply with certain Rules of court is only one factor among others to be
considered in determining the voluntariness and admissibility of a confession.
152. One commentator has equated the term "neutral principle" with "a standard that
transcends the case at hand." Wechsler, supra note 127, at 17.
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hierarchy of constitutionally protected rights," 3 and whose retroactivity formula
has become ad hoc and based more upon policy considerations than judicial
principles. By applying Johnson retroactively only to those defendants who are
before the court on direct review and who timely preserved the issue of a prompt
presentment violation, however, the court in McClain significantly limited the
practical effect of its holding.
153. In other words, the Supreme Court appears to find some constitutionally protected
rights more valuable than others because it grants the former a retroactive application
and the latter a prospective application only. The Court does this without any mandate
from the language of the Constitution itself. The Supreme Court vehemently denies,
however, that it has ranked constitutional rights according to value: "[T]he choice between
retroactivity and nonretroactivity in no way turns on the value of the constitutional
guarantee involved." Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 728 (1966). But see Justice
Fortas' criticism:
The significance of the [retroactivity] decisions is not only that they deprive a
relatively few convicted persons of their constitutional rights, but also that they
diminish the Constitution; they imply the availability of constitutional principle can
be the subject of judicial choice in circumstances which, I respectfully submit, are far
from compelling.
Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 269 (1969) (dissenting opinion) (emphasis added).
See also Haddad, supra note 27, at 429:
If the rights recognized in Wade and Gilbert are so important, how can the Court deny
relief to prisoners, some under sentences of death, whose constitutional rights were
violated in the same manner as Wade's and Gilbert's? If the Supreme Court does not
take its decisions any more seriously than that, how can it expect the people and the
States to take them seriously? (footnotes omitted).
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GIDEON AND GUN CONTROL: Lewis v. United States
Congress enacted the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 19681
in the wake of the violence that followed the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther
King2 and the shock of the assassination of a presidential candidate, Sen. Robert
F. Kennedy.3 Titles IV4 and VII5 of this act, more commonly known as the Gun
Control Act of 1968,6 regulate the possession, receipt and transfer of firearms.
Section 1202(a) of Title VII prohibits the receipt, possession or transportation of
any firearm by a convicted felon.7 In Lewis v. United States' the Supreme Court
held that a felony conviction obtained where the defendant lacked counsel, thus
a violation of Gideon v. Wainwright,9 could subsequently be used as a predicate
conviction for a prosecution under Section 1202(a).' °
1. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (1968). The Act was initiated as House Bill 5037
and passed the House on August 8, 1967. See H.R. REP. No. 488, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1967). The Senate substituted its language in the text and passed the bill (S. 917) on May
24, 1968. See S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. reprinted in [19681 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 2112. The House accepted the Senate amendments without reference and passed
the amended bill on June 6, 1968, 114 CONG. REC. 16271-300, the same day Senator
Kennedy died from gunshot wounds he received the previous day.
2. King was assassinated on April 4, 1968. Shortly after his assassination rioting
broke out in several major U.S. cities, including Washington, D.C.
3. Senator Kennedy was shot on June 5, 1968 and died early the next day.
4. Codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-928 (1976).
5. Codified at 18 U.S.C. app. §§ 1201-03 (1976).
6. The Omnibus Act was amended by the Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No.
90-618, 82 Stat. 1212. The amending statute enacted §§ 921-28 essentially unaltered and
created only minor changes in §§ 1201-03.
7. Section 1202(a) provides:
Any person who-
(1) has been convicted by a court of the United States or of a State or any
political subdivision thereof of a felony, or
(2) has been discharged from the Armed Forces under dishonorable conditions,
or
(3) has been adjudged by a court of the United States or of a State or any
political subdivision thereof of being mentally incompetent, or
(4) having been a citizen of the United States has renounced his citizenship, or
(5) being an alien is illegally or unlawfully in the United States, and who
receives, possesses, or transports in commerce or affecting commerce, after the date of
enactment of this Act, any firearm shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned
for not more than two years, or both.
18 U.S.C. app. § 1202 (1976).
8. 445 U.S. 55 (1980).
9. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Gideon held that indigent state felony defendants, unable to
obtain counsel, must be furnished counsel by the state. Because the assistance of counsel
is fundamental to a fair trial, the rule of Gideon has been held to be completely
retroactive. Pickelsimer v. Wainwright, 375 U.S. 2 (1963); see also Linkletter v. Walker,
381 U.S. 618, 639 & n.20 (1965); Kitchens v. Smith, 401 U.S. 847 (1971).
10. Although the Court did not couch its language in terms expressly sanctioning the
use of unconstitutional, uncounselled convictions, see 445 U.S. at 65 ("we therefore hold
that § 1202(a)(1) prohibits a felon from possessing a firearm despite the fact that the
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Justice Blackmun, writing for the 6-3 majority," held that an unchal-
lenged unconstitutional conviction could be used as a predicate conviction
within the statutory scheme, that there was no constitutional infirmity in using
such a conviction, and that the unconstitutional conviction could not be
collaterally attacked during the Section 1202 trial. In dissent, Justice Brennan
12
argued that the language of the statute did not admit the majority's result and
that prior decisions of the Court prohibited the use of unconstitutional,
uncounselled convictions in prosecutions under Section 1202(a). This Note will
examine the two questions faced by the Lewis court: First, did Congress intend
that an unconstitutional conviction be used as a predicate conviction in a
Section 1202(a) proceeding; and, second, if Congress did intend such a use, is
that use constitutional?
I. LEWIS IN THE LOWER COURTS
George Calvin Lewis, Jr. was indicted for violating two sections of the Gun
Control Act: section 922(h) (1), unlawfully receiving a firearm; and section
1202(a), unlawfully possessing a firearm after having previously been convicted
of a felony. 3 At the beginning of his trial, Lewis' counsel moved for a
continuance to secure the Florida records of Lewis' previous conviction.
14
Counsel sought to show by these records that Lewis was without counsel at that
proceeding, thereby rendering the Florida conviction void and allowing Lewis to
defend at the section 1202(a) trial by denying the existence of the prior
conviction.'" The trial court denied the motion for continuance, ruling that the
alleged invalidity of the prior conviction was immaterial. 16 Lewis was convicted
under section 1202(a)'7 whereupon he appealed to the Fourth Circuit and
presented that court with the question of whether a defendant in a gun control
predicate felony may be subject to collateral attack on constitutional grounds."), and 445
U.S. at 67 ("we simply hold today that the firearms prosecution does not open the
predicate conviction to a new form of collateral attack."), the inescapable result of the
Court's decision is that such unconstitutional convictions may be used.
11. Justice Blackmun was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart,
White, Rehnquist and Stevens. 445 U.S. at 56.
12. Justices Marshall and Powell joined in the dissent. Id.
13. Brief for Petitioner, app. at 10, Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as Appendix].
14. Appendix at 2, 6. The previous felony conviction was a 1961 Florida conviction for
breaking and entering. Appendix at 10-11.
15. Lewis' counsel also sought to show that the Florida indictment was invalid on its
face, Appendix at 4, and that the Florida conviction was void because at that time Lewis
was a juvenile who, was tried as an adult without requisite procedural safeguards.
Appendix at 4, 9.
16. Appendix at 9.
17. Appendix at 11-12. Lewis was acquitted of the § 922(h)(1) offense. 445 U.S. at 57
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proceeding could defend "by claiming for the first time that this [prior] felony
conviction was constitutionally invalid.
18
In a divided decision, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the conviction. Judge
Russell, writing for the court, found that "the legislative history as well as the
statutory language itself makes clear . . . that any person within this status
class of a convicted felon, whose conviction was not facially invalid and whose
conviction had not been invalidated as of the time the firearm is possessed, is
subject to the statutory prohibition stated in section 1201(a)(1). . . ."19 The
majority further held that the use of prior unconstitutional uncounselled
convictions in a section 1202(a) trial does not violate the Supreme Court's
decision in Burgett v. Texas20 in which it stated that "a conviction obtained in
violation of Gideon v. Wainwright [may not] be used against a person either to
support guilt or enhance punishment for another offense ... ,,21 The dissent,
by Judge Winter, found "insubstantial support" for the majority's conclusion
that Congress intended to impose gun control disabilities on persons whose
convictions were obtained in violation of the sixth amendment right to
counsel.2 2 Furthermore, Judge Winter felt that Burgett v. Texas prohibited the
introduction of the prior uncounselled conviction because it is "inescapable that
the prior offense supported the determination of guilt for the instant [gun
control] offense ... ."23
The Fourth Circuit in Lewis was the first circuit court to hold that a section
1202 defendant could not attack the predicate felony conviction as being
violative of Gideon.24 Several circuit courts had considered various grounds
upon which a defendant in a section 1202 prosecution could challenge the
validity of the predicate conviction, and which grounds could not be used to
18. 591 F.2d 978 (4th Cir. 1978). The question presented was actually a narrower one:
Lewis challenged the prior conviction as being violative of the sixth amendment right to
counsel, not as being generally unconstitutional. Compare the question presented by
Lewis, Brief for Petitioner at 2, United States v. Lewis, 445 U.S. 55 (1980), [hereinafter
cited as Brief for Petitioner] with the question presented by the United States, Brief for
United States at 2, United States v. Lewis, 445 U.S. 55 (1980), [hereinafter cited as Brief
for United States].
19. 591 F.2d at 979, citing United States v. Liles, 432 F.2d 18, 20 (9th Cir. 1970)
(emphasis supplied).
The majority stated that Lewis "[does not] dispute his earlier conviction in
Florida or that such conviction is facially valid." 591 F.2d at 978. The dissent, however,
"do[es] not understand, as the majority asserts, that defendant concedes the 'facial'
validity of his earlier conviction. He asserts that the record of the [prior Florida]
conviction shows that he was unrepresented by counsel and that the conviction is void on
its face." Id. at 982 (Winter, J., dissenting); see also Brief for the Petitioner at 6-8.
20. 389 U.S. 109 (1967).
21. Id. at 115, citing Greer v. Beto, 384 U.S. 269 (1966).
22. 591 F.2d at 982 (Winter, J., dissenting).
23. Id. at 983.
24. See Dameron v. United States, 488 F.2d 724 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Lufman, 457 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1972); see also United States v. DuShane, 435 F.2d 187 (2d
Cir. 1970); United States v. Thoresen, 428 F.2d 654 (9th Cir. 1970); cf. Williams v. Coiner,
392 F.2d 210 (4th Cir. 1968).
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challenge such a conviction.25 The Supreme Court granted Lewis' petition for
certiorari to resolve this "conflict among the Courts of Appeal.
26
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION
The Court first considered the statutory interpretation question: Does
section 1202(a) permit the use of an unconstitutional uncounselled conviction as
an element of the gun control offense? Section 1202(a) prohibits "[a]ny person
who - (1) has been convicted . . . of a felony . . ." from possessing a
firearm. 27 Reading this language, the Court found "[n]o modifier . . . present,
and nothing [to] suggest[] any restriction on the scope of the term 'convicted.' "28
Thus, the Court viewed the statute as admitting no exception for a person whose
prior conviction "might turn out to be invalid for any reason."2
9
Turning from the language of the statute to its legislative history, the
Court found no evidence that Congress was willing to allow a defendant to
question the validity of his prior conviction at his section 1202(a)(1) trial.30
Although there was "little legislative history" to examine, the Lewis Court
stated that "[slection 1202(a) was a sweeping prophylaxis, in simple terms,
against misuse of firearms. There is no indication of any intent to require the
Government to prove the validity of the predicate conviction."
31
Justice Blackmun cited provisions of Title IV of the Act to support his
conclusion that Congress intended to enact a "sweeping prophylaxis" against
dangerous persons carrying guns. Sections 922(g)(1) and (h)(1), originally part of
Title IV, make it unlawful for a person who has been convicted of or who is
"under indictment for" a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than one
year, to receive or transport a firearm "which has been shipped or transported in
interstate. . . commerce." 32 Because Titles IV and VII were enacted simul-
25. See United States v. Maggard, 573 F.2d 926 (6th Cir. 1978) (prior conviction may
not be challenged on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel); United States v. Allen,
556 F.2d 220 (1977) (prior conviction may not be challenged in section 922(a)(6) trial on
grounds of denial of counsel); United States v. Pricepaul, 540 F.2d 417 (9th Cir. 1976)
(prior conviction challengeable where defendant alleges cases involuntary guilty plea);
Cassity v. United States, 521 F.2d 1320 (6th Cir. 1975) (in section 922(a)(6) trial, prior
conviction may not be attacked on grounds that it was a guilty plea obtained without
assistance of counsel); United States v. Graves, 554 F.2d 65 (3d Cir. 1975) (prior conviction
may not be challenged on grounds that juvenile jurisdiction procedures were not complied
with); cf. Pasterchik v. United States, 466 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1972) (where prior
conviction is vacated on constitutional grounds, gun control conviction also must be
vacated); United States v. Liles, 432 F.2d 18 (9th Cir. 1970) (where after arrest for gun
control offense, prior conviction is reversed on non-constitutional grounds, defendant
remains triable for gun control offense).
26. 445 U.S. at 58.
27. 18 U.S.C. app. 1202(a) (1976).
28. 445 U.S. at 60.
29. Id. at 62.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 63.
32. 18 U.S.C. sections 922(g)(1) & (h)(1) (1976). See note 41 infra which sets forth the
text of the sections.
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taneously, the majority reasoned that "[s]ince the fact of mere indictment is a
disabling circumstance [under section 922], a fortiori the much more significant
fact of conviction must deprive the person of a right to a firearm."33 Thus, with
the "statute and legislative history so clear" and unambiguous, 34 the Court
found that section 1202(a)(1) prohibits a felon from possessing a firearm despite
the fact that his prior conviction may be constitutionally infirm.
35
Justice Brennan, writing in dissent, disagreed with the majority's reading
of the statute and its legislative history, and found the statute "ambiguous."
Justice Brennan argued that the phrase, "who has been convicted," necessarily is
ambiguous because even the majority had conceded that the government could
not validly convict under section 1202(a)(1) where a defendant's predicate
conviction had been vacated or reversed on appeal.36 Once the statutory
language is found to be ambiguous, Brennan argued, statutory construction
principles of "lenity in construing criminal statutes" and "construction of
statutes so as to avoid constitutional questions" require that section 1202(a)(1)
be read narrowly to impose disabilities only on those persons who have been
constitutionally convicted.3"
The majority and the dissent examined the legislative history of section
1202 and arrived at contradictory conclusions. Thus, it is necessary to examine
events which lead to the enactment of section 1202 in order to put the issues and
resolutions into perspective.
III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION 1202
In his February 6, 1967 message to Congress, President Johnson urged the
90th Congress to enact some kind of firearms regulation before the end of the
session.31 In response to this request the House passed a bill, H.R. 5037, which
included provisions for handgun control.39 The House bill was entirely
re-written by the Senate Judiciary Committee,40 with Title IV being the main
provision for firearms control.4 1 Senator Long of Louisiana offered Title VII as a
33. 445 U.S. at 64.
34. Id. at 65.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 69 (Brennan, J., dissenting) citing 445 U.S. at 60-61 n.5.
37. Id. at 68-71 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
38. S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 78 (1968), reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2112, 2116.
39. See H.R. REP. No. 488, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
40. The Senate bill was designated S. 917. See note 1 supra.
41. Title IV, 18 U.S.C. section 922 (1976), provides in part:
(a) It shall be unlawful
(6) for any person in connection with the acquisition or attempted acquisition of
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floor amendment to the re-written bill,42 whereupon he described his proposed
amendment as one that would "simply [set] forth the fact that anybody who has
been convicted of a felony . .. is not permitted to possess a firearm." 43 One
week after the introduction of the Title VII, Senator Long called up the
amendment for consideration. 4 After asserting that Congress did possess the
power to constitutionally outlaw the mere possession of weapons by certain
any firearm to make any false or fictitious oral or written statement ...with
respect to any fact material to the lawfulness of the sale ... [of a] firearm .
(g) It shall be unlawful for any person-
(1) who is under indictment for, or who has been convicted in any court of, a
crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year;
to ship or transport any firearm or ammunition in interstate commerce.
(h) It shall be unlawful for any person-
(1) who is under indictment for, or who has been convicted in any court of, a
crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year;
to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in
interstate or foreign commerce.
In addition to prohibiting shipping, transporting or receiving of firearms by indictees and
convicted felons, sections 922(g) end (h) prohibitions apply to fugitives from justice, drug
abusers and mental defectives.
While there is some overlap between Title IV and Title VII, see notes 4-7 supra
and a person tried under one statute might also be triable under the other, e.g., United
States v. Batchelder 442 U.S. 114 (1979), there are differences between the two titles. For
example, Title IV prohibitions extend to persons who are indicted whereas Title VII
provisions do not; Title VII reaches possessions "in commerce or affecting commerce"
whereas Title IV reaches the receipt of firearms "shipped or transported in interstate
commerce or foreign commerce." Indeed, courts have held that despite the fact that the
two titles "are, in part, redundant" they do not "dovetail neatly" and "no conclusion can be
drawn from Title IV concerning the correct interpretation of Title VII." United States v.
Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 343-44 (1971); see also United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114
(1979); Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 569-70 (1977); see generally Note,
Prior Convictions and the Gun Control Act of 1968, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 326, 327-28 (1976);
Annot., 13 A.L.R. Fed. 103, 110-11 (1972).
42. On May 17, 1968, Sen. Long first indicated that he would propose an amendment,
and the amendment was published in the record. 114 CONG. REC. 13867-68.
43. Id. at 13868. Sen. Long's amendment would, as he stated, also prohibit firearm
possession by persons whose discharge from the military was other than honorable,
mental incompetents, illegal aliens and those who have renounced United States
citizenship. Id.




persons,45 the Senator stated that the proposed Title VII would take nothing
from the provisions of Title IV; rather, Title VII would "add to the fine work the
committee did in this area. '46 Several senators questioned the effect of the
proposed amendment and suggested that the amendment be studied further.
4 7
There was an unexpected call to vote upon the amendment, however, and the
amendment passed.48
The re-written bill, now including Title VII, was returned to the House, and
on June 5, 1968 the House overwhelmingly rejected the proposal for a
House-Senate conference.4 9 When the bill was considered on June 6, the
members of the House were faced with a choice of either accepting the
re-written bill as stated or rejecting the bill in its entirety. The House passed
the bill as amended by the Senate and the bill became law on June 19, 1968.50
Thus, unlike other Titles of the Omnibus Act,5 ' Title VII, introduced as a floor
amendment, became law without ever having undergone close committee
45. Id. at 13773-74. Sen. Long asserted that Congress had the power to prohibit
certain classes of people from possessing firearms by its power to regulate commerce.
Indeed, Congress ultimately grounded its power to enact Title VII in several provisions, as
set forth by the Congressional findings and declarations:
The Congress hereby finds and declares that the receipt, possession, or
transportation of a firearm by felons, veterans who are discharged under dishonorable
conditions, mental incompetents, aliens who are illegally in the country, and former
citizens who have renounced their citizenship, constitutes-
(1) a burden on commerce or threat affecting the free flow of commerce,
(2) a threat to the safety of the President of the United States and Vice
President of the United States,
(3) an impediment or threat to the exercise of free speech and the free exercise of
a religion guaranteed by the first amendment to the Constitution of the United
States, and
(4) a threat to the continued and effective operation of the Government of the
United States and of the government of each State guaranteed by article IV of the
Constitution.
18 U.S.C. app. section 1201 (1976).
46. 114 CONG. REc. 14774.
47. Sen. McClellan, Sen. Dodd and Sen. Dominick all suggested that the amendment
be studied further. Id. at 14774-75.
48. Id. at 14775.
49. The vote against a conference was 317-60. See id. at 16237. One of the reasons
for the failure of the bill to go to conference was a fear by congressmen that the would-be
chairman of the House conferees, Rep. Emanuel Cellar, would attempt to emasculate
certain provisions of the bill (specifically Titles I, II, and III) and strengthen Title IV. See,
e.g., id. at 16297 (remarks of Rep. Pollock); id. at 16237 (remarks of Rep. Kelly).
50. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197.
51. The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act initially was conceived as a law
enforcement assistance program to state and local governments (Title I). As the act grew
in scope to include eleven titles, much of the debate focused upon two controversial titles:
Title II, which dealt with the admissibility of confessions, and Title III, which concerned
wiretapping and electronic surveillance. See S. REP. No. 1097, reprinted in [1968] U.S.
CONG. CODE & AD. NEWS, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2112-2309; see, e.g., 114 CONG. REC. 16281
(remarks of Rep. Bingham suggesting that Titles II and III may be unconstitutional).
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scrutiny by either congressional body or having been the subject of negotiation
by a conference committee.
A. Prior Federal Courts' Interpretation of the
Legislative History
Faced with this meager legislative history, several courts prior to the Lewis
decision addressed the issue of legislative intent concerning the ambit of section
12 02(a). In United States v. Graves52 the Third Circuit held that Congress did
not intend to permit a gun control defendant to challenge his prior conviction on
due process grounds. The defendant in Graves was charged, inter alia, with
violating section 1202(a). At his gun control trial Graves sought to show that his
prior conviction was constitutionally violative of due process because of alleged
failures to comply with procedures for waiving juvenile court jurisdiction.53
After a lengthy consideration of the legislative history of the statutes,54 the
court found that Congress intended to impose gun control disabilities on those
with "outstanding convictions, even those alleged to be constitutionally
imperfect."5 Although the Graves court held that a prior conviction could not be
challenged at trial on due process grounds, the court intimated that it might
have ruled otherwise had the predicate conviction been challenged as violative
of the sixth amendment.
56
Other courts have disagreed with Graves-and have been unable to discover
a congressional intent from the legislative history of section 1202 to impose
firearm disabilities on persons convicted unconstitutionally. In Dameron v.
United States,57 the petitioner brought a habeas corpus action asserting that his
federal firearms conviction should be set aside because it was based on a prior
unconstitutional uncounselled conviction. The Fifth Circuit reversed the gun
control conviction, stating that the firearms prohibitions applied only to "those
who ha[d] been constitutionally convicted of a felony."58 The court found it
unnecessary to "look further than the statute to determine legislative intent,"
finding that "[t]he statute should explicitly set forth application to unconstitu-
tional convictions, if it is so intended. '59 Similarly, in United States v. Lufman,60
the Seventh Circuit refused to allow a defendant's 1202(a) conviction to stand
52. 554 F.2d 65 (3d Cir. 1977).
53. Id. at 67-68.
54. Id. at 73-76.
55. Id. at 78. The court also found that such a use was not unconstitutional, id. at
78-80, and did not run afoul of the Supreme Court's pronouncement in Burgett v. Texas,
389 U.S. 109 (1967); see text accompanying notes 71-78 infra.
56. 554 F.2d at 82 & n.68.
57. 488 F.2d 724 (5th Cir. 1974) (discussing 18 U.S.C. section 922(g)(1)).
58. Id. at 727 (emphasis in original).
59. Id.
60. 457 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1972).
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where the predicate conviction was obtained without the defendant's having had
the assistance of counsel.6'
Indeed, prior to Lewis the Supreme Court had examined the language and
legislative history of Title VII provisions. In United States v. Bass, 62 the
Supreme Court first encountered a question concerning section 1202 when it
was asked to determine whether, as an element of its case, the government
need establish a nexus between the receipt or possession of a firearm and
interstate commerce.6 3 Looking to the legislative history for guidance, the Court
found the materials "meager" and "inconclusive," noting that "'the legislative
history of [the] Act hardly speaks with that clarity of purpose which Congress
supposedly furnishes courts in order to enable them to enforce its true will.' "
Because the statute and its legislative history were ambiguous, the Court in
Bass utilized the lenity principle of statutory construction: An "ambiguity
concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of
lenity;"65 and "'when [a] choice has to be made between two readings of what
conduct Congress has made a crime, it is appropriate, before we choose the
harsher alternative, to require that Congress should have spoken in language
that is clear and definite.' ,66 Utilizing the lenity principle, the Court held that
the statute requires the government to prove a connection between the firearm
and interstate commerce as an element of a section 1202(a) prosecution.6 7
B. Analysis of the Court's Interpretation of the
Legislative History of Section 1202
The Lewis Court should have applied the statutory construction principle of
lenity because it is uncertain whether Congress intended that section 1202
apply to unconstitutional convictions. If anything emerges from examining the
61. Id. at 166-67; see also United States v. Thoresen, 428 F.2d 654 (9th Cir. 1970)(defendant at gun control trial who asserts constitutional invalidity of prior conviction
must be given a reasonable opportunity to establish such a contention).
62. 404 U.S. 336 (1971).
63. Section 1202(a) prohibits persons described in that subsection from "receiv[ing],
possess[ing], or transport[ing] in commerce or affecting commerce ... any firearm .. "
The government argued that the statute did not require proof of a connection with
interstate commerce in cases involving receipt or possession; rather, the "interstate
commerce" language referred only to the transporting offense. 404 U.S. at 338, 341-42.
64. Id. at 346 (citation omitted). The court also stated that "the various remarks by
legislators 'are sufficiently ambiguous . . . [as] to invite mutually destructive dialectic,'
and not much more." Id. (citation omitted). But see Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by
Burger, C.J., arguing that the legislative history clearly shows intent to prohibit all
possessions of firearms by felons, regardless of connection with interstate commerce. Id. at
353-56.
65. Id. at 347 (citations omitted). See also United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768,
778-79 (1979); Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814, 830-31 (1974).
66. 404 U.S. at 347-48, quoting United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 334
U.S. 218, 221-22 (1952); see also Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 580 (1977)
(Stewart, J., dissenting).
67. 404 U.S. at 347-49.
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language and legislative history of section 1202, and its interpretation by
courts, it is that no one can say with certainty what the congressional intent
was regarding the use of unconstitutional convictions as predicate convictions
for section 1202 offenses. 68 As used in section 1202(a), the word "convicted"
cannot mean any person who has suffered a conviction at any time because once
a person's conviction is vacated or reversed on appeal he is no longer deemed to
have been "convicted." Thus, the statute is ambiguous on its face. Once
statutory language is found to be ambiguous, statutory construction principles
mandate resort to the legislative history to discern the legislative intent.
69
Because the legislative history of section 1202(a) is not helpful and invites a
"Imutually destructive dialectic,' and not much more," 70 Lewis is a paradigm
case for application of the lenity rule. The doubt concerning definition of the
word "convicted" should have been resolved in favor of Lewis, 7 1 and construed to
exclude unconstitutional uncounselled convictions. Indeed, any interpretation of
the statute which would allow a conviction obtained in violation of Gideon v.
Wainwright to be used as an element of a gun control offense would "attribute to
Congress .. . a cavalier attitude toward one of the 'fundamental principles of
liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political
institutions.'
72
By not applying the lenity principle in Lewis, the Court seemingly deviated
from its prior interpretation of section 1202 in Bass.73 The Court in Bass found
68. See text accompanying notes 52-65 supra.
69. See J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §§ 237, 300
(1891).
70. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 346 (1971) (citation omitted).
71. "Where there is ambiguity in a criminal statute, doubts are resolved in favor of
the defendant." Id. at 348.
72. United States v. Lewis, 591 F.2d 978, 982 (4th Cir. 1979) (Winter, J., dissenting)
(citation omitted).
73. The Court has found it necessary to interpret section 1202 in other contexts. For
example, in Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563 (1977), the Court was faced with
the issue left open by Bass: if section 1202 requires that a nexus with interstate commerce
be shown, what is the extent of that nexus? Must the government prove that the firearm
was travelling in commerce at the time the defendant possessed it, or is it sufficient
merely to show that the firearm travelled in commerce at some prior time? The Court
found that only a minimal nexus need be shown, "that the firearm have been, at some
time, in interstate commerce." 431 U.S. at 575 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). Unlike
Bass, the Court found no reason to apply the lenity rule in construing section 1202 in this
context. Reading the words of section 1202, "in commerce or affecting commerce," the
Court found no "conflicting pull between the text and the history that confronted us in
Bass. In this case, the history is unambiguous and the text consistent with it. Congress
sought to reach possessions broadly, with little concern for when the nexus with commerce
occurred." 431 U.S. at 577.
The Court again faced construction of section 1202, and found no need to apply
the lenity principle, in United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114 (1979). Petitioner in
Batchelder was convicted under 18 U.S.C. section 922(h) of receiving a firearm after
having been previously convicted of a felony. See note 41 supra. Although such receipt
would also violate section 1202(a) and be punishable by a maximum term of two years
imprisonment, the petitioner was convicted under section 922(h) and sentenced under that
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section 1202 and its legislative history to be ambiguous and applied the lenity
rule for the benefit of the criminal defendant. 74 Although the specific statutory
language considered in Bass differed from that considered in Lewis, both Courts
considered the same statute with its same "meager" legislative history.75 If the
lenity rule, as applied to section 1202 in Bass, requires that, as an element of its
prosecution, the government must prove an "interstate nexus," not merely
"receipt" of the firearm, then surely the most basic element of a section 1202(a)
offense, the conviction, must be shown to be constitutional, not merely "of
record." It is incongruous to accord a defendant the "benefit of the doubt" for a
relatively minor element of a section 1202 charge but not for the gravamen of
the offense.76
C. The Statutory Exemption Argument
As support for its conclusion that Congress intended to include unconstitu-
tionally convicted persons within the scope of section 1202, and in support for its
holding that a "felon" may not collaterally attack his prior conviction at a gun
control trial, the Court referred to several statutory methods by which a
"convicted" felon could reacquire his privilege of possessing firearms. 77 The
Omnibus Act's firearm prohibitions do not apply to a convicted felon who (1) has
received a pardon which expressly authorizes him to possess a firearm, or (2)
has applied to the Secretary of the Treasury for relief from federal firearms
disabilities, and such relief has been granted.7 8 However, the mere fact that
Congress provided two exceptions to the act's coverage, i.e., two methods by
which a "convicted" person may reacquire the privilege to possess a firearm,
does not mean that these methods are the exclusive recourse of the "felon.
'79
Indeed, the act's relief provisions appear to provide redress to persons whose
section to the statutory maximum of five years imprisonment. Petitioner argued, inter
alia, that because the same conduct violated two provisions of the Gun Control Act the
Court should utilize the lenity principle and impose only the two year maximum sentence
permitted under section 1202. The Court rejected this argument finding "no ambiguity to
resolve," and that "Congress' clear understanding [was] that the two Titles would be
applied independently." 442 U.S. 121 (footnote omitted). See text accompanying note 46
supra, quoting remarks of Sen. Long.
74. 404 U.S. at 347-49.
75. See text accompanying notes 38-51 and text accompanying note 64, supra.
76. Another principle of statutory construction might have urged the Lewis court to
interpret section 1202 disabilities to apply only to constitutionally convicted felons. A
principle of statutory construction is that, where possible, courts should resolve issues on
statutory rather than constitutional grounds. See, e.g., Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth.,
297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331
U.S. 549, 568-71 (1946); see also Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 71 (1980) (Brennan,
J., dissenting). Because the Court found that Congress clearly intended to include
unconstitutional uncounselled convictions within the statutory term "convicted," the
Court then was forced to consider whether the use of such convictions was constitutional.
77. 435 U.S. at 64, 67; see also text and accompanying notes at notes 140 to 152 infra.
78. 18 U.S.C. app. section 1203(2) (1976); 18 U.S.C. section 925(c) (1976).
79. See 445 U.S. at 70 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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convictions are constitutional; the relief provisions do not address the situation
in which a person has been unconstitutionally convicted. Thus, the act's relief
provisions do not support the Court's assertion that Congress intended to
include unconstitutionally-convicted persons within the act's prohibition;
rather, it is more reasonable to infer that the use of unconstitutionally obtained
convictions as predicate offenses under section 1202 was not contemplated by
Congress when the act was drafted.
IV. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE USE OF AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL
UNCOUNSELLED CONVICTION AS A SECTION
1202 PREDICATE OFFENSE
Once the Court resolved the statutory question against the defendant, it
was compelled to resolve the constitutional issue: Is it constitutionally
permissible to use a prior unconstitutional, uncounselled conviction as an
element in a section 1202 prosecution?
The primary focus of the Court's constitutional argument was a line of cases
beginning with Burgett v. Texas.80 In Burgett the Supreme Court reversed the
conviction of a defendant tried under a state recidivist statute, where a portion
of the indictment read to the jury referred to prior convictions8 1 which facially
raised a presumption8 2 that the prior convictions were obtained without the
defendant having had the assistance of counsel. Justice Douglas, writing for the
Court, held that use of an unconstitutional, uncounselled conviction was
impermissible because "permit[ting] a conviction obtained in violation of Gideon
v. Wainwright to be used against a person either to support guilt or enhance
punishment for another offense is to erode the principle of that case. Worse yet,
since the defect in the prior conviction was denial of the right to counsel, the
accused in effect suffers anew from the deprivation of that Sixth Amendment
right."8 3 The Burgett rationale prohibiting the use of prior uncounselled
convictions to "support guilt or enhance punishment" subsequently was
extended by the Court, in United States v. Tucker,s4 to prohibit consideration of
unconstitutional uncounselled convictions for sentencing purposes; and, in Loper
v. Beto,s5 to prohibit the use of such invalid prior convictions to impeach the
credibility of the defendant.
80. 389 U.S. 109 (1967).
81. The indictment referred to four prior convictions. The record of one conviction
affirmatively indicated that the defendant was without counsel, id. at 112; evidence of
another conviction was stricken from the record as being void under state law, id. at
112-13; evidence of the other convictions indicated that the defendant appeared "in lroper
person," but failed to indicate if counsel was present or validly waived, id. at 112.
82. See id. at 114. The majority stated that "[piresuming waiver of counsel from a
silent record is impermissible." 389 U.S. at 114-15, citing Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S.
506 (1962).
83. Id. at 115 (emphasis supplied) (citations omitted).
84. 404 U.S. 443 (1972).
85. 405 U.S. 473 (1972) (plurality opinion).
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Using the rationale of Burgett and its progeny, Lewis argued that his prior
unconstitutional uncounselled felony conviction was "'void from the outset,"'
that it was "'not usable for any purpose,"' 8 6 and that to permit its use at his
section 1202 trial would deny him "again the protection of the Sixth
Amendment.,8 7 The majority, however, rejected this argument, stating that the
Court had "never suggested that an uncounselled conviction is invalid for all
purposes."8s Acknowledging that convictions in violation of Gideon may be too
unreliable to show guilt, enhance punishment, or impeach credibility,8 9 the
Court reiterated its belief that Congress could constitutionally rely upon such
convictions to prohibit the convicted person from possessing a firearm. 90 In his
dissent, Justice Brennan found Burgett and its progeny to be dispositive. He
argued that the government's use of the prior unconstitutional uncounselled
conviction, when proof of the prior conviction was a necessary element of the
government's case, was plainly a use "to support guilt" and thus a violation of
the Court's mandate in Burgett.91
Several questions emerge from the above conflict: (1) Is a conviction
obtained in violation of Gideon void for all purposes or merely voidable by some
affirmative action by the defendant; and (2) if it is unconstitutional to use an
unconstitutional uncounselled conviction as a predicate offense in a section 1202
prosecution, what specific provision of the Constitution is violated?
A. Is a Conviction in Violation of Gideon Void or Voidable?
The issue of whether a conviction obtained in violation of Gideon is void or
voidable is significant. A void judgment is "[o]ne which has no legal force or
effect, [the] invalidity of which may be asserted by any person whose rights are
affected at any time and at any place directly or collaterally - one which, from
its inception, is and forever continues to be absolutely null, without legal
efficacy."92 In contrast, a voidable judgment is "apparently valid, but in truth
wanting in some material aspect. '93 That which is voidable "operates to
accomplish the thing sought to be accomplished, until the fatal vice in the
transaction has been judicially ascertained and declared."94 Thus, a void
judgment has no effect from its inception, whereas a voidable judgment implies
that the person against whom the judgment was made must take some action to
render the effect of the judgment nugatory; until such action is taken, the
voidable conviction is entitled to recognition equal to that of a valid conviction.
Such a distinction is important as applied to Lewis because, if his conviction in
86. United States v. Lewis, 591 F.2d 978, 980 (1979).
87. Brief for Petitioner at 4.
88. 445 U.S. at 66-67.
89. See id. at 60.
90. Id. at 66.
91. Id. at 72 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
92. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1745 (4th ed. 1968) (citations omitted).
93. Id. at 1746 (citation omitted).
94. Id.
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violation of Gideon is viewed as void, a position urged by the dissent,95 Lewis
need not make any effort to expunge the prior conviction and the government
would be prohibited from using the conviction against him in a 1202
prosecution. The majority, however, rejected the view that a conviction in
violation of Gideon is "void from the outset '96 and intimated that Lewis should
have taken steps to have his prior conviction invalidated.
9 7
The Court's pronouncement that a conviction in violation of Gideon is not
"invalid for all purposes," i.e., that it is not void, but only voidable by some
affirmative action of the defendant, is squarely at odds with the Burgett line of
cases. In Burgett the Court noted that "the certified records of the
[prior] . . . conviction on their face raise a presumption that the petitioner was
denied his right to counsel in the [prior] . . . proceeding, and therefore that his
conviction was void."9s If an unconstitutional uncounselled conviction is void, as
opposed to being merely voidable, it is viewed as no conviction at all. Indeed,
several circuit courts have used this rationale in deciding that unconstitutional
uncounselled convictions are void. In United States v. Lufman9 9 the Seventh
Circuit reversed the section 1202(a) conviction of a defendant whose prior
conviction was obtained without counsel, holding that the prior conviction was
"presumptively void"100 and "infirm from its incipiency,"'' and thus the
defendant "was not a convicted felon at the time of possession."'1 2 The court
noted that because the prior conviction was "infirm from its incipiency" the
defendant had no burden to vindicate himself of his prior invalid conviction. 10 3
The Fifth Circuit adopted a view similar to that of Lufman in Dameron v.
United States.'0 4 There the court stated that "a conviction in violation of Gideon
is void, and not a conviction at all. It cannot be judicially used for any
purpose."'10 5 Other circuits also have held unconstitutional uncounselled convic-
tions to be void and unusable in prosecutions for federal firearms offenses and
other criminal matters.1
0 6
A further reason for viewing unconstitutional uncounselled convictions as
void and unusable for any purpose is apparent from examining the rationale for
95. 445 U.S. at 71 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 66-67.
97. Id. at 64-65, 67.
98. 389 U.S. at 114 (emphasis added).
99. 457 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1972).
100. Id. at 168, citing Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 115 (1967).
101. 457 F.2d at 168, citing United States ex rel. Smith v. Fay, 409 F.2d 564, 566 (2d
Cir. 1969).
102. 457 F.2d at 168 (footnote omitted).
103. Id. at n.3.
104. 488 F.2d 724 (5th Cir. 1974).
105. Id. at 727 (dictum) (citations omitted). In Dameron, the defendant took action to
have his prior unconstitutional uncounselled conviction voided. The point remains,
however, that once this prior conviction was rendered void, it was retroactively judicially
unusable.
106. See United States v. Pricepaul, 540 F.2d 417 (1976) (where gun control defendant
alleges prior conviction was based upon involuntary guilty plea, trial court must
determine validity of the plea); Pasterchik v. United States, 466 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1972)
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holding that the rule of Gideon applies retroactively.' 0 7 By applying Gideon
retroactively, the Court acknowledged that lack of counsel casts doubt upon the
accuracy of such a trial. l0 8 Indeed, "the bedrock of the principle of retroactive
application is that the defendant would not have been convicted if he had
counsel."' 0 9 Surely then, a conviction in violation of Gideon should be unusable
in a section 1202 trial if its integrity is of dubious, if any, value.
The majority cited two cases, Scott v. Illinois"0° and Loper v. Beto,i1 to
support its conclusion that unconstitutional uncounselled convictions are not
invalid for all purposes. In Scott, the indigent petitioner was convicted of
shoplifting and fined $50. He appealed his conviction arguing that he had a
right to have counsel appointed. The Court held that a state trial court is not
constitutionally required to appoint counsel for an indigent criminal defendant
who is charged with an offense for which imprisonment upon conviction is
authorized, but not imposed. 112 In the second case cited by the Lewis court,
Loper v. Beto, 3 the Court found that due process was violated where prior
convictions, constitutionally invalidated by Gideon, were used to impeach a
defendant's credibility." 4 A footnote in Loper, cited in the Lewis opinion,
acknowledged that Loper's prior convictions were not used to rebut specific false
statements from the witness stand; rather, they were used to impeach the
(where prior conviction is vacated on constitutional grounds, gun control conviction also
must be vacated); United States v. DuShane, 435 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1970) (where record of
prior uncounselled conviction failed to show whether counsel was waived, trial judge at
gun control trial must hold evidentiary hearing on the waiver issue); United States v.
Thoresen, 428 F.2d 654 (9th Cir. 1970) (gun control defendant is entitled to establish that
his prior conviction was uncounselled, and therefore invalid); Williams v. Coiner, 392 F.2d
210 (4th Cir. 1968) (in sentencing under a recidivist statute court must determine that, at
the time of the prior convictions, defendant was informed of his right to counsel); cf.
United States v. Martinez, 413 F.2d 61 (7th Cir. 1969) (alleged involuntary guilty plea,
based upon ineffective assistance of counsel, may not be used to increase punishment for
narcotics offense); Beto v. Stacks, 408 F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1969) (where prior conviction was
obtained in violation of the fourth amendment, it may not be used to enhance
punishment). But see United States v. Allen, 556 F.2d 720 (1977) (prior conviction may not
be attacked on grounds of denial of counsel in trial for making a false statement to procure
a firearm); United States v. Maggard, 573 F.2d 926 (6th Cir. 1978) (gun control defendant
may not attack prior conviction on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel).
107. See note 8 supra.
108. See cases cited in note 138 infra.
109. Dameron v. United States, 488 F.2d 724, 727 (5th Cir. 1974). Indeed, "in each of
the . . . areas in which [the Court] ha[s] applied [its] rule retrospectively the
principle . . . applied went to the fairness of the trial - the very integrity of the
fact-finding process." Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 639 (1965) (emphasis added)
(footnote omitted).
110. 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
111. 405 U.S. 473 (1972) (plurality opinion).
112. 440 U.S. at 373-74.
113. 405 U.S. 473 (1972) (plurality opinion).
114. Id. at 483.
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defendant's general character and credibility.'1 5 The Lewis Court apparently
read this footnote as broadly implying that a prior uncounselled conviction
might be usable to rebut a specific false statement made by a defendant.
It is clear that neither Scott nor Loper supports Lewis' use of an
unconstitutional uncounselled conviction as an element of a section 1202
offense. Scott merely demarks the point at which the right to counsel attaches' 16
not whether an unconstitutional uncounselled conviction is usable for some
purpose. It held that only indigent misdemeanor defendants who are both
convicted and sentenced to imprisonment have the right to court appointed
counsel. 1 17 Conviction of a misdemeanor with no sentence of imprisonment is a
constitutional uncounselled conviction. Lewis involves an unconstitutional
uncounselled conviction. In addition, Scott only dealt with misdemeanor
defendants and the section 1202 prohibition is against convicted felons,
therefore Scott does not apply to Lewis.
The Loper footnote cited by the Lewis majority merely held open the
possibility that a prior uncounselled conviction might be usable to rebut false
testimony." 8 Lewis did not involve the issue of rebutting false testimony.
Loper actually supports the dissent in Lewis because Loper held that due process
prevents the use of an unconstitutional uncounselled conviction to impeach the
credibility of the defendant." 9 If due process prohibits the use of an unconstitu-
tional uncounselled conviction against a criminal defendant for impeachment
purposes, then it is even more fundamentally unfair to permit the same
conviction to be used against the same defendant to supply an element of the
offense with which the defendant is charged. 20
B. Constitutional Bases for Asserting That an Unconstitutional
Uncounselled Conviction Cannot be Used as a
Section 1202 Predicate Offense
The second question born by the constitutional arguments in Lewis is what,
if any, constitutional provisions would be violated if the government used a
conviction obtained in violation of Gideon as a predicate felony in a section 1202
prosecution?
1. The Right to Counsel
Lewis argued that by using his prior unconstitutional uncounselled
conviction he would, in the words of Burgett, be "denied anew"'121 his right to
counsel. Because he was denied counsel at his prior felony trial, the use of that
115. Id. at 482 n.ll.
116. 440 U.S. at 373-74.
117. Id.
118. 405 U.S. at 482 n.11.
119. Id. at 483.
120. See Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109 (1967).
121. Brief for Petitioner at 9, quoting Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 325 (1967).
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conviction would violate his sixth amendment right to counsel again at his
1202(a) trial.
Gideon held that an indigent defendant in a felony prosecution has the
right to court-appointed counsel because an ordinary layman is not able to
competently defend himself against a skilled prosecutor, even if he is
innocent.1 22 Because the lack of counsel affects the integrity of the truth-
determining process, Gideon has been held to be retroactive.123 Lewis was
convicted of breaking and entering in violation of Gideon at his first trial. 124 In
his second trial, Lewis was convicted of possession of a handgun because he had
been previously convicted of a felony. Lewis had no adequate means to defend
himself at his first trial125 and no adequate means to defend himself as to a
necessary element of the second prosecution, that of the predicate felony
conviction. In effect, Lewis was denied counsel as to an element of the section
1202 offense; the defect in the initial conviction carried over to the subsequent
prosecution.
2. Due Process
Although the sixth amendment argument follows logically from the Court's
holding in Burgett,12 additional arguments can be made by reference to other
constitutional provisions. Chief Justice Warren's concurrence in Burgett focused
upon "the constitutionally protected right of a criminal defendant to a fair and
unpartial trial."' 7 The Chief Justice stated that "we are presented in this case
with a violation of due process."'12 Indeed, the use of an unconstitutional
uncounselled prior conviction at a subsequent trial seems more clearly at
constitutional odds with notions of fifth amendment due process and "fun-
damental fairness" than it does with the sixth amendment.' 29 It seems more
fundamentally unfair to allow a prior uncounselled conviction to supply a
necessary element of a statutory offense than to permit the conviction to be
used as mere evidence either "to support guilt" (prohibited by Burgett)13 , or to
impeach credibility (prohibited by Loper)3 . Moreover, in Lewis, the defendant
122. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963).
123. See note 8 supra.
124. See note 14 supra.
125. See note 121 supra.
126. See 389 U.S. at 115-16. Justice Douglas' majority opinion focused solely upon the
sixth amendment; his concern was that to allow the subsequent use of the prior
uncounselled convictions would cause Gideon "to suffer serious erosion." Id. at 116.
127. Id. at 116-17 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
128. Id. at 119 n.4 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
129. This does not mean to say that there is no sixth amendment violation when the
prior uncounselled conviction is used; rather, that the denial of counsel at the first trial
and the resultant assertion of a sixth amendment violation at the second trial appears
more tenuous in connection than would an allegation of violation of fifth amendment due
process.
130. 389 U.S. 109 (1967).
131. 405 U.S. 473 (1972) (plurality opinion).
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had already once been convicted and imprisoned in violation of his constitution-
al rights. To subject the defendant again to the risk of conviction and




It can be argued that the classification scheme embodied in section 1202
lacks the rational basis required by the equal protection concepts of the fifth
amendment. 133 According to the majority's interpretation of section 1202(a),
Congress distinguished unconstitutionally convicted persons from the populace
at large, imposing firearm disabilities on the former, but not the latter. The
Court found this distinction to be consonant with fifth amendment equal
protection concepts, stating that "Congress could rationally conclude that any
felony conviction, even an allegedly invalid one, is a sufficient basis on which to
prohibit the possession of a firearm."'
134
The Court's pronouncement that the classification scheme does not violate
equal protection merits critical examination. Generally, to pass equal protection
muster, there must be a "rational basis" for a statute's classification scheme, 135
or the classifications must have some relevance to the purpose for which they
are made.'36 Because the purpose of section 1202(a) is to keep firearms away
from "potentially irresponsible and dangerous"'37 people, any statutory classi-
fication must be rationally related to this end. The Court many times has
recognized that the denial of counsel "impeaches the very integrity of the
fact-finding process;' 138 uncounselled convictions are not reliable indicators of
guilt. Because "the absence of counsel impairs the reliability of a felony
conviction just as much when used to prove potential dangerousness as when
used as direct proof of guilt,' 139 there is no rational basis for including persons
convicted in violation of Gideon within the class of dangerous persons who
132. See Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. at 483; cf. Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 116-17
(1967) (Warren, C.J. concurring).
133. The equal protection clause is part of the fourteenth amendment, however, the
due process clause of the fifth amendment has been held to embody the concept of equal
protection. See, e.g., Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417, 422 (1974).
134. 445 U.S. at 66.
135. Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948). As noted by the Court, the "rational
basis" test is used, not the "strict scrutiny" test, because legislative reliance upon convict
status has been held not to be a suspect classification. 445 U.S. at 65 n.8. For a concise
discussion of the two tests, see P. FREUND, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND OTHER
PROBLEMS 1914-16 (4th ed. 1977).
136. See Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417, 422 (1974), cited in Lewis v. United
States, 445 U.S. at 65.
137. 445 U.S. at 65, quoting Barrett v. United States, 423 U.S. 212, 218 (1970); see also
114 CONG. REC. 14773 (1968) (Remarks of Sen. Long).
138. 445 U.S. at 72 (Brennan, J., dissenting), citing Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S.
618, 639 (1965); Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 341 (1978); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407
U.S. 25, 31 (1972); see text at notes 107-09 supra.
139. 445 U.S. at 72 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
1981]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
should be denied the right to possess firearms. Therefore, the use of such a
conviction in a section 1202(a) trial violates the equal protection concepts of the
fifth amendment.
V. EXCLUSIVITY OF STATUTORY RELIEF FROM
UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONVICTIONS
The government argued that because Lewis never applied for relief from
gun control disabilities as provided in the statute, 140 and because he never
collaterally attacked his prior conviction, he should not be allowed to challenge
his prior conviction at the section 1202 proceeding.1 41  Neither argument,
however, satisfactorily resolves the problems in Lewis. The government stated
that Lewis should have obtained a statutory exemption from gun control
disabilities by either securing a section 1203(2) pardon from the Florida
governor expressly authorizing him to possess a firearm 4 2 or by applying to the
Secretary of the Treasury for relief from gun control disabilities pursuant to
§ 925(c). 143 While both these alternatives in theory were available to Lewis, the
argument assumes its conclusion: Persons convicted in violation of Gideon are
prohibited from possessing firearms. Again, the questions remain as to
congressional intent,'4 4 constitutionality 14  and the status of convictions
obtained in violation of Gideon.
1 46
140. See 18 U.S.C. section 925(c) (1976); 18 U.S.C. app. section 1203(2) (1976); see also
text and accompanying notes at notes 77-79 supra.
141. Brief for Respondent at 32-34.
142. 18 U.S.C. app. section 1203 (1976) provides in part:
This title shall not apply to-
(2) any person who has been pardoned by the President of theUnited States or the
chief executive of a State and has been expressly authorized by the President or
such chief executive, as the case may be, to receive, possess, or transport in
commerce a firearm.
143. 18 U.S.C. section 925(c) (1976) provides in part:
A person who has been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a
term exceeding one year . . . may make application to the Secretary for relief from
the disabilities imposed by the Federal laws with respect to the acquisition, receipt,
transfer, shipment, or possession of firearms and incurred by reason of such
conviction, and the Secretary may grant such relief if it is established to his
satisfaction that the circumstances regarding the conviction, and the applicant's
record and reputation, are such that the applicant will not be likely to act in a manner
dangerous to public safety and that the granting of the relief would not be contrary to
the public interest ...
The relief provision of section 925 has been held applicable to section 1202 because under
section 925 the secretary may grant relief from any disabilities imposed "by federal laws,"
thus encompassing section 1202 disabilities. United States v. Graves, 554 F.2d 65, 72 (3d
Cir. 1977).
144. See text accompanying notes 38-67 supra.
145. See accompanying notes 65-76, 80-91, 121-39 supra.
146. See text accompanying notes 92-120 supra.
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The argument that Lewis should have collaterally attacked his prior
conviction at a date prior to his gun control trial is even weaker than the
statutory exemption argument. Lewis could not have attacked his prior
conviction on direct appeal because his conviction was pre-Gideon, thus he had
no enforceable right to counsel at that point.'4 7 It is unclear whether Lewis
could have secured the benefits of Gideon's retroactivity in a habeas corpus
action 148 because by the time Gideon was decided and held retroactive 149 Lewis
may no longer have been deemed to be in custody.1"' The only other way for
Lewis to have collaterally attacked his prior conviction would have been to
initiate coram nobis' 5' proceedings in the Florida court in which he was
convicted, after Gideon was held retroactive. Whether such action is required
depends upon whether there is an affirmative duty incumbent upon a convict to
vindicate himself and also whether the prior conviction is void or merely
voidable. At least one court has stated that under such conditions a person need
not pursue coram nobis remedies because the prior conviction is void. 152
VI. Administration of Criminal Justice Considerations
A major concern expressed by Justice Blackmun in the majority opinion, 153
and by circuit courts in similar cases,' 54 is the effect upon trial procedure were a
defendant allowed to defend at a prosecution under section 1202 by contesting
the constitutionality of his prior conviction. The Lewis majority feared that the
government would be routinely required to prove the constitutionality of the
147. Lewis' prior felony conviction in Florida occurred in March of 1961. Gideon was
not decided until March of 1963. Prior to Gideon the constitutional rule followed was that
announced in Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), that a state's refusal to appoint counsel
for an indigent felony defendant did not violate the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.
148. See 28 U.S.C. sections 2254, 2255 (1976).
149. See note 8 supra; Pickelsimer v. Wainwright, 375 U.S. 2 (1963).
150. Lewis was sentenced to a term of six months to four years, Appendix at 10, but
there is no indication of how much time he actually served.
Lewis need not actually be in prison to receive the benefits of federal habeas corpus.
See Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963) (prisoner released on parole is "in custody"
for federal habeas corpus purposes); see also Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968)
(where jurisdiction has attached in district court by the filing of a habeas corpus petition,
such jurisdiction will not be defeated by petitioner's release prior to the completion of the
proceedings on the application). For a further discussion of "custody" requirements see
Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1038, 1072-93 (1970).
151. See generally, 18 AM. JUR. 2D Coram Nobis §§ 1-29 (1965); United States v.
Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 (1954) (prisoner convicted by state and sentenced to a longer term
as a second offender because of a prior federal conviction, was entitled to attempt to show,
by motion for writ of error coram nobis, that the prior conviction should be set aside on
ground that his constitutional right to counsel had been violated).
152. See United States v. Lufman, 457 F.2d 165, 168 n.3 (7th Cir. 1972).
153. See 445 U.S. at 63, 67.
154. See, e.g., United States v. Lewis, 591 F.2d 978, 980-81 (4th Cir. 1979); United
States v. Maggard, 573 F.2d 926, 929 (6th Cir. 1978); United States v. Graves, 554 F.2d
65, 83 (3d Cir. 1977).
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predicate conviction whenever the defendant chose to challenge its validity. 55 It
feared that such a system would create a "new form of collateral attack.' 5 6
There are several responses to the problem posed by the Court. One
solution, suggested by the circuit court dissent in Lewis, is to allow the
defendant to introduce the record of the prior conviction at the 1202 trial and
determine from that record whether or not the defendant was afforded the
assistance of counsel.' If the record affirmatively showed that the defendant
lacked counsel, 5 8 or if the record was silent," 9 the invalidity of the prior
conviction would be established and the defense would be complete. Conversely,
if the record showed that counsel was present the defense would fail. The
important point, however, is that in either case the dispute could be resolved
simply by examining the record of the prior conviction without the necessity of
engaging in the "trial-within-a-trial" feared by the Court. 6 °
Another method for dealing with constitutional challenges to prior convic-
tions is to have a pretrial chambers hearing on the issue. This procedure, as
described in People v. Coffey,16 ' would require that the defendant allege facts
which, if true, would render the prior conviction constitutionally infirm; after
the prosecution has shown that the defendant was indeed convicted, the
defendant would have the burden of proving that the prior conviction was
unconstitutional by a preponderance of the evidence. After hearing the
arguments of both sides, the judge must decide whether the prior conviction is
constitutionally valid; if it is not, it is excluded. 6 2 Such a procedure has several
155. 445 U.S. at 67.
156. Id. This line of reasoning has been characterized by one judge as "utterly
specious" because "[tihe defendant is not initiating a collateral attack. He is only asking to
be left alone." United States v. Graves, 554 F.2d 65, 90 (3d Cir. 1977) (Gibbons, J.,
dissenting).
157. 591 F.2d at 984-85 (Winter, J., dissenting).
158. E.g., Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 112 (1967).
159. E.g., United States v. Lufman, 457 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v.
DuShane, 435 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1970); United States v. Thoresen, 428 F.2d 654 (9th Cir.
1970); cf. United States v. Pricepaul, 540 F.2d 417 (9th Cir. 1976) (record did not
affirmatively show that guilty plea was voluntary).
It has been held that where the record of a prior conviction is silent as to the
presence of counsel it will be presumed that the defendant's sixth amendment rights were
violated; one may not presume a valid waiver of counsel from a silent record. Burgett v.
Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 114-15 (1967); Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516 (1962).
160. See United States v. Lewis, 591 F.2d 978, 984 (4th Cir. 1979) (Winter, J.,
dissenting). This process would be particularly appropriate in Lewis' case where the
alleged constitutional infirmity is lack of counsel, a fact which should be verifiable by
looking solely to the record of the conviction. Where, however, the alleged constitutional
infirmity may not be patent on the fact of the prior conviction, e.g., United States v.
Graves, 554 F.2d 65 (3d Cir. 1975) (claim that prior conviction violated due process where
state juvenile official waived juvenile jurisdiction and permitted defendant to be tried as
an adult), such a cursory facial inspection of the record may not suffice.
161. 60 Cal. Rptr. 457, 430 P.2d 15 (1967); see Note, The Evidentiary Use of
Constitutionally Defective Prior Convictions, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1168, 1173 (1968).
162. 60 Cal. Rptr. at 465-66, 430 P.2d 23-24.
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advantages: First, it places the burden of proof of constitutional irregularity on
the defendant, and thus alleviates the concern "that the Government, at any
time a defendant chooses to raise the issue lof an unconstitutional prior
conviction], would be obligated to prove in a firearms prosecution that the
underlying felony conviction was free of constitutional error. ' 16 3 Under a
Coffey-type proceeding, the defendant would have to affirmatively allege and
prove the unconstitutionality of the prior conviction; the defendant bears the
risk of non-persuasion. Another positive aspect of this type of hearing is that the
defendant must affirmatively act; unless he challenges and brings forward
evidence of constitutional infirmity, the prior conviction is presumed constitu-
tional. However, placing the burden on the defendant of proving the unconstitu-
tionality of his prior conviction is of questionable constitutionality.164
A third method for dealing with constitutional challenges to prior
convictions was suggested in United States v. McDowell. 1 5 A McDowell
proceeding, somewhat of a variation of the Coffey procedure, would also place
upon the defendant the burden of raising the unconstitutionality of the prior
conviction. Once the defendant has set forth a prima facie case of the prior
conviction's unconstitutionality, the burden of persuasion shifts to the govern-
ment to show that the prior conviction was not unconstitutional.1 66 As in the
Coffey procedure, the McDowell type of proceeding would not burden the
government with routinely proving the constitutionality of the predicate
conviction; rather, the government would assume the burden of showing
163. United States v. Lewis, 591 F.2d 978, 980 (4th Cir. 1979).
164. It is questionable whether placing such a burden on the defendant would comport
with due process. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) ("Lest there remain any
doubt about the constitutional stature of the reasonable-doubt standard, we explicitly hold
that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof
beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is
charged."); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975) (Maine law requiring defendant to
establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he acted in the heat of passion in
order to reduce murder to manslaughter held unconstitutional. "[Tihe Due Process Clause
requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of the heat of
passion on sudden provocation when the issue is properly presented in a homicide case."
421 U.S. at 704.). But see Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977) (New York law
requiring defendant in a prosecution for second-degree murder prove by a preponderance
of the evidence the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance in order to reduce
the crime to manslaughter does not violate the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.); Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952) (Oregon statute requiring criminal
defendant prove insanity beyond a reasonable doubt, where such defense is raised, does
not violate the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment). See generally McLane,
The Burden of Proof in Criminal Cases: Mullaney and Patterson Compared, 15 CRIM. L.
BULL. 346 (1979); Allen, Mullaney v. Wilbur, The Supreme Court, and the Substantive
Criminal Law - An Examination of the Limits of Legitimate Intervention, 55 TEX. L. REV.
269 (1977).
165. 328 F. Supp. 606 (W.D. Pa. 1971).
166. Id. at 608-09; see also United States v. Cavataio, 425 F. Supp. 1250 (D. Mich.
1977) (same procedure used when challenging constitutionality of prior conviction at
section 922(h)(1) trial); Note, Prior Convictions and the Gun Control Act of 1968, 76
COLUM. L. REV. 326, 338-39 & n.67 (1976).
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constitutionality only after the defendant has made out a prima facie case.
Indeed, the McDowell burden-shifting procedure is not unknown in criminal
law. It is analogous to the presumptions and burden-shifting utilized in
instances where a defendant raises an insanity defense.1" 7
Assuming that a 1202 defendant is permitted to challenge his prior
conviction as void under the sixth amendment, in addition to the concern about
a "trial-within-a-trial, 168 the fear exists that such a procedure would permit
prior convictions to be challenged on other constitutional grounds as well. 1 69
This problem can again be solved by an analogy to the retroactivity
rationale,17 ° i.e., allow constitutional challenges where the alleged constitution-
al violation at the prior proceeding would cast grave doubt upon "the very
integrity of the [prior] fact-finding process." 171 Therefore, because Gideon found
the assistance of counsel at felony trials to be indispensible to the accuracy of
the prior conviction, a violation of the retroactively applied rule of Gideon172
would be challengeable at the 1202 proceeding; on the other hand, a challenge
to the prior conviction based upon the failure to exclude evidence seized in
violation of the fourth amendment, for example, would not be challengeable




It is ironic that because Lewis was convicted, imprisoned, and released
before Gideon was decided, his conviction may be used as a predicate offense
under section 1202; had he been imprisoned at the time Gideon was decided, he
would have been released upon a proper habeas corpus petition because Gideon
167. See, e.g., Government of Virgin Islands v. Bellott, 495 F.2d 1393 (3d Cir. 1974).
Although the burden of proving insanity may rest upon the defendant, the prosecution
still retains the burden of proving all necessary elements of guilt, including premeditation
and deliberation. Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
168. See United States v. Lewis, 591 F.2d 978, 981 (4th Cir. 1979) quoting U.S. v.
Graves, 554 F.2d 65, 83 (3d Cir. 1977).
169. A prior conviction might be attacked on grounds that it was the result of a coerced
confession, an unlawful search and seizure, or a violation of due process. See, e.g., United
States v. Graves, 554 F.2d 65 (3d Cir. 1977) (prior conviction allegedly obtained in
violation of fourteenth amendment due process).
170. See generally Rossum, New Rights and Old Wrongs: The Supreme Court and the
Problem of Retroactivity, 23 EMORY L. J. 381 (1974); Note, The Evidentiary Use of
Constitutionally Defective Prior Convictions, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1168 (1968).
171. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 639 (1965); see also Fuller v. Alaska, 393 U.S.
80, 81 (1968); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297-300 (1967); Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S.
406, 426 (1966).
172. See note 8 supra.
173. The rule of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), that evidence seized in violation of
a person's fourth and fourteenth amendment rights must be excluded at trial, was held not
to be retroactive in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965), because the primary
purpose of the Mapp exclusionary rule was to deter police misconduct, not to insure the
"integrity of the fact-finding process."
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was held to be retroactive1 7' 4 and his conviction could not be used as a section
1202 predicate offense. 175 Because law enforcement and judicial officials are
cognizant of the Gideon mandate, (an indigent person is entitled to the
appointment of counsel unless he is convicted of a misdemeanor and not
sentenced to imprisonment), there probably would be few cases in which a 1202
defendant would contest the validity of his prior conviction on right to counsel
grounds. Indeed, only in rare cases, like Lewis, where the accused had not
received the benefits of the retroactive application of Gideon, would such a
defense arise.176 Thus, with the prospect of such a limited number of collateral
attacks in a 1202 proceeding, along with notions of fundamental fairness, the
Court should have permitted Lewis to attack the validity of his prior conviction.
Furthermore, because no court had denied a 1202(a) defendant the right to
collaterally attack his prior conviction as violative of Gideon, from the date of
the enactment of section 1202 until Lewis,1 77 it seems harsh to do so at this
point absent a "clear and definite" direction from Congress. 178 On the other
hand, there was probably no reliance on the lower court decisions that permitted
potential criminal defendants such as Lewis to attack their prior unconstitution-
al uncounselled conviction. Even so, allowing a defendant in Lewis' situation to
show that he was denied counsel at his prior trial seems justified by the
statute, 179 required by the Constitution,18 0 and need not involve a routine
"trial-within-a-trial."'' 1
174. See note 8 supra.
175. See United States v. Lewis, 445 U.S. at 60-61 n.5 (1980).
176. Lewis' situation is uncommon in that his challenge is to a predicate conviction
that pre-dates Gideon. As one commentator notes, "it seems likely that the number of
challenges courts must hear should decline as the population of victims of pre-Gideon
violations decreases." Comment, The Use of Prior Uncounselled Convictions in Federal
Gun Control Prosecutions: United States v. Lewis, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1790, 1799 (1979).
177. See text and accompanying notes at notes 24-25 supra.
178. See text and accompanying note at note 66 supra.
179. See text and accompanying notes at notes 38-79 supra.
180. See text and accompanying notes at notes 121-139 supra.
181. See text and accompanying notes at notes 153-172 supra.
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TIMES DEFAMATION CASES - Berkey v. Delia
In Berkey v. Delia,' the Court of Appeals of Maryland addressed the
question whether it was proper to grant summary judgment in a defamation
suit brought by a public official. 2 Finding that the propriety of such a practice
was doubtful, especially when the credibility of the movant for summary
disposition was at issue,3 the court held that it must deny summary judgment
because genuine disputes of material fact existed which made a jury trial
necessary.4 Additionally, the court defined the burden of proof that a public
official would bear at a trial on the merits,5 and it expressed some reluctance
over finding low level government employees to be public officials for the
purpose of a defamation suit.
6
Private Gregory Delia of the Prince George's County Police Department
stopped psychiatrist Barry Berkey, M.D., for speeding while the Berkey family
was driving through Maryland. 7 Delia drove up behind Berkey's car, and
because it was after sunset, directed high intensity lights atop his patrol car
towards Berkey's car. s While Delia was issuing the speeding ticket, Berkey
told Delia that the lights were "blinding" him and asked Delia to turn them
off or deflect them. Delia refused to do so. Although the facts are disputed as to
exactly what occurred during the traffic stop, an altercation between Berkey
and Delia clearly ensued.' Five days later Berkey wrote to his attorney, to
Delia's superior officer, and to the local State District Court judge, complaining
about Delia's actions.1 ° Berkey repeated his complaint orally to the officer
1. 287 Md. 302, 413 A.2d 170 (1980).
2. See id. at 324-27, 413 A.2d at 180-82.
3. Id. at 332, 413 A.2d at 185.
4. Id., 413 A.2d at 184.
5. The court held that a public official must adduce clear and convincing proof of
knowing or reckless falsity. Id. at 317-18, 413 A.2d at 177.
6. Id. at 322-23, 413 A.2d at 179-80.
7. Id. at 306, 413 A.2d at 172.
8. Id. at 306-07, 413 A.2d at 172-73. The location of the patrol car was a factual
inference established by the court for purposes of disposing of Berkey's motion for
summary judgment. Delia stated that he was parked behind Berkey's car, whereas Berkey
failed to comment upon the location of the patrol car. See id. at 336, 413 A.2d at 186-87
(Eldridge, J., dissenting). When the facts are disputed, the court will resolve all inferences
against the party moving for summary judgment. See note 53 and accompanying text
infra. Moreover, for purposes of summary adjudication, undisputed facts are accepted as
true or may be stipulated as such. MD. R. P. 610(d)(4).
9. Compare 287 Md. at 307-08, 413 A.2d at 172 (Berkey's letter) and id. at 310, 413
A.2d at 173-74 (Berkey's deposition) with id. at 309, 413 A.2d at 173 (Delia's deposition).
10. Berkey's letter, in pertinent part, is set out below:
This is to request an investigation on Private Gregory Delia. The reason for this
request has to do with the officer's behavior when he stopped my car by signalling
with lights flashing from his patrol car. He asked for my license and automobile
registration but gave me no reason (until asked); he had high power spot lights
directed at my car and upon request, he refused to deflect or turn them off. After
(638)
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assigned to investigate the incident." On the basis of Berkey's complaints,
Delia filed suit for defamation. The first count of his declaration was in libel and
was based on the letter Berkey sent to Delia's superior officer and the District
Court judge. The second count was in slander and was based on the statements
Berkey made to the investigating officer. 2
After extensive discovery procedures, 13 Berkey moved for summary judg-
ment on the ground that because there was no genuine dispute as to any issue of
writing up the summons, he refused to repeat his inaudible instructions and insisted I
sign the summons immediately or that he would "take me in." Private Delia kept the
high powered lights directed into my wife's eyes, my twelve year old son's eyes and my
own - while he kept his back toward the beam. (I couldn't identify Private Delia if
my life depended on it because of the blinding light).
I regard his behavior as abnormally cruel and inhumane, rude and insensitive,
threatening and punative [sic]. I neither look nor behave like a fugitive, but I, as well
as my wife and son, were treated by Private Delia as such.
Partly because of my professional background and training, I question if this
young officer is mentally deranged, if he is psychopathic and/or pathologically
sadistic. This letter is to formally request a mental evaluation of Private Delia ....
287 Md. at 307-08, 413 A.2d at 172 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
Delia disputed three of the assertions made in Berkey's letter. He claimed that he did
not refuse to repeat his instructions to Berkey, that he did not insist that Berkey sign the
summons immediately, and that he did not direct the lights on his patrol car into the eyes
of Berkey, his wife, and his son. See Brief for Appellee at 13. In addition, Delia disputed
three of the assertions made in Berkey's deposition. Berkey claimed that Delia answered,
"No!" in a "rather harsh and direct way," in response to Berkey's request to turn down or
deflect the lights. Delia, however, alleged he said: "No, sir. They are on for your safety and
mine. I am not going to turn them off." Berkey also claimed that in response to his
statement that he did not need Ielia's flashlight pointing into his glove compartment,
Delia replied, "Can't be too careful with people like you." This statement allegedly made
by Delia, as well as Berkey's allegation that Delia said, "I don't have all night," when
Berkey was looking for his driver's license and registration, was missing from Delia's
version of the incident. See id. at 14. However, while these contradictions between
Berkey's and Delia's depositions may be important to test the credibility of each party at
trial, they are not relevant to the disputed letter on a summary judgment motion because
Delia is suing on the allegedly libelous statements contained in the letter, not Berkey's
deposition. For a discussion of the absolute immunity from defamation that attaches to a
litigant's statements in a judicial proceeding, see Adams v. Peck, 288 Md. 1, 3-4, 415 A.2d
292, 293 (1980); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 587 (1977).
11. On this occasion Berkey also stated that Delia had a "real emotional problem"
and "should seek professional help." 287 Md. at 308, 413 A.2d at 173.
12. Id. at 306-08, 413 A.2d at 172-73.
13. Depositions of Delia, Berkey, psychologist Dr. Weinreb, and psychiatrist Dr.
Crowley, as well as a letter from psychiatrist Dr. Esquibel, were a part of the record. Dr.
Weinreb examined Delia and found "no evidence at all" that Delia was deranged,
psychopathic or sadistic. The examinations of Drs. Crowley and Esquibel were in accord
with Dr. Weinreb's finding. Contrary to Berkey's letter, the test results uniformly showed
that Delia was a stable, intelligent individual suited for the functions of a police officer. In
addition, Dr. Crowley testified that in his opinion Berkey's letter had made a diagnosis of
Delia. See id. at 309-14, 413 A.2d at 173-75.
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material fact, he was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.14 On the strength
of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan 5 the Circuit Court for Prince George's
County granted the motion for summary judgment.16 The Maryland Court of
Special Appeals reversed and remanded the case to the trial court for further
proceedings.' 7 The intermediate appellate court expressed some misgivings as to
the propriety of summary judgment when the movant's state of mind is at issue.
Moreover, since the court found a jury could draw conflicting inferences from
the differing versions of the traffic stop, the court held that there were genuine
issues of material fact that precluded summary disposition of the case.' 8
In a majority opinion written by Judge Smith, the Maryland Court of
Appeals dealt with four basic issues. First, the court made a threshold
determination that a public official must adduce clear and convincing proof to
succeed in a defamation action under New York Times. In so doing, the Court of
Appeals established new law for Maryland by defining clear and convincing
evidence as "'more than a preponderance of the evidence and less than evidence
beyond a reasonable doubt .. , ,"' The court then made a second threshold
determination to assume arguendo that Private Delia was a public official for
New York Times purposes. Although the court expressed some misgivings as to
whether a policeman of the lowest level was a public official, it preferred to
assume arguendo that Delia was a public official because the issue had not been
briefed or argued before the court.20
The third issue which the court addressed was the propriety of granting
summary judgment when the movant's state of mind is at issue. The majority
opinion noted its doubts about such a procedure2 1 and refused to allow the
practice on the facts of the instant case. However, the court did leave open the
possibility of utilizing summary judgment procedure in New York Times
defamation cases on a case-by-case basis in the future. 22 The majority based its
doubts as to the propriety of summary judgment primarily on three cases. In
Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 23 the Supreme Court had warned that
motive and intent in complex antitrust litigation raise important issues of
14. This is the standard used for granting summary judgment in Maryland. MD. R. P.
610 (d)(1). It is substantially the same standard used in federal courts. See note 51 and
accompanying text infra.
15. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See notes 58 to 63 and accompanying text infra.
16. 287 Md. at 304, 413 A.2d at 171.
17. Delia v. Berkey, 41 Md. App. 47, 395 A.2d 1189 (1978).
18. Id. at 53-55, 395 A.2d at 1193.
19. 287 Md. at 320, 413 A.2d at 178 (quoting Whittington v. State, 8 Md. App. 676,
679 n.3, 262 A.2d 75, 77 n.3 (1970)). See notes 79 to 86 and accompanying text infra.
20. Id. at 320-24, 413 A.2d at 179-80. See notes 87 to 99 and accompanying text
infra.
21. Id. at 324-27, 413 A.2d at 180-82. See notes 100 to 115 and accompanying text
infra.
22. Id. at 332, 413 A.2d at 185.
23. 368 U.S. 464 (1962).
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credibility that should be tried before a jury.24 Goldwater v. Ginzburg25 applied
Poller's stringent policy to a New York Times defamation case. The Goldwater
court reiterated the need for cross-examination before a jury because a
movant's subjective state of actual malice is at issue in a New York Times
action.26 In Hutchinson v. Proxmire,27 the Supreme Court expressed these same
doubts about the propriety of summary judgment when a defendant's state of
mind is at issue. 28 The Berkey majority thus based its doubts as to the propriety
of summary judgment on the policy that generally credibility issues that turn on
a subjective state of mind are to be resolved by the jury.29
The final issue the court addressed was the factual determination as to
whether a genuine dispute of material fact existed that would preclude
summary disposition of the case. The court noted that if the facts were
susceptible of more than one permissible inference, the choice between
inferences must be made by a jury at trial, not by a judge on a motion for
summary judgment. 30 Although the court's opinion is not entirely clear, it would
appear that the court found that the facts would support at least four genuine
disputes of material fact. First, having decided that Delia's patrol car was
behind Berkey's car,31 the court determined that Berkey's family could not be
"blinded" by a light to the rear of their car. Because Berkey had alleged that his
family was "blinded," a jury could find a direct conflict between Berkey's and
Delia's version of the traffic stop. This conflict over the basic fact of reflection of
light would allow a jury to conclude that either Berkey or Delia was speaking
with knowing falsity when he described the lights.3 2 Second, if Berkey used a
"calculated untruth"3 in stating his version of the incident, then a jury could
find that he acted with reckless disregard of the truth in describing Delia's
behavior as "abnormally cruel and inhumane, rude and insensitive, threatening
and punative[sic].."34 Third, a jury could infer that Berkey wanted his
professional knowledge of psychiatry to be taken into account. This was
evidenced by the fact that Berkey wrote the complaint on his professional
letterhead, referred to his "professional background and training," and sent a
copy of the complaint to the district court judge. 35 Although not explicitly
24. Id. at 473.
25. 261 F. Supp. 784 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), affd, 414 F.2d 324 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 1049 (1970).
26. Id. at 788.
27. 443 U.S. 111 (1979).
28. Id. at 120 n. 9 (dictum).
29. 287 Md. at 326, 332-33, 413 A.2d at 181, 185.
30. Id. at 326-27, 413 A.2d at 182.
31. See note 8 supra.
32. 287 Md. at 330, 413 A.2d at 183.
33. This term derives from Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964), in which the
Supreme Court stated that "calculated falsehoods" were not protected under the New York
Times malice standard.
34. 287 Md. at 330, 413 A.2d at 184 (quoting Berkey's letter to Chief Rhoades).
35. Id. at 331, 413 A.2d at 184. The court might also have pointed to the fact that
Berkey had used diagnostic terms. See id. at 312, 413 A.2d at 175.
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stated, the implication in the court's opinion is that these factors would allow a
jury to find that Berkey acted with reckless disregard of the truth in
"diagnosing" Delia as "mentally deranged, . . .-psychopathic and/or pathologi-
cally sadistic."36 Finally, the court found that because Berkey "questioned" if
Delia was "mentally deranged," a jury could infer that the mental characteris-
tics that Berkey attributed to Delia actually constituted an allegation rather
than a critical expression of opinion.37 In support of this inference, the court
pointed to the extreme forcefulness of the language Berkey used, as well as
Berkey's formal request for a mental evaluation of Private Delia. 38 The court
found that these permissible inferences created genuine disputes of material
fact. Hence, whether Delia produced clear and convincing evidence to support
his action against Berkey was for the jury to decide. 39
In dissent, Judge Eldridge attacked the majority's position because of its
"chilling effect" on the exercise of first amendment rights40 and on the general
policy ground that a court of law should not discourage criticism of governmen-
tal action.41 He contended that Delia was clearly a public official for New York
Times purposes, citing authoritative cases which held that policemen even of
the lowest rank have repeatedly been found to be public officials within the New
York Times rule.42 Judge Eldridge challenged the court's factual findings
because they were based on what he considered to be a "most tortured reasoning
process."4 3 According to Judge Eldridge there was no real conflict between the
basic facts recounted by Delia and Berkey, but only in the evaluation of those
facts. 44 This meant that the majority started from a "false premise" - that
there was a direct conflict in the two versions of the incident - and went on to
draw "extraordinary conclusions" - that Dr. Berkey told an untruth about the
blinding light and that he spoke with reckless disregard in characterizing
Delia's behavior.45 Delia thus failed to meet his burden of production in showing
36. Id. at 331, 413 A.2d at 184 (quoting Berkey's letter to Chief Rhoades).
37. Id. at 331-32, 413 A.2d at 184.
38. See id.
39. See id. at 330, 413 A.2d at 183 (jury might find clearly and convincingly that
Berkey made his "blinding light" statement with knowing falsity). However, the court
failed to assess whether the calculated falsehood, diagnosis and allegation inferences
might meet the clear and convincing standard of proof. See id. at 332-33, 413 A.2d at 185
("whether Delia adduces clear and convincing evidence to support his action against
Berkey must be determined by the trier of facts ...."). Thus, it is not clear whether the
Berkey court intended the clear and convincing burden of proof to apply at the summary
judgment stage.
40. Id. at 333, 413 A.2d at 185 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 341-42, 413 A.2d at 189.
42. Id. at 334-35, 413 A.2d at 186.
43. Id. at 336, 413 A.2d at 186.
44. Id. at 336, 413 A.2d at 187. Judge Eldridge's argument was based on Delia's
deposition at which Delia stated that he recognized that Berkey thought the light was
blinding. Id. Judge Eldridge strengthened this position by pointing out that Delia
admitted that he had received "occasional" complaints from other motorists. Id. at 336 n.
1, 413 A.2d at 187 n. 1 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 335-37, 413 A.2d at 186-87.
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that a genuine issue of fact existed.4" According to Judge Eldridge, there was
"utterly no evidence of knowing falsity or reckless disregard for the truth."4 7 He
also argued that in his view the inferences drawn by the majority failed to meet
the clear and convincing standard of proof that Delia would be required to make
at a trial on the merits.4" Finally, Judge Eldridge contended that Berkey's letter
stated an opinion only, and as such might be entitled to first amendment
protection under either the freedom of speech or redress of grievances clause.49
In order that the Berkey case may be placed in context, it is necessary to
examine both Maryland's summary judgment procedure and the law of
defamation. Summary judgment is authorized in Maryland whenever "the
pleadings, depositions and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."5° The Maryland
standard is closely modeled after the federal summary judgment rule;5 hence,
arguments based on the federal rule have been found to be "especially
persuasive" in interpreting the Maryland provision.5 2 Maryland courts have
also developed several corollary rules that are applied on a motion for summary
judgment. For instance, if a factual dispute exists, the contested facts must be
46. See id. at 335, 413 A.2d at 186. Berkey had made a prima facie showing that
Delia had no triable evidence of knowing or reckless falsity. Berkey submitted a
deposition wherein Delia had stated that he was unable to specify any facts to support his
allegation that Berkey had written his letter with knowing falsity. Id. at 325-26, 413
A.2d at 181.
47. Id. at 335, 413 A.2d at 186 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 338, 413 A.2d at 187.
49. Id. at 338-39 n.2, 413 A.2d at 187-88 n.2. Judge Eldridge cited two cases which
were factually similar to Berkey, but which reached opposite conclusions. Id. at 339-40,
413 A.2d at 188-89. First, in Michaud v. Inhabitants of Town of Livermore Falls, 381 A.2d
1110 (Me. 1978), a court granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict to the defendant,
who had written a letter of complaint about a state employee to the state's governor,
because there was "no evidence, and certainly none of convincing clarity, that the ...
[defendant's letter of complaint], although possibly biased and exaggerated, was not an
honest communication relating the author's own interpretation of the plaintiff's conduct."
Id. at 1115. Second, the court in Cline v. Brown, 24 N.C. App. 209, 210 S.E.2d 446 (1974),
cert. denied, 286 N.C. 412, 211 S.E.2d 793 (1975), granted summary judgment in a libel
suit to the defendant, who had written a letter of complaint about a police officer, by
reasoning that the caution inherent in prefacing statements with the word "may"
demonstrated the absence of reckless disregard for whether the allegations were false.
50. MD. R. P. 610(d)(1). See generally Brown, Summary Judgment in Maryland, 38
MD. L. REV. 188 (1978).
51. See White v. Friel, 210 Md. 274, 285, 123 A.2d 303, 308 (1951); Brown, supra note
50, at 195-96. The modifications of the federal summary judgment rule incorporated into
the Maryland standard were intended to broaden the summary judgment rule rather than
restrict it. See Fletcher v. Flournoy, 198 Md. 53, 57, 81 A.2d 232, 233 (1951), cert. denied,
343 U.S. 917 (1952).
52. Frush v. Brooks, 204 Md. 315, 321, 104 A.2d 624, 626 (1954).
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resolved against the party moving for summary judgment.53 Even when the
facts are undisputed, if more than one "permissible" inference 54 exists, a
53. E.g., Peck v. Baltimore County, 286 Md. 368, 381, 410 A.2d 7, 13 (1979); Brown,
supra note 50, at 215. Accord, Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 443 U.S. 157, 162 n.5
(1979).
54. Maryland's "permissible" or "legally sufficient" inference is an elusive term.
Compare Peck v. Baltimore County, 286 Md. 368, 381, 410 A.2d 7, 13 (1979) (facts
susceptible of more than one "permissible" inference, so summary judgment denied;
"permissible" inference not defined) with Fenwick Motor Co. v. Fenwick, 258 Md. 134, 142,
265 A.2d 256, 259 (1970) (standard for summary judgment is a reasonable inference).
While relatively few Maryland decisions have determined whether a "legally
sufficient" inference was raised at the summary judgment stage, many cases have
considered whether such an inference existed upon a motion for a directed verdict. These
cases are illustrative because of the similarity in treatment between motions for summary
judgment and directed verdicts. But see Impala Platinum Ltd. v. Impala Sales (U.S.A.),
Inc., 283 Md. 296, 326, 389 A.2d 887, 905 (1978) (on motion for summary judgment, the
court only determines if a material fact issue exists, but on a motion for a directed verdict
the court assesses the legal sufficiency of the evidence). At the directed verdict stage,
Maryland courts have found relatively weak evidence to be sufficient evidence to send the
case to the jury. In Fowler v. Smith, 240 Md. 240, 213 A.2d 549 (1965), the Court of
Appeals acknowledged that: "Maryland has gone almost as far as any jurisdiction we
know of in holding that meager evidence of negligence is sufficient to carry the case to the
jury." Id. at 246, 213 A.2d at 554. Accord, Beahm v. Shortall, 279 Md. 321, 342, 368 A.2d
1005, 1017 (1977); Haraszti v. Klarman, 277 Md. 234, 254, 352 A.2d 833, 844 (1976);
Dalmo Sales of Wheaton, Inc. v. Steinberg, 43 Md. App. 659, 684, 407 A.2d 339, 352
(1979); Lynch, Directed Verdict in Maryland: Less Obvious Applications of a Simple Rule,
9 U. BALT. L. REV. 217, 219 n.ll (1980). This weak showing placed on the nonmovant was
emphasized in Ford v. Bradford, 213 Md. 534, 541, 132 A.2d 488, 492 (1957), in which the
court noted that "a case will not be withdrawn from the jury for want of legally sufficient
evidence, if there is any evidence, however slight, legally sufficient as tending to prove
negligence..." Accord, Beahm v. Shortall, 279 Md. 321, 342, 368 A.2d 1005, 1017 (1977);
Curley v. General Valet Serv., Inc., 270 Md. 248, 264, 311 A.2d 231, 239 (1973). Legally
sufficient evidence is not met by "'offering a mere scintilla of evidence amounting to no
more than a surmise, possibility or conjecture, but such evidence must be of legal
probative force and evidential value."' Beahm v. Shortall, 279 Md. 321, 342, 368 A.2d
1005, 1017 (1977) (quoting Curley v. General Valet Serv., Inc., 270 Md. 248, 264, 311 A.2d
231, 239 (1973)). "'The test of legal sufficiency ..."is whether the evidence serves to
prove a fact or permits an inference of fact that could enable an ordinarily intelligent
mind to draw a rational conclusion therefrom in support of the right of the plaintiff to
recover." "' Id. In Undeck v. Consumer's Discount Supermarket, 29 Md. App. 444, 453, 349
A.2d 635, 640 (1975), the Court of Special Appeals reviewed the evidence because it
"amounted to one gossamer greater than a scintilla," only to conclude after its review that
the evidence was insufficient to deny the defendant's directed verdict motion.
In the New York Times libel case of Hohman v. A.S. Abell Co., 44 Md. App. 193,
201, 407 A.2d 794, 798 (1979), the Court of Special Appeals held that a plaintiff bears a
heavy burden in overcoming a directed verdict on the issue of knowing or reckless falsity.
The force of these constitutional considerations, especially when coupled with an increased
burden of clear and convincing proof, should apply equally at the summary judgment
stage. If the analogy between summary judgments and directed verdicts is maintained, it
is apparent that Maryland's customary "legally sufficient" inference standard is
inadequate as a standard for summary judgments in New York Times defamation cases. A
plaintiff who makes a "permissible" showing only will be sent to trial with no hope of
surviving a directed verdict motion.
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Maryland trial judge cannot make the choice between the inferences but instead
must submit the inferences to the jury.55 While a primary concern on a motion
for summary judgment is to ensure that the nonmovant's right to a jury trial is
protected,56 granting a motion for summary judgment nonetheless performs
important functions. For example, summary judgment minimizes harassment,
avoids the threat of coerced settlements, and saves the movant from the expense
of a useless trial.
5 7
The Supreme Court substantially rewrote the law of defamation in New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan.5" In New York Times the Court held that in order to
recover for defamation, a "public official '59 who was criticized in his "official
conduct"6 must show with "convincing clarity"'" that the defendant acted with
"actual malice," which the Court defined as knowing falsity or reckless
disregard for the truth.62 To further ensure that free expression was adequately
protected, the Court utilized "'an independent examination of the whole
record,'" which guaranteed that the findings of fact would sustain the jury
verdict.
6 3
Subsequent Supreme Court opinions have attempted to maintain the
balance struck in New York Times between the need for the free exercise of first
amendment rights and the desire of a public official to maintain his
reputational interests. For instance, the demanding New York Times standards
55. E.g., Fenwick Motor Co. v. Fenwick, 258 Md. 134, 138, 265 A.2d 256, 258 (1970).
56. See Washington Post Co. v. Keogh, 365 F.2d 965, 967 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 1011 (1967); 10 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 2714 (1969). When properly granted, summary judgment does not usurp any
jury functions. Impala Platinum Ltd. v. Impala Sales (U.S.A.), Inc., 283 Md. 296, 326, 389
A.2d 887, 905 (1978). The Court of Appeals has warned that a Maryland trial court is not
to usurp the jury's function by passing on the legal sufficiency of the evidence. Simmons v.
State, 165 Md. 155, 168, 167 A. 60, 65-66 (1933).
57. See Washington Post Co. v. Keogh, 365 F.2d 965, 968 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 1011 (1967); 10 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 56, § 2712, at 370-84;
Brown, supra note 50, at 193 n.35.
58. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
59. The New York Times Court did not define the term "public official." Id. 283 n.23.
The only guidance provided by the Supreme Court thus far was in Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383
U.S. 75, 84-85 (1966). See notes 90 to 93 and accompanying text infra.
60. The New York Times Court did not expound upon this term. 376 U.S. at 283 n.23.
However, the meaning of "official conduct" is not at issue in the Berkey case since Delia
was clearly criticized for "official conduct." See generally Annot., 19 A.L.R. 3d 1361, § 51b]
(1968).
61. 376 U.S. at 285-86. The need for "convincing clarity" was restated in Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974), as an evidentiary standard that requires
"clear and convincing" proof.
62. 376 U.S. at 279-80. See generally Annot., 20 A.L.R.3d 988 (1968).
63. 376 U.S. at 285 (quoting Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1962)).
Accord, A.S. Abell Co. v. Barnes, 258 Md. 56, 71-72, 265 A.2d 207, 216 (1970), cert.
denied, 403 U.S. 921 (1971). For an argument that the independent examination of the
facts violates a Maryland litigant's state right to a jury trial, see 39 MD. L. REV. 515, 531
n.121 (1980).
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were extended to "public figures" 64 and later to private persons when
statements made about them concern matters of general or public interest.65
However, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,66 the Supreme Court reversed its trend
toward enlarging the scope of New York Times and refused to extend New York
Times to matters of public interest.67 Cases following New York Times have also
attempted to give full meaning to the "actual malice" standard that a public
official must meet. The Supreme Court has found that a showing of neligence is
insufficient for actual malice, 6s as is proof that the publisher failed to conduct a
reasonable investigation before publishing.69 Recovery also cannot be premised
on a showing that the critic was motivated by ill-will or hatred,7" or by a desire
to injure the official.7 1 To establish knowing falsity or reckless disregard, an
official must show that the defendant possessed "a high degree of awareness of
.. .probable falsity," 72 or "that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts
as to the truth of his publication." 73 The Supreme Court has stated that a public
official must show that the defendant acted with a "subjective awareness of
probable falsity." 74 The Supreme Court, however, has refused to extend
protection to "calculated falsehood, 75 and has held that "an intent to inflict
harm through falsehood" is actionable by a public official.76
Berkey v. Delia represents an effort by the Maryland Court of Appeals to
harmonize the clash between New York Times' defamation standards and
established summary judgment procedures. The court appears to have been
noticeably swayed by the Supreme Court's dictum in Hutchinson v. Proxmire
77
that proof of actual malice does not lend itself to summary adjudication. 78 In the
struggle to define the proper balance between the law of defamation and the
64. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967).
65. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 43-44 (1971) (plurality opinion).
66. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
67. Id. at 346.
68. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 US. 64, 79 (1964).
69. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).
70. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 73-74 (1964).
71. Beckley Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U.S. 81, 82 (1967).
72. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964).
73. St. Amant v. Tompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).
74. Id.
75. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964). Justice Harlan later equated a
"calculated falsehood" with a publication that was "deliberately falsified." Curtis
Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 153 (1967).
76. Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356, 357 (1965) (per curiam).
77. 443 U.S. 111 (1979).
78. In response to a lower court assertion that summary judication "may well be the
'rule' rather than the 'exception"' the Court stated that:
[w]e are constrained to express some doubt about the so-called "rule." The proof of
"actual malice" calls a defendant's state of mind into question, and does not readily
lend itself to summary disposition. In the present posture of the case, however, the
propriety of dealing with such complex issues by summary judgment is not before us.
Id. at 120 n.9 (citations omitted).
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first amendment, the Maryland court gave defamation a decided advantage. The
court's failure to assess the effect of this decision on the exercise of first
amendment rights is particularly ominous.
CLEAR AND CONVINCING PROOF
Before reaching the disputed factual issues, the Berkey court held that in a
New York Times defamation suit, a public official had to meet a burden of "clear
and convincing proof." 9 The court defined this burden as "more than a
preponderance of the evidence and less than evidence beyond a reasonable
doubt, 8 0 and in so doing set out a new evidentiary standard for Maryland."1
Courts that have adjudicated New York Times defamation suits have almost
unanimously accepted and applied this same increased burden of "clear and
convincing proof."
8 2
As with most attempts to define an intermediate standard of proof, the
Berkey definition of "clear and convincing proof" suffers from a lack of
specificity. 3 The court may have attempted to overcome this vagueness by
reciting a number of prior Maryland cases in which the court had apparently
called for this intermediate standard of proof by using terms analogous to "clear
79. 287 Md. at 317-18, 413 A.2d at 177.
80. Id. at 320, 413 A.2d at 178 (quoting Whittington v. State, 8 Md. App. 676, 679 n.3,
262 A.2d 75, 77 n.3 (1970)).
81. Id. at 319, 413 A.2d at 178.
82. "Clear and convincing proof" is an intermediate standard between the "pre-
ponderance of the evidence" standard and the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard.
Yiamouyiannis v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 619 F.2d 932, 940 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 117 (1980); Nader v. de Toledano, 408 A.2d 31, 49 (D.C. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1078 (1980); Loeb v. New Times Communications Corp., 497 F. Supp. 85,
92 n.ll (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Dacey v. Connecticut Bar Ass'n, 170 Conn. 520, 536-37 & n.5,
368 A.2d 125, 134 & n.5 (1976); Callahan v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., Inc., 372
Mass. 582, 584, 363 N.E.2d 240, 242 (1977). In some jurisdictions, "clear and convincing
proof" appears to approach the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of criminal cases.
See Manuel v. Fort Collins Newspapers, 42 Colo. App. 324, 599 P.2d 931, 933 (1979);
MacGuire v. Harriscope Broadcasting, 612 P.2d, 830, 839 (Wyo. 1980) (Clear and
convincing proof "requires proof that is clear, precise and indubitable or unmistakable and
free from serious doubt. It is that kind of proof which would persuade a trier of fact that
the truth of the contention is highly probable."). One of the functions of an increased
burden of proof is that it serves to remind the trier of fact of the policy goals at stake.
83. An intermediate standard of proof is difficult for both the judge and the jury to
apply. See Williams v. Superintendent, 43 Md. App. 588, 591, 406 A.2d 1302, 1304-05
(1979), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Coard v. State, 288 Md. 523, 419 A.2d 383
(1980) (per curiam); 39 MD. L. REV. 515, 530 (1980). The confusion surrounding the
meaning of "clear and convincing proof" stems in part from the fact that the Supreme
Court has never defined the term. See Callahan v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 372
Mass. 582, 584, 363 N.E.2d 240, 242 (1977); Stone v. Essex County Newspapers, Inc., 367
Mass. 849, 872-77, 330 N.E.2d 161, 176-80 (1975) (Quirico, J., concurring and dissenting)
(The Supreme Court's failure to define "clear and convincing proof" demonstrates that the
term is rhetorical and devoid of any constitutional significance.).
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and convincing proof."'14 Yet the precise location of the intermediate "clear and
convincing" standard remains less than certain. Recently the confusion over this
evidentiary standard was compounded further by the Court of Special Appeals'
holding in the civil commitment proceeding of Williams v. Superintendent 5 that
"clear and convincing proof" is equivalent to "proof beyond a reasonable
doubt."
8 6
POLICEMEN As PUBLIC OFFICIALS
The Berkey majority dealt with the public official issue by assuming
arguendo that Private Delia was a public official. The majority stated that it
would not address thb issue since it had not been briefed or argued. 7 Judge
Eldridge's dissent, however, appears to be correct in light of the almost
unanimous consensus that even the lowest ranking police officer is indeed a
public official.88 It is unfortunate that the majority chose not to rule on the
84. The Berkey court referred to analogous language in both Maryland and
Massachusetts cases. 287 Md. at 318-20, 413 A.2d at 177-78. See Quillen v. Bell, 158 Md.
677, 683, 149 A. 462, 464 (1930) ("facts must be established clearly, with small possibility
of error"); Zulver v. Murray, 139 Md. 242, 244, 114 A. 896, 896 (1921) ("evidence must be
of the most convincing character"); Duvall v. Hambleton & Co., 98 Md. 12, 20, 55 A. 431,
434 (1903) ("clear, explicit, and strict proof"); Whalen v. Milholland, 89 Md. 199, 210, 43
A. 45, 50 (1899) ("evidence ought to be free from uncertainty"); Kidder v. Greenman, 283
Mass. 601, 613, 187 N.E. 42, 48 (1933) ("proof must be full, clear and decisive"); Coghlin v.
White, 273 Mass. 53, 55, 172 N.E. 786, 786 (1930) (proof must be "strong, positive and free
from doubt"). In Smith v. Higinbothom, 187 Md. 115, 126, 48 A.2d 754, 760 (1946), the
court stated the common law rule that "corruption, and alleged fraud, bribery, coercion or
intimidation [were] required to be established clearly." Such an imputation of a crime in a
civil suit requires more than a mere preponderance of the evidence to prove the plaintiff's
case. Rent-A-Car Co. v. Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co., 161 Md. 249, 268, 156 A. 847, 855
(1931). The same evidentiary standard exists in civil cases in which a charge involving
moral turpitude is imputed. Stenger v. Stenger, 14 Md. App. 232, 239-40, 286 A.2d 552,
557 (1972) (proof must be "clear and satisfactory").
85. 43 Md. App. 588, 406 A.2d 1302 (1979), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Coard
v. State, 288 Md. 523, 419 A.2d 383 (1980) (per curiam).
86. Id. at 591, 406 A.2d at 1304. The Williams court simply felt that an intermediate
standard was too vague and that the difference between "clear and convincing proof" and
"preponderance of the evidence" may well be "purely academic" to a jury. Id. at 590, 406
A.2d at 1304. The court compared the elusive intermediate standard to an exercise in
"shoveling smoke." Id. at 591, 406 A.2d at 1304-05. But see McBee v. Fulton, 47 Md. 403,
429 (1878) ("beyond a reasonable doubt standard" only appropriate in criminal trials;
defense of conditional privilege did not require libel defendant to prove the truth of a
criminal allegation "beyond a reasonable doubt," but only by a "preponderance of the
evidence").
87. 287 Md. at 320-24, 413 A.2d at 179-80. Cf. LaRocca v. New York News, Inc., 156
N.J. Super. 59, 62, 383 A.2d 451, 453 (1978) (appellate court determined that a policeman
was a public official even though trial court had made no ruling on the issue).
88. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 284 (1971) (deputy chief of detectives of
Chicago Police Department was a public official); St Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727,
730 n.2 (1968) (deputy sheriff); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 &n.23
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issue, because uncertainty about a patrolman's status under New York Times
may encourage litigation.
8 9
The Supreme Court's only attempt to define the term "public official" for
New York Times purposes occurred in Rosenblatt v. Baer.90 The Rosenblatt
Court held that "the 'public official' designation applies at the very least to
those among the hierarchy of government employees who have, or appear to the
public to have, substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of
governmental affairs." 91 The Court provided the additional guideline that New
York Times applies to a government employee whose position has such apparent
importance that the public has an independent interest in the qualifications and
performance of the person who holds the position, beyond the general interest
that the public has in the qualifications and performance of all government
employees.92 In addition, "the employee's posit*ion must be one which would
invite public scrutiny and discussion of the person holding it, entirely apart
from the scrutiny and discussion occasioned by the particular charges in
controversy.
9 3
Low-level policemen have been found to meet the "substantial control over
the conduct of governmental affairs" standard stated in Rosenblatt94 as well as
its corollary standard that the public have an "independent interest in [a public
official's] qualifications and performance."95 The notion that a low-level
policeman is a public official for New York Times purposes is sound. A
(1964) (police commissioner); Meiners v. Moriarty, 563 F.2d 343, 352 (7th Cir. 1977)
(federal drug agents); Jackson v. Filliben, 281 A.2d 604, 605 (Del. 1971) (police sergeant);
Hohman v. A.S. Abell Co., 44 Md. App. 193, 199, 407 A.2d 794, 797-98 (1979) (retired
police major); Hirman v. Rogers, 257 N.W.2d 563, 566 (Minn. 1977) (two police officers and
deputy sheriff). See generally Annot., 19 A.L.R.3d 1361, § 5[d] (1968).
89. See Comment, Wolston and Hutchinson: Changing Contours of the Public Figure
Test, 13 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 179, 203 (1979) (confusion over the public figure standard in
light of recent Supreme Court constrictions on that term encourages litigation).
90. 383 U.S. 75 (1966). In addition, New York Times has been cited for the proposition
that elected officials are public officials if the alleged defamation relates to their official
capacity. See Johnston v. Corinthian Television Corp., 583 P.2d 1101, 1102-03 (Okla.
1978).
91. 383 U.S. at 85.
92. Id. at 86.
93. Id. at 87 n.13.
94. Scelfo v. Rutgers Univ., 116 N.J. Super. 403, 412, 282 A.2d 445, 449 (1971); Cline
v. Brown, 24 N.C. App. 209, 214-15, 210 S.E.2d 446, 449, cert. denied, 286 N.C. 412, 211
S.E.2d 793 (1975); See Comment, Police Defamation Suits Against Citizens Complaining of
Police Misconduct, 22 ST. Louis U.L.J. 676, 684 n.48 (1978) (describing the policeman's
pervasive role in contemporary society) [hereinafter cited as Police Defamation SuitsI.
95. See, e.g., Meiners v. Moriarty, 563 F.2d 343, 352 (7th Cir. 1977) (federal drug
agents); Cline v. Brown, 24 N.C. App. 209, 215, 210 S.E.2d 446, 449, cert. denied, 286 N.C.
412, 211 S.E.2d 793 (1975) (deputy sheriff).
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patrolman plays an "influential role in ordering society."9 6 In the course of his
duties a policeman will exercise broad judicial, legislative and executive
functions.9 7 Hence, the rationale for classifying a policeman as a public official
is that he wields general power and broad discretion.98 The potential for abuse
96. The Supreme Court has used this standard to determine whether a plaintiff is a
public figure. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974) (quoting Curtis
Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring)). One
commentator has stated that the New York Times privilege is limited to those individuals
with potential sociopolitical impact, persuasive power or influence. Ashdown, Editorial
Privilege and Freedom of the Press: Herbert v. Lando in Perspective, 51 U. CoLo. L. REV.
303, 309 (1980). Cf. Hirman v. Rogers, 257 N.W.2d 563, 566 (Minn. 1977) (two policemen
and a deputy sheriff held to New York Times' standards) ("[Wlhere plaintiffs in a
defamation action perform governmental duties, directly related to the public interest,
they are public officials .. ").
97. See Police Defamation Suits, supra note 94. In commenting on Rawlins v.
Hutchinson Publishing Co., 218 Kan. 295, 543 P.2d 988 (1975), the court in Gleichenhaus
v. Carlyle, 3 Kan. App. 2d 146, 591 P.2d 635, rev'd on other grounds, 226 Kan. 167, 597
P.2d 611 (1979), stated that policemen are public officials in order "to recognize a police
officer's unique position in our society of having the responsibility of enforcing laws .
Id. at 154, 591 P.2d at 641 (dictum).
98. This was the standard developed by the Washington Supreme Court for
determining the scope of the New York Times "public official" designation. See Clawson v.
Longview Publishing Co., 91 Wash. 2d 408, 417, 589 P.2d 1223, 1228 (1979) (en banc)
(although manager of a county motor pool did not hold an important government position,
the alleged defamation bore on his fitness for office and therefore he was held to New York
Times "actual malice" standard). It is well established that a policeman's duties entail
vast discretionary powers. See, e.g., Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 298 (1978) ("abuse or
misuse of [police power] . . . can have serious impact on individuals") (footnote omitted);
Coursey v. Greater Niles Township Publishing Corp., 40 Ill. 2d 257, 265, 239 N.E.2d 837,
841 (1968); K. DAvis, POLICE DISCRETION iii-v (1975); Police Defamation Suits, supra note
94, at 677-79. But cf. T. AARON, THE CONTROL OF POLICE DISCRETION ix (1966) ("very little
attention has been given the police use of discretion").
A low level policeman would qualify under the various rationales that have been
advanced for holding a plaintiff to the public official standard. See generally RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 580A, Comment a (1977); Comment, Defamation of the Public Official,
61 Nw. U.L. REV. 614, 619-26 (1966). First, policemen have a conditional immunity from
defamation suits. Carr v. Watkins, 227 Md. 578, 585, 177 A.2d 841, 844-45 (1962);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 598A (1977). As such, a citizen-critic of government
should be able to claim the New York Times privilege as a fair equivalent to the
policeman's privilege. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 282-83 (1964).
Second, a policeman "assumes the risk" that by performing a job that directly impacts on
the public he will be subjected to criticism, and that some of it will be false. See Angelo v.
Brenner, 84 Ill. App. 3d 594, 598, 406 N.E.2d 38, 41 (1980) (police officer cannot be
surprised when an arrested defendant responds with some remarks). Third, the lowest
level policemen, while not necessarily in positions to affect policy issues, are in positions to
resolve important public issues. "Police officers in the ranks do not formulate policy, per
se, but they are clothed with authority to exercise an almost infinite variety of
discretionary powers. The execution of the broad powers vested in them affects members of
the public significantly and often in the most sensitive areas of daily life." Foley v.
Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 297 (1978) (footnote omitted) (upholding statute that barred aliens
from entering a state police force against an equal protection claim).
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of this discretion is so great that some courts encourage citizen complaints as an
effective check on the exercise of police power.
99
PROPRIETY OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The Berkey court used traditional summary judgment procedure in analyz-
ing the case before it. Because a credibility issue was raised, the court followed
the rule of Goldwater v. Ginzburg.100 Goldwater expressed the general rule that
when the movant's state of mind is at issue, summary judgment is
inappropriate, 10 1 and thus, Goldwater is particularly responsive to plaintiff's
limited access to the proof. Goldwater makes motive and intent questions for the
jury; cross-examination will allow evaluation of the defendant's credibility and
demeanor. 102
Many courts, however, have fashioned a more liberal summary judgment
rule for defamation cases.' The utility of dealing with defamation cases
through summary adjudication was pointed out in the leading case of
Washington Post Co. v. Keogh.' °4 The rationale for encouraging summary
judgment is that the harassment and expense of a full trial will cause would-be
critics to censor their speech.' This would have a chilling effect on the free
flow of ideas and debate on public issues.
The Berkey court strongly implied that whenever the credibility of a witness
is even remotely at issue, summary judgment is necessarily improper.10 6 Such
an overly simplified rule would obviously appeal to a trial judge because it is
relatively easy to apply. However, the strength of credibility issues constitutes a
99. "The abuse of a patrolman's office can have great potentiality for social harm;
hence, public discussion and public criticism directed towards the performance of that
office cannot constitutionally be inhibited by threat of prosecution under State libel laws."
Coursey v. Greater Niles Township Publishing Corp., 40 11. 2d 257, 265, 239 N.E.2d 837,
841 (1968). Accord, Jackson v. Filliben, 281 A.2d 604, 605 (Del. 1971); Police Defamation
Suits, supra note 94, at 677. See also Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164
(1967) (Warren, C. J., concurring) (public opinion is a check on the behavior of public
figures).
100. 261 F. Supp. 784 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd, 414 F.2d 324 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 1049 (1970).
101. Id. at 788.
102. See id.
103. See Nader v. de Toledano, 408 A.2d 31, 43 n.7 (D.C. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1078 (1980) and cases cited therein.
104. 365 F.2d 965 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1011 (1967).
105. Nader v. de Toledano, 408 A.2d 31, 42-43 (D.C. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1078
(1980).
106. 287 Md. at 326, 332, 413 A.2d at 181, 185. See generally 6 pt. 2 MOORE's FEDERAL
PRACTICE, 56.15[5] (2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as MOORE's FEDERAL PRACrICEI. In
assessing the strength of the court's credibility inferences, it must be remembered which
statements in Berkey's letter Delia was actually contesting. Delia only disputed that (1)
he did not refuse to repeat his instructions to Berkey, (2) he did not insist that Berkey sign
the summons immediately, and (3) he did not have his cruiser lights directed into Berkey's
eyes. See note 10 supra.
1981]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
continuum ranging from very weak to very strong. °7 As with most factors
affecting the resolution of a motion for summary judgment, credibility issues are
not absolute but must be balanced along with other factors.'0 8 Today the
traditional statement that trial by jury is required whenever the defendant's
credibility is at all in doubt has lost much of its force; modern discovery
techniques such as the deposition allow the plaintiff to demonstrate whether he
has a strong case with specific grounds for impeaching the defendant or a weak
case with only latent doubts to present to the jury. 0 9 Indeed, a number of courts
have ruled that a plaintiff must make a strong showing in order to raise a
credibility issue when the continued vigor of the first amendment is at stake.
10
In considering the propriety of summary judgment, the Berkey court
apparently relied on Maryland's customary "legally sufficient" inference
standard. Under this standard, the plaintiff meets his burden of production if he
adduces enough evidence to surpass a scintilla, mere hope, speculation,
conjecture or latent doubt."' However, it is submitted that the proper standard
for summary judgment in a defamation case requires a court to determine if a
reasonable juror, acting reasonably, could find for the plaintiff under the
applicable burden of proof." 2 This general standard for plaintiff's burden of
production is arguably better than Maryland's "legally sufficient" standard for
two reasons. First, the Berkey court held that a public official must meet a
heavier burden of proof than that placed on the ordinary litigant. This increased
burden should be reflected in plaintiff's burden of production on a motion for
summary judgment or else cases will be sent to trial with no hope of surviving
the defendant's motion for a directed verdict. The "clear and convincing"
inference standard thus promotes judicial efficiency by maintaining the strong
analogy that exists between summary judgment and directed verdict motions." 3
Second, requiring an inference to be supported by "clear and convincing
evidence" would be consistent with the New York Times policy of minimizing
107. Professor Wright has broken down credibility issues into three categories. The
strongest case for denying a summary judgment motion is when the nonmovant can
advance specific grounds for impeachment. The nonmovant has a weaker case when he
only has latent doubts as to the movant's credibility. And if all the evidence has been
disclosed, credibility is even less at issue. 10 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 56,
§ 2726, at 521-24. See Brown, supra note 50, at 216 n.174; Lynch, Directed Verdict in
Maryland: Less Obvious Applications of a Simple Rule, 9 U. BALT. L. REV. 217, 221 n.18
(1980).
108. MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 106, 56.15151, at 523-25; Bauman, A
Rationale for Summary Judgment, 33 IND. L. J. 467, 489-504 (1958).
109. MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 106, at 513-14; Louis, Federal Summary
Judgment Doctrine: A Critical Analysis, 83 YALE L.J. 745, 762-64 (1974).
110. E.g., Goldman v. Time, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 133, 138-39 (N.D. Cal. 1971); Buckley
v. Vidal, 327 F. Supp. 1051, 1055 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Konigsberg v. Time, Inc., 312 F. Supp.
848, 852-53 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
111. See note 54 supra.
112. See Nader v. de Toledano, 408 A.2d 31, 42 (D.C. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1078
(1980).
113. See 10 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 56, §2713, at 407-08.
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self-censorship.' 14 Judge Eldridge apparently detected the impropriety of the
customary "legally sufficient" inference standard in a New York Times action
when he stated in dissent in Berkey: "It is apparent that the inferences drawn by
the majority from the alleged falsehoods are too weak to satisfy the 'clear and
convincing proof' requirement of New York Times."" 5
GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACTS
Blinding Light Inference
The first inference the majority drew was that lights directed from the rear
of a car would not "blind" the car's passengers; Berkey, therefore, may have
acted with knowing falsity in describing the light as "blinding." Such an
inference overlooks several facts of this case. It is normal for a motorist, along
with his passengers, to experience anxiety and apprehension when stopped by a
policeman." 6 These feelings may be especially acute on the part of any
passengers who are children. At such times it is human nature to seek support
from and to exchange misgivings with one's fellow passengers. But in turning to
face his son and wife, Berkey would have to contend with the "blinding" light to
his rear. In effect, the court's inference that the light was not "blinding"
requires the manifestly unreasonable assumption that anxious passengers sit
facing forward like horses fitted with blinders. The court's inference is
questionable because a passenger whose eyes are adjusted to the darkness of
10:15 p.m., who suddenly finds himself involuntarily thrust onto an intensely
illuminated "stage" where he is forced to converse with a policeman he cannot
even identify," 7 might reasonably and in good faith consider himself and his
family to have been "blinded."
Another defense for Berkey's "blinding" light statement is that a defendant
in a defamation case cannot be held liable for exaggerations, half-truths, and
rhetorical hyperbole."18 As previously indicated, Berkey had some basis for
making his "blinding" light statement. Even assuming as the court did that
passengers passively sit facing forward and docilely turn car mirrors so as to
deflect lights from the rear, it must be conceded that during those times when
114. Presumably, fewer plaintiffs will be able to meet this increased burden of
production, so the chilling effect of proceeding with a costly trial will be ameliorated.
115. 287 Md. at 338, 413 A.2d at 187 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
116. See Brief for Appellee at App. 17 (Delia's deposition). See also note 143 infra.
117. Delia failed to contest Berkey's statement that he could not identify Delia because
he had been blinded when he turned to face Delia. As such, Delia has failed to raise a
genuine dispute as to this statement. For a discussion of summary judgment in Maryland,
see note 54 supra.
118. Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 275 (1974); Greenbelt Coop. Publishing
Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 14 (1970); Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers Local 114,
383 U.S. 53, 58 (1966); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271-73 (1964). In a
later case, the Court stated: "lHowever pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its
correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas."
Gertz v, Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974) (footnote omitted).
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Officer Delia was standing beside Berkey's car, Berkey was unable to identify
Delia. There is utterly no evidence to suggest the contrary. 119 Two arguments
are therefore warranted. First, in a sense Berkey was "blinded" during those
times when he was required to turn and face Officer Delia. This argument is
strengthened by a reading of Berkey's letter in context: "Private Delia kept the
high powered lights directed into my wife's eyes, my twelve year old son's eyes
and my own - while he kept his back toward the beam. (I couldn't identify
Private Delia if my life depended on it because of the blinding light)."12
Berkey's statement that he was "blinded" when he faced Delia is certainly not
an untruth; at most, the statement is an exaggeration. Second, even when
Berkey was not facing Officer Delia, he was justified in characterizing the light
as "blinding." Such a characterization represents no more than the "partisan
analysis, '121 exaggeration, half-truth or rhetorical hyperbole that typically
results from such contentious encounters. 122 This argument militates against a
reasonable jury being able to find that Berkey knew he spoke falsely.
119. See note 117 supra.
120. See note 10 supra.
121. See O'Brien v. Tribune Publishing Co., 7 Wash. App. 107, 117, 499 P.2d 24, 30
(1972), cert. denied sub nom. O'Brien v. Franich, 411 U.S. 906 (1973) (mild exaggeration
was no more than the usual "partisan analysis" of the salary and responsibilities of a
political opponent's former assistant).
122. The court in Jackson v. Filliben, 281 A.2d 604 (Del. 1971), faced a situation
similar to Berkey. The defendant, who was "uncooperative" at the time of his arrest; id. at
605; wrote a letter to the commissioner of police and the F.B.I. complaining that he was
"yoked" around the neck, "thrown to the ground twice ... the second time held there face
down, threatened . . . and handcuffed so that he was in 'unbearable' pain." Id. The
policeman who arrested defendant brought a defamation suit against him. There was
evidence of some discrepancies and exaggerations in defendant's statements, but the
allegations were not entirely false. Id. The court reversed a jury verdict for the plaintiff
and held that unless the defendant's statements are "completely unfounded," plaintiff has
failed to establish actual malice. Id.
When determining whether a statement qualifies as a rhetorical hyperbole, a
court will consider the expectations of the recipient of a defamatory statement.
Thus, where potentially defamatory statements are published in a public debate, a
heated labor dispute, or in another setting in which the audience may anticipate
efforts by the parties to persuade others to their positions by use of epithets, fiery
rhetoric or hyperbole, language which generally might be considered as statements of
fact may well assume the character of statements of opinion.
Good Gov't Group of Seal Beach, Inc. v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. 3d 672, 680, 586 P.2d 572,
575-76, 150 Cal. Rptr. 258, 261 (1978), cert. denied sub nom. Good Gov't Group of Seal
Beach, Inc. v. Hogard, 441 U.S. 961 (1979) (quoting Gregory v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,
17 Cal. 3d 596, 601, 552 P.2d 425, 428, 131 Cal. Rptr. 641, 644 (1976)). See also text
accompanying note 144 infra. A letter complaining of police misconduct would arguably
qualify as rhetorical hyperbole because such a letter evidences just the sort of
"acrimonious dispute in which the integrity and subjective motives of competitors are
under attack." 22 Cal. 3d at 681, 586 P.2d at 576, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 262.
Because police exercise discretionary powers, a policeman's expectation of
vehement criticism should rise proportionately as his discretion increases. It should be
noted that Delia told Berkey that the lights were on as a safety measure for both of them.
See 287 Md. at 327-28, 413 A.2d at 182 (Delia's answer to interrogatories). Thus, Berkey
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The court's use of the knowing falsity prong of New York Times in order to
show actual malice in reference to Berkey's "blinding light" statement is also
questionable. Apparently the court felt that it could infer that Berkey had a
knowing state of mind because it was scientifically impossible for a car
passenger to be "blinded" by lights from the rear. 123 The majority conveniently
failed to mention that Delia had "occasionally" received complaints about the
lights from other motorists that he had stopped. 124 This fact lends credence to
Berkey's statement and makes the "blinding light" statement a particularly
unlikely candidate for a jury finding of knowing falsity on the speaker's part.
This case stands in stark contrast to Bose Corporation v. Consumers Union of the
United States, Inc., 125 in which an expert testified that it was "scientifically
impossible" for the plaintiff's sound equipment to produce the sound waves
which defendant claimed to have heard. The court found that this evidentiary
showing raised an inference of knowing falsity sufficient to deny defendant's
summary judgment motion.126
Calculated Falsehoods in the Supporting Facts
of an Opinion
The second inference drawn by the majority was:
[I]f the trier of fact were to determine that Berkey spoke a calculated
untruth in giving his version of the incident, . . . then a trier of fact could
conclude that Berkey spoke with reckless disregard for the truth when he
used the adjectives ["cruel and inhumane, rude and insensitive, threatening
and punative (sic)"] . . . to characterize Delia's behavior on this occasion.' 27
The court then cited Garrison v. Louisiana 128 for the proposition that calculated
falsehoods are not entitled to first amendment protection 129 and Henry v.
Collins' 30 for the statement that an "intent to inflict harm through falsehood" is
was under the erroneous impression that the lights were on solely as an exercise of Delia's
discretion. Actually, Delia had been following departmental policy in leaving on the
lights. See Brief for Appellee at App. 14 (Delia's deposition).
123. The court stated: "When two people describe the basic fact of reflection of light in
the conflicting manner we have here, it is obvious that a jury might find clearly and
convincingly that one of them must have known that he was speaking falsely." 287 Md. at
330, 413 A.2d at 183.
124. Id. at 336 n.1, 413 A.2d at 187 n.1 (Eldridge, J., dissenting). Moreover, there is no
knowing or reckless falsity where reasonable persons could and do have differing points of
view about plaintiff's actions. See Adey v. United Action for Animals, Inc., 361 F. Supp.
457, 465 & n.26 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), affd, 493 F.2d 1397 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 842
(1974).
125. 84 F.R.D. 682 (D. Mass. 1980).
126. Id. at 684-86 (alternative holding).
127. 287 Md. at 330, 413 A.2d at 184.
128. 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
129. Id. at 75.
130. 380 U.S. 356, 357 (1965).
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actionable.13 1 Thus, if any of the "facts" Berkey cited to support his conclusion
that Delia was "cruel and inhumane" were intentionally false, the court' would
hold Berkey liable to Delia for defamation.'
32
The court's inference of a calculated falsehood in this situation presents a
conflict with the common law substantial truth doctrine. The Restatement
(Second) of Torts sets out the general rule for determining the falsity of a
defendant's statements in a defamation case: "It is not necessary to establish the
literal truth of the precise statement made. Slight inaccuracies of expression are
immaterial provided that the defamatory charge is true in substance."'3 3 Berkey
arguably based the substance of his complaint on the "blinding light" to which
he was subjected.' 34 As a result, the Berkey court's calculated falsehood
inference would stand or fall on the truth of the "blinding light" statement.
Arguably, the "blinding light" statement is substantially, even if not literally,
true. 135
Psychiatric Diagnosis Inference
The Berkey majority stated that a third inference which a jury might draw
was that Dr. Berkey had intended that his professional knowledge be taken into
account when he described Delia as "mentally deranged, . . . psychopathic
131. Id. at 357.
132. For a similar Maryland case, see Kapiloff v. Dunn, 27 Md. App. 514, 343 A.2d 251
(1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 907 (1976). See also Mashburn v. Collin, 355 So. 2d 879, 889
(La. 1977) (plaintiff failed to contest the supporting facts).
133. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581A, Comment f (1977). At common law,
substantial truth was a jury question. See McBee v. Fulton, 47 Md. 403, 426 (1878); C.
GATLEY, LIBEL AND SLANDER § 369 (7th ed. 1974). Courts, however, have read the New
York Times actual malice requirement as barring liability where the defendant's
statements are not wholly unfounded. See, e.g., Adey v. United Action for Animals, Inc.,
361 F. Supp. 457, 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 493 F.2d 1397 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
842 (1974); Jackson v. Filliben, 281 A.2d 604, 605 (Del. 1971). See generally C. MORRIS &
C. MORRIS, ON TORTS 353-54 (2d ed. 1980). Thus, courts have granted summary judgment
where the defendant's statements were substantially true. See, e.g., Anderson v. Stanco
Sports Library, Inc., 542 F.2d 638, 641 (4th Cir. 1976) (applying South Carolina law)
(defendant stated that plaintiff was a high-ranking member of the Mafia and the plaintiff
admitted that he was a member of the Mafia); Scelfo v. Rutgers Univ., 116 N.J. Super.
403, 413-14, 282 A.2d 445, 450-51 (1971). See also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 286 (1964) (even if not "substantially correct", defendant's belief was reasonable
and there was no evidence with which to impeach that belief).
134. Judge Eldridge stated in dissent: "[T]he two versions of the highway incident are
remarkably consistent." 287 Md. at 336, 413 A.2d at 187 (Eldridge, J., dissenting). The
majority did not designate which facts were genuinely disputed. Presumably, the disputed
facts are those facts designated by Delia to be disputed; see note 10 supra. Delia disputed
that: (1) he did not insist that Berkey sign the summons immediately, although he did
insist that it be signed; (2) he did not refuse to repeat his instructions; and (3) he did not
direct the car lights into the eyes of Berkey's family. See also Koren v. Capital-Gazette
Newspapers, Inc., 22 Md. App. 576, 584-85, 325 A.2d 140, 145 (1974) (Newspaper's
addition of one word to implication that F.B.I. believed that plaintiff was involved in
extortion was not defamatory, where, looking at newspaper article as a whole, article
clearly indicated FBI's official belief in plaintiff's criminal involvement) (summary
judgment granted to defendant).
135. See notes 116 to 126 and accompanying text supra.
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and/or pathologically sadistic."' 36 The court implied that this would allow a jury
to infer that Berkey had "diagnosed" Delia and that Berkey's requested mental
evaluation of Delia would confirm Berkey's "diagnosis."' 37 Thus, the court
implied that Berkey wrote his letter of complaint not as an ordinary outraged
citizen, but in his professional capacity as a psychiatrist.
38
The issue remains whether the "diagnosis" inference could be sustained by
clear and convincing proof. In this regard, the Berkey case may be profitably
compared with Angelo v. Brenner.139 Policeman Angelo was on patrol when he
saw a traffic violation committed. The officer stopped the car, which was being
driven by the defendant's wife and in which the defendant Dr. Brenner, a
psychiatrist, was a passenger. Because defendant's wife did not possess the
necessary bond card for out-of-state residents, Officer Angelo properly directed
the couple to follow him to the police station where they would be required to
136. 287 Md. at 308, 413 A.2d at 172. The inference that Berkey intended his
professional knowledge to be taken into consideration would be relevant in establishing
negligence. If the court intended to imply that a psychiatrist should have been more likely
to notice the potential error in his description of Delia, this notion would constitute
potential liability based on the now discarded negligence standard. However, it is not clear
how this inference alone would assist Delia in establishing actual malice. The court gave
no indication why a professional would be more likely than a layman to have acted with
knowing falsity or serious doubt when using the terms of his profession. Arguably, the
term "mentally deranged" is sufficiently common so that a layman who used it would be
just as likely as a psychiatrist to realize the full impact of its meaning. Mere use of a
specialized term such as "pathologically sadistic" also affords no basis for concluding that
the term was spoken with serious doubts as to its truth. Nor would the use of a specialized
term necessarily make it more likely that a professional would have serious doubts about
the truth before a layman would under the same circumstances. This last proposition
would not be true under an objective recklessness standard. The Supreme Court, however,
has established a subjective recklessness standard that closely approaches actual personal
awareness. See text accompanying notes 72 to 74 supra. Under such a standard, there is
no reason to more readily ascribe serious doubts of the truth to a professional's use of the
terms of his profession than to a layman's use. Cf. Rinsley v. Brandt, 6 MEDIA L. REP.
(BNA) 1222, 1234 (D. Kan. 1980) ("'[Slensational and offensive conclusions"' despite lack
of expertise in the field does not constitute actual malice; "laymen are entitled to opinions
just as are experts, and those opinions are protected by the First Amendment."). But see
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 84 F.R.D. 682 (D. Mass. 1980) (the
fact that defendant's employee was an expert in the field apparently enabled court to infer
actual malice).
137. Psychiatric statements made during lunacy inquests and related judicial
proceedings are absolutely privileged, even if they are defamatory. See, e.g., Adams v.
Peck, 288 Md. 1, 4, 415 A.2d 292, 294 (1980); Annot., 73 A.L.R.2d 325, § 7 (1960).
Establishing that Berkey had made a diagnosis is important because a jury is more likely
to infer recklessness when an expert is commenting on his field of expertise. See
Comment, Defamation and the First Amendment: The Elements and Application of the
Reckless-Disregard Test, 50 N.C.L. REV. 390, 400 n.59 (1972); 13 AKRON L. REV. 373, 387
(1979); cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 580B, Comment e (1977) (due to wider
publication, publication by the professional media causes greater damage than private
conversation does).
138. See 287 Md. at 331, 413 A.2d at 184.
139. 84 Ill. App. 3d 594. 406 N.E.2d 38 (1980).
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post a cash bond. The Brenners expressed their displeasure over this diversion,
and upon arrival at the station the defendant complained about the incident to
Angelo's superior. As defendant Brenner was leaving the station, "he pointed at
plaintiff and said in a raised voice, 'as a psychiatrist, II think] Officer Angelo is
unfit to be a policeman."'
140
The Angelo trial court entered summary judgment for the defendant. On
appeal Angelo argued inter alia that Brenner had made a psychiatric diagnosis;
the Illinois intermediate appellate court readily disposed of this contention. The
court characterized the defendant's statement as merely
one isolated comment [directed] at plaintiff after plaintiff had inconveni-
enced him and his wife. . . . Although the words used were poorly chosen
and poorly timed, we are certain that such a comment, even when made by
a psychiatrist, does not constitute the type of egregious conduct creating a
triable issue on the question of actual malice.'
41
The court was also unwilling to find that Brenner's statement constituted
slander per se. 42 After quoting Officer Angelo's comment that "'lilt's a normal
thing for (arrested) people to make some remarks,' "1 43 the court stated that the
fact that Brenner was a psychiatrist did not elevate his angry use of "unfit" to
the level of a professional opinion. The court also emphasized the surrounding
circumstances by noting that only one allegedly defamatory statement was
made, that it was "relatively mild," and that the fellow officers who witnessed
the event were accustomed to such outbursts. 4 4 Brenner's comment was
analogized to the situation in Stanley v. Taylor,145 in which the defendant had:
140. Id. at 596, 406 N.E.2d at 40.
141. Id. at 597, 406 N.E.2d at 41.
142. At common law, a statement was slanderous per se if it imputed criminal conduct,
a loathsome disease, or sexual misconduct, or if it affected the plaintiff in his business,
trade, profession or office. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §§ 571-74 (1977). Once
slander per se was established, the plaintiff did not have to prove special damages. The
rationale for this procedural advantage was that criticism that fell into one of the
slanderous per se categories would naturally tend to injure one's reputation. Id. § 569,
Comment b. A finding of slander per se would arguably be relevant in establishing New
York Times actual malice. See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967) (a
public figure may "recover damages for a defamatory falsehood whose substance makes
substantial danger to reputation apparent .. "); Comment, Defamation and the First
Amendment: The Elements and Application of the Reckless-Disregard Test, 50 N.C.L. REV.
390, 396 (1972) ("The greater the risk of falsity actually appreciated by the defendant, and
the more severe the charges, the more likely a finding of reckless disregard."). But see
Washington Post Co. v. Keogh, 365 F.2d 965, 970 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
1011 (1967) (seriousness of charge in publication in itself is not probative of reckless
disregard of truth).
143. 84 Il. App. 3d at 598, 406 N.E.2d at 41. Accord, Scelfo v. Rutgers Univ., 116 N.J.
Super. 403, 410-11, 282 A.2d 445, 449 (1971) (police were accustomed to frequent abusive
name calling).
144. See 84 Ill. App. 3d at 599, 406 N.E.2d at 41. See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK
OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 111, at 747-49 (4th ed. 1971).
145. 4 11. App. 3d 98, 278 N.E.2d 824, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 983 (1972).
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spoken in a rather hysterical manner and under circumstances which would
make it apparent to the observer that what was said was nothing more than
an irrational argumentative characterization not worthy of serious consid-
eration. . . . As the record shows, the outburst was spontaneous and made
directly to plaintiff and was obviously more thoughtless than anything else,
and a considered evil intention to defame is not easily imputed
therefrom. 146
The facts in Angelo stand in sharp contrast to the facts supporting the
diagnosis inference in Berkey. Because Berkey waited until five days after the
incident before he wrote his complaint, his original anger would have had
sufficient time to dissipate.147 His letter was apparently composed in a
deliberate, orderly fashion; it would be difficult to characterize it as spon-
taneous, thoughtless, hysterical or irrational as the Angelo court had characte-
rized defendant Brenner's behavior. Berkey clearly intended his letter to be
taken seriously as evidenced by his statements to the investigating officer some
three weeks later that Delia "had a real emotional problem" and "should seek
professional help."14 Whereas Brenner had made a single, isolated comment
directed solely at the plaintiff, Berkey repeated his statements in separate
incidents to the district court judge, Delia's superior, and the investigating
officer. In addition, Brenner's use of the relatively mild and non-psychiatric
"unfit" is qualitatively distinguishable from Berkey's use of specific, extremely
forceful adjectives because descriptions such as "mentally deranged, psycho-
pathic and/or pathologically sadistic" carry a heavy emotional impact. 149 These
factors probably indicate that Dr. Berkey did conduct himself egregiously and
appear to produce a triable issue as to whether Dr. Berkey's diagnosis of Delia
was made with actual malice capable of being shown clearly and convincingly.
ALLEGATION OF FACT RATHER THAN EXPRESSION OF OPINION
The final inference drawn by the Berkey majority was that a jury might
reasonably find that Berkey's statement about Delia's mental health was an
146. Id. at 105, 278 N.E.2d at 829.
147. Cf. Scelfo v. Rutgers Univ., 116 N.J. Super. 403, 411, 282 A.2d 445, 449 (1971)
("The statements referring to the mounted police would not suggest to the average reader
that they were remiss in their duty or actually deserving of the invective, but that the
author was angry, upset and resentful towards the police.").
148. 287 Md. at 308, 413 A.2d at 173. In addition, the formal statement "I shall look
forward to your reply" with which Berkey ended his letter; id at 308, 413 A.2d at 174;
would lend support to the view that Berkey intended to be taken seriously.
149. 287 Md. at 312, 413 A.2d at 175. Although admittedly there is great potential for
abuse of the power that a psychiatrist wields, there is no reason to believe that a
psychiatrist's opinions are not equally protected as any layman's "vehement, caustic, and
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials." New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). In fact, experts will often be in the
forefront of any public debate and therefore they need adequate "breathing space" if they
are to perform their leadership role.
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"allegation" rather than an expression of opinion.150 The court noted that a jury
might find the letter to be an "allegation" by considering the letter's effect on an
ordinary reader, the letter's extremely forceful language, and Berkey's formal
request for a mental examination of Delia. This allegation inference is closely
akin to the "diagnosis" inference, since a diagnosis is nothing more than an
expert's opinion that a certain set of facts or conditions exist.151 Thus, should a
jury make a factual determination that Berkey did not diagnose Delia, the jury
might still find that Berkey had made allegations of certain defamatory traits in
his non-expert capacity as an ordinary citizen.
The dissent failed to analyze whether the facts would support an
"allegation" inference and stated simply that "in effect [Berkey] set forth his
opinion" in his letter. 152 Jidge Eldridge noted three Supreme Court cases that
have suggested that opinions are treated differently than statements of fact
under the first amendment. 153 Judge Eldridge, however, does not appear to have
accepted Berkey's argument that by prefacing his statment about Delia's mental
health with the qualifying comment "I question if," Berkey was thereby
expressing only his opinion. The closest the dissent came to accepting Berkey's
qualifying comment argument was by citing Cline v. Brown.154 In Cline, the
court found that the defendant had not spoken with reckless disregard for the
truth as evidenced by his use of the word "may" in qualifying his statements
that a policeman "may have a personal grudge" and "may have conspired" to
kill a third party. 155 Cline, however, is factually distinguishable from Berkey.
The defendant in Cline filed affidavits which the plaintiff failed to contest and
which gave the source of the information the defendant used to reach his
conclusion that the policeman "may" have acted improperly. 56 There was no
150. 287 Md. at 331-32, 413 A.2d at 184. See, e.g., Pride v. Quitman County Voters
League, 226 So. 2d 735, 737 (Miss. 1969) (language of allegedly defamatory circular that
police officer was an untrained, uneducated, and inhuman law enforcement officer who
had performed brutal, barbaric and wicked acts upon innocent women and children of
black community was an accusation; defendant's demurrer was denied since the circular
was not "fair comment" about a public official); cf. Cianci v. New Times Publishing Co.,
486 F. Supp. 368, 373 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (whether the allegedly defamatory material is held
to be a statement of fact or opinion is a question of law for the court), rev'd on other
grounds, 639 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1980). The New York Times Court was much more amenable
to the fact-opinion distinction. "'Errors of fact, particularly in regard to a man's mental
states and processes, are inevitable ... ' New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
272 (1964) (quoting Sweeney v. Patterson, 128 F.2d 457, 458 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 317
U.S. 678 (1942)).
151. 287 Md. at 314, 413 A.2d at 175 (deposition of Dr. Crowley).
152. Id. at 338, 413 A.2d at 188 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at n.2, 413 A.2d at 188 n.2. See note 159 infra.
154. 24 N.C. App. 209, 210 S.E.2d 446, cert. denied, 286 N.C. 412, 211 S.E.2d 793
(1975).
155. Id. at 216, 210 S.E.2d at 450. Accord, Standke v. B.E. Darby & Sons, Inc., 291
Minn. 468, 477-78, 193 N.W.2d 139, 145-46 (1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 902 (1972)
(defendant "used qualifying language where he felt uncertain of his material.
156. 24 N.C. App. at 216, 210 S.E.2d at 450.
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basis upon which to establish that the Cline defendant knew of the falsity, if
any, of the material these sources contained. Also, the letter in Cline was mailed
only to the proper law enforcement agency for the purpose of suggesting an
investigation of the incident and not to accuse the officer of any misconduct. 5 '
There is an important policy reason for not allowing a defendant to escape
liability for defamation merely by prefacing his assertions with "I regard" or "I
question" as Berkey did in his letter. If courts found as a matter of law that such
comments were constitutionally protected opinions, they would effectively
resurrect the absolute immunity for defamation suggested in the concurring
opinions to New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.15 8 Such a position could be easily
abused by defamation defendants. The Second Circuit in Cianci v. New Times
Publishing Co.159 analyzed the dicta concerning the treatment of opinions which
has appeared in several Supreme Court cases and which prompted Judge
Eldridge to note that statements of opinions were treated differently from
157. Id.
158. 376 U.S. at 293 (Black, J., concurring); id. at 298 (Goldberg, J., concurring). See
Cianci v. New Times Publishing Co., 639 F.2d 54, 64 (2d Cir. 1980) ("It would be
destructive of the law of libel if a writer could escape liability for accusations of crime
simply by using, explicitly or implicitly, the words 'I think'.") (footnote omitted); C.
GATLEY, supra note 133, § 163 (The common law does not allow someone to escape liability
by simply prefacing their statemeait with "in my opinion"; "It is my opinion that the
plaintiff is a thief" is equivalent to an allegation that the plaintiff is a thief.). But see
Medina v. Time, Inc., 439 F.2d 1129, 1130 (1st Cir. 1971) (per curiam) (There is no actual
malice where statement in magazine article questioning disparity of treatment as between
plaintiff and others did not assert accuracy of published accounts implicating plaintiff in
the slaughter of civilians.).
159. 639 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1980). The Second Circuit analyzed three cases that have
suggested constitutional protection for the expression of opinions - Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6
(1970), and Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264 (1974): In Gertz, Justice Powell cited
Thomas Jefferson's argument that the freedom of speech should be extended to those who
want to dissolve the Union as an example of his conception of a protected opinion. 418 U.S.
at 340 n.8. In Greenbelt, the Court protected a "rhetorical hyperbole" that could not be
read as having charged criminal conduct. 398 U.S. at 14. In Letter Carriers, the majority
found that the "loose, figurative" use of "traitor" was protected as a "lusty and
imaginative expression of the contempt felt." 418 U.S. at 284-86. The Second Circuit in
Cianci also cited Buckley v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062
(1977), as a case in which it had protected the "loosely definable, variously interpretable
statements of opinion . . . made inextricably in the contest of political, social, or
philosophical debate." Id. at 895 (plaintiff had been described as a fellow traveler of
fascists). Based on this authority the Second Circuit held:
(1) that a pejorative statement of opinion concerning a public figure is constitutionally
protected . . . no matter how vigorously expressed; (2) that this principle applies even
when the statement includes a term which could refer to criminal conduct if the term
could not reasonably be so understood in context; but (3) that the principle does not
cover a charge which could reasonably be understood as imputing specific criminal or
wrongful acts.
639 F.2d at 64. See also Cafeteria Union v. Angelos, 320 U.S. 293, 295 (1943) ("to use loose
language or undefined slogans that are part of the conventional give-and-take in our
economic and political controversies - like 'unfair' and 'fascist'- is not to falsify facts.").
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statements of facts for first amendment purposes. The Cianci court concluded
that only "pure opinions" were absolutely protected by the first amendment
since they alone can be corrected when subjected to public debate.1 60 Under this
standard, Berkey's statement "questioning" Delia's mental health would almost
certainly fail to qualify as an absolutely protected opinion because it is not the
sort of issue to be fairly and appropriately subjected to public debate.
REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES CLAUSE
Having examined the issues raised by the Berkey majority, there remains
one matter that was hinted at by Judge Eldridge 16 1 and completely ignored by
the majority - the role that the first amendment's redress of grievances clause
might play in this case. It should be noted initially that the Supreme Court has
never addressed the question of the impact that the redress of grievances clause
may exert on a defamation claim. 162 The Supreme Court opinions that have
construed the clause, however, have consistently advanced the right to petition
as logically implicit in and fundamental to the very idea of a republican form of
governance.' 63 Indeed, there is some support for the notion that if Delia is not a
public official for New York Times purposes, Berkey might still be able to claim
the protection of New York Times by virtue of the redress of grievances
clause.
164
160. 639 F.2d at 63-66. But see Rinsley v. Brandt, 6 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1222, 1226
(D. Kan. 1980) ("Because the statement is qualified with the phrase 'to my knowledge,' it
is doubtful that plaintiff could ever prove it to be untrue."); McGuire v. Roth, 8 Ohio Misc.
92, 96, 219 N.W.2d 319, 322 (1965) ("wondering" if plaintiff had gotten a kickback was a
nondefamatory distortion of fact or innuendo; defendant's statement was "simply a remote
allusion or reference to a person not named or a deprecatory hint").
161. 287 Md. at 339, 413 A.2d at 188 (Eldridge, J., dissenting). The first amendment
provides in pertinent part that "Congress shall make no law.., abridging. . . the right
of the people . . . to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST.
amend. I. Maryland's equivalent redress of grievances clause provides: "[Elvery man hath
a right to petition the Legislature for the redress of grievances-in a peaceable and orderly
manner." MD. CONST. DECL. OF RIGHTS, art. 13.
162. Sierra Club v. Butz, 349 F. Supp. 934, 937 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
163. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1875). The right to petition for
redress of grievances is "among the most precious of the liberties safeguarded by the Bill
of Rights." United Mine Workers of America, District 12 v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n., 389
U.S. 217, 222 (1967). The redress of grievances clause has "a sanctity and a sanction not
permitting dubious intrusions." Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945).
164. See Arlington Heights Nat'l Bank v. Arlington Heights Fed. Savings & Loan
Ass'n., 37 Ill. 2d 546, 550-51, 229 N.E.2d 514, 517 (1967). See also Rusack v. Harsha, 470
F. Supp. 285, 297 (M.D. Pa. 1978); Sierra Club v. Butz, 349 F. Supp. 934, 938-39 (N.D.
Cal. 1972) (when the "real purpose" of a petition for redress is "to obtain governmental
action" and not "injure the plaintiff," no tort action will lie for exercising the right to
petition).
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There remains the issue whether the redress of grievances clause should
suffice to provide absolute immunity from liability for defamation.16 5 On this
issue a minority of states have held that a petition for redress of grievances will
absolutely bar a defamation suit. 166 There are three grounds in support of such
165. There is a justifiable concern over the potential abuse of an absolute immunity
from defamation. See Oakes, Proof of Actual Malice in Defamation Actions: An Unsolved
Dilemma, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 655, 715-17 (1979). In contrast to a citizen petitioner, the
institutional press has significant checks at work upon it. For example, the press must
account to reviews, academy analyses, inhouse ombudsmen, and ethical considerations
that demand full and honest disclosure to the public. See J. HULTENG, THE MESSENGER'S
MOTIVES: ETHICAL PROBLEMS OF NEWS MEDIA 227-37 (1976). As an ongoing institution
with an interest in self-perpetuation, the press is also held to traditions, attitudes and
public credibility, which is reflected in its bank accounts. See T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 538 (1970). Press review councils are another potential check.
Peterson, Press Councils - A Look Toward the Future, 29 U. MIAMI L. REV. 487 (1975). In
addition, when journalists sue for defamation, they too have frequently been held to the
New York Times actual malice standard. See Stevens, Journalists as Plaintiffs in Libel
Suits Since 1966, 51 JOURNALISM Q. 134, 134-36 (1974).
In contrast, a citizen petitioner does not have significant checks at work upon
him. However, the lack of institutional checks on a citizen petitioner does not necessarily
make the citizen any less manageable or give him a license to be a "character
assassinator," St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 734 (1968) (Fortas, J., dissenting).
The potential damage from a false complaint filed only with the proper authority is
negligible when compared to the potential harm from a false multi-state newspaper
publication. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580B, Comment e (1977) (due to wider
publication, publication by the professional media causes greater damage than a private
conversation does). It is also arguable that the recipient of a citizen's petition would
consider the lack of institutional checks in assessing the reliability of the information.
Thus, the plaintiffs reputation would sustain little, if any, tarnishing.
Even if an absolute position is not adopted, the exercise of the right to petition
can still be accorded additional protection. For example, a petition for redress arguably
should merit a higher burden of persuasion than the usual "clear and convincing proof"
standard. The burden on a plaintiff defamed by a petition for redress arguably should
approach or equal the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of criminal trials. For other
suggestions as to how various types of speech might be stratified according to their
importance, see Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. BAR
FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 521, 528.
166. Rusack v. Harsha, 470 F. Supp. 285, 297 (M.D. Pa. 1978) (absolute immunity from
defamation for a letter filed with the appropriate officials was based on the importance of
the right to report possible criminal violations), Yancey v. Commonwealth, 135 Ky. 207,
216, 122 S.W. 123, 125 (1909); Maurice v. Worden, 54 Md. 233, 253 (1880) (in dictum, the
court stated that at common law, there was an absolute right to petition the legislature);
Thorn v. Blanchard, 5 Johns. 508, 530 (N.Y. 1809) (petition seeking the removal of
plaintiff, a local district attorney, was sent to the council empowered to remove plaintiff
and was absolutely privileged); Campo v. Rega, 79 A.D.2d 626, 626, 433 N.Y.S.2d 630, 631
(1980) (absolute privilege attached to civilian complaint about conduct of police officer);
Harris v. Huntington, 2 Tyl. 129, 139-40 (Vt. 1802) (cited with approval in Petitions of
Davenport, 129 Vt. 546, 559, 283 A.2d 452, 458 (1971)); Larkin v. Noonan, 19 Wis. 93, 98
(1865) (letter to governor complaining of sheriff's misconduct and seeking his removal was
absolutely privileged as initiating a judicial proceeding); cf. Kerpelman v. Bricker, 23
Md. App. 628, 634, 329 A.2d 423, 427 (1974) (letter of complaint to Grievance Committee
of Maryland State Bar Association was absolutely privileged as initiating a "judicial
proceeding."). See also California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S.
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a view. First, linguistic analysis of the first amendment suggests that the
founding fathers must have deemed the right to petition a more important form
of speech than that protected by the general freedom of speech clause because
they set the right to petition out separately.16 7 Moreover, the right to petition is
declared a "right," while the freedom of speech clause is much more general and
less affirmatively worded. In fact, prefacing the freedom of speech clause with
"the" demonstrates that a citizen has a weaker claim to exercising "the," not
his, freedom of speech than he does in exercising his "right" to petition. 168
Hence, the right to petition arguably allows a citizen to invoke first amendment
protection more readily than the general, non-personal freedom of speech clause.
Second, there are structural arguments for granting absolute immunity to a
petition for redress of grievances. This form of speech is peculiarly important for
the proper functioning of a democratic form of government. 169 A petition for
redress identifies a specific instance where government has trampled on an
individual's interests in personal sovereignty. While the typical New York
Times suit concerns the general performance or qualifications of a. public
official, 170 a petition for redress centers on specific, identifiable acts which
508, 510 (1972) ("the right to petition extends to all departments of the Government");
Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 139 (1961)("The right of the people to inform their representatives in government of their desires
with respect to the passage or enforcement of laws cannot properly be made to depend upon
their intent in doing so.") (emphasis added); Gorman Towers, Inc. v. Bogoslavsky, 626 F.2d
607, 614 (8th Cir. 1980); Stern v. United States Gypsum, Inc., 547 F.2d 1329, 1345 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 975 (1977) (leaving open whether an absolute immunity from
defamation attached to a letter of complaint filed with the superiors of an I.R.S. agent);
Weiss v. Willow Tree Civic Ass'n, 467 F. Supp. 803, 819 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
Many commentators have argued that the free speech clause of the first
amendment alone should be sufficient to justify an absolute immunity from defamation,
especially where a political issue is raised. See, e.g., Blasi, supra note 165, at 587;
Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REv. 245, 255-66;
Comment, Defamation and the First Amendment: Protecting Speech on Public Issues, 56
WASH L. REV. 75, 76 (1980). For a general discussion of the absolute privilege as a defense
to defamation in Maryland, see 39 MD. L. REV. 515, 519 n.38 (1980).
167. Cf. Stewart, "Or of the Press", 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 633 (1975) (If the free press
clause warrants no greater protection than the free speech clause, then the guarantee of a
free press is a "constitutional redundancy.").
168. Leflar, The Free-ness of Free Speech, 15 VAND L. REV. 1073, 1080 (1962). Professor
Leflar makes the linguistic argument that by prefacing "freedom of speech" with "the",
the founding fathers indicated that the exercise of free speech depends on the social and
legal mores of the time. Professor Leflar suggests that this argument would apply to "the"
right to petition as well.
169. Blasi, supra note 165, at 589 (The checking value of the first amendment
recognizes the importance of outside, unconventional criticism which the media is unlikely
to provide).
170. See, e.g., Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295, 296 (1971) (mayor
falsely accused of perjury in federal court); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 65-66
(1964) (state court judges accused of laziness and inefficiency, and of hampering the
enforcement of the vice laws).
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inevitably constitute official conduct or official policy.' Comments about such
conduct or policy arguably merit greater protection than statements about the
general performance or qualifications of a public official. Moreover, the right to
petition is particularly fragile. Although any member of society may criticize
social evils such as an official's unfitness for office, there are often only a few, if
that many, individuals who ever experience the specific form of conduct that
usually gives rise to a petition for redress.
72
Under these circumstances, if the individual fails to act, the entire incident
is left unreported. The typical, large media New York Times defendant often
will be able to marshal significant political support for his views since the evil
he seeks to alleviate touches society at large. The citizen petitioner, however,
lacks such a political backing when the grievance he has endured does not
receive adequate publication, and consequently, does not mobilize the social
conscience. 1 73 Moreover, not only is the right to petition fragile, but it is often
the only effective way to exert a check on governmental power. For example,
writing a letter may be the only real way for a citizen to complain about police
work, and that letter may be effective only if addressed to the policeman's
superior or the newspaper.
174
171. See, e.g., Stern v. United States Gypsum, Inc., 547 F.2d 1329 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 975 (1977) (letter of complaint to the superiors of an I.R.S. agent
concerning the agent's conduct during an official audit).
172. See id.; A. BLACK, THE PEOPLE AND THE POLICE 97-99 (1968). The prospect of
self-censorship of a citizen complaint "may be viewed as particularly serious [since] it
relates to a category of communication which can be identified as uniquely important in
the constitutional scheme; in that respect, the self-censorship arguments are bolstered by
the checking value [of the first amendment]." See Blasi, supra note 165, at 587.
173. See Stern v. United States Gypsum, Inc., 547 F.2d 1329, 1343 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 975 (1977) ("[T]he fact that a grievance may not arouse sufficient public
concern to generate political support makes the individualized exercise of the right to
petition all the more important") (quoted with approval in Bradley v. Computer Sciences
Corp., 643 F.2d 1029, 1033 (4th Cir. 1981)).
174. See id. ("Unless the grievance embodies a violation of established and judicially
enforceable state or federal rights, individual petitioning may be the only available means
of seeking redress."); T. AARON, supra note 98, at 3-4 ("Courts can act only when a specific
right is claimed or when a specific law can be shown to have been violated. . . . Often, the
citizen is offered no other opportunity than to press his claim with the offending public
official's superiors.") Cf Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 378-79 (1976) (under the principles
of federalism a federal court should not limit a police department in handling citizen
complaints of police misconduct by granting injunctions). Not only may a petition be
ineffective unless addressed to a superior officer, but writing to other individuals may also
be more perilous. At common law, for instance, no privilege attached to a petition if it was
addressed to someone who had no power to grant the redress or to inquire into the alleged
abuse. C. GATLEY, supra note 133, § 574. However, it is important to note that the very
fact that complaints are handled by an officer's superiors tends to minimize and
discourage complaints. Council of Organizations on Philadelphia Police Accountability
and Responsibility v. Rizzo, 357 F. Supp. 1289, 1320 (E.D.Pa. 1973), affd, 506 F.2d 542
(1974), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
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Third, there is historical support for the notion that a right to petition is
critical to society. The practice of petitioning was deeply rooted in England by
the time the first amendment to the Constitution was drafted. 1 75 The right to
petition, however, was not absolute at common law. 176 Moreover, the strongest
argument against adoption of an absolute right to petition is that a clear
majority of states have declared that the right to petition is adequately
protected by a qualified privilege for defamation defendants. 177
CONCLUSION
The impact of the Berkey decision on the exercise of first amendment rights
in Maryland may well be significant. Ironically, the Berkey majority did not
even mention the first amendment by name in the course of its entire opinion.
In contrast, even the more traditional courts concede that close scrutiny is
required when dealing with the interaction of freedom of speech and right to
trial by jury. 7 8 The majority omitted any evaluation of the impact that this
decision may have on the general public, 179 which concededly has a strong
175. See Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 49 n.2 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting);
Jackson v. Filliben, 281 A.2d 604, 605 (Del. 1971); Richards Furniture Corp. v. Board of
County Comm'rs, 233 Md. 249, 259, 196 A.2d 621, 626 (1964) (At common law, the right to
petition was "among the most cherished rights of the citizens of that time.").
176. See, e.g., White v. Nicholls, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 266, 291 (1845) (quoted in Herbert v.
Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 163 n.10 (1979)); Maurice v. Worden, 54 Md. 233, 254 (1880) (letter
of complaint sent to the naval academy); C. GATLEY, supra note 133, § 572 (the fact that
the defendant was seeking a redress will repel the common law presumption of malice); W.
PROSSER, supra note 144, § 115, at 791-92; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 598,
Comment c (1977). But see note 166 supra.
177. See, e.g., Sowder v. Nolan, 125 A.2d 52, 54 (D.C. 1956) (qualified privilege to write
complaint to a police officer's superior); Thompson v. Upton, 218 Md. 433, 437, 146 A.2d
880, 883 (1959) (same). See generally 50 AM. JuR.2d Libel and Slander § 219 (1970); 51
COLUM. L. REV. 244, 245 (1951). One commentator has noted that for the last fifty years,
there has been a strong national trend to abolish or restrict absolute and conditional
privileges. L. ELDREDGE, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION 243-44 (1978). See also Brush-Moore
Newspapers, Inc. v. Pollitt, 220 Md. 132, 137, 151 A.2d 530, 533 (1959).
178. In Tait v. King Broadcasting Co., 1 Wash. App. 250, 460 P.2d 307 (1969), the
court stated:
[Olur court has been conservative in granting summary judgment where the issues
involve the inferences to be drawn from admitted facts to determine ultimate facts
such as intent, knowledge, good faith and negligence. . . . These issues do not
normally involve, however, the pursuit of constitutionally protected practices.
Id. at 255, 460 P.2d at 311 (citation omitted).
179. The duty to minimize self-censorship is not limited to the Supreme Court. Use of a
defamation suit to squelch criticism can occur at the national, regional or local level. See,
e.g., A. BLACK, supra note 172, at 70-71 (noting that the police in at least one
[unidentifiedi city promote the use of defamation suits to minimize citizen complaints);
Footlick, Stop or I'll Sue, NEWSWEEK, March 6, 1978, at 102 ("Los Angeles police alone
filed 30 law suits against citizens last year [19771 and 20 in 1976."). Furthermore, the
Maryland Court of Appeals has stated that it is important not to have self-censorship
when the interest advanced outweighs the plaintiff's interest in his reputation. Marchesi
v. Franchino, 283 Md. 131, 135-36, 387 A.2d 1129, 1131 (1978). The complaint procedure
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interest in the unfettered interchange of complaints by aggrieved citizens. One
commentator has noted: "II]n the course of time, police misconduct cumulates
over a population of citizens so that a sizeable minority of citizens experience
police misconduct at one time or another. The striking fact is that relative to the
actual incidence of police misconduct, the volume of complaints about it is
low." s1 8 0 The Berkey decision may widen this gap since many citizens may prefer
to remain silent or to complain in a "neutral" manner that will allow them to
steer around dangerous public issues regardless of the social importance and
desirability of their candid comments. Moreover, the Berkey court's reliance on a
jury trial in defamation cases raises the problem that a community majority
is especially important because "the courts are generally powerless to provide relief for
citizens complaining of vague, although real, misuse of police discretion." T. AARON, supra
note 98, at x.
180. A. REiss, THE POLICE AND THE PUBLIC 151 (1971). See A. BLACK, supra note 172, at
70, 95-96. In L. RUCHELMAN, WHO RULES THE POLICE? (1973), the author underscored the
critical danger when citizen complaints are low: "[slince the very nature of police work
involves a high degree of efficiency on the part of the individual officer, it is especially
crucial that the Police Commissioner receive as much reliable information as possible
about how policemen are performing their duty and how departmental practices affect the
public." Id. at 61-62. See also Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 277 (1941) (the
Secretary of Labor is charged with preventing labor strikes and is therefore entitled to
receive all available information) (the message sent to the Secretary of Labor was a
petition for redress).
The complaint process has been hindered because the police are increasingly
using defamation suits as a weapon to discourage and defend against citizen complaints.
A. BLACK, supra note 172, at 70-71, 99; H. GOLDSTEIN, POLICING A FREE SOCIETY 173
(1977); POLICE DEFAMATION SUITS, supra note 94, at 676; Footlick, supra note 179. The
defamation suit and other potential weapons are so highly refined that there is even a
special magazine that is published to assist police officers in learning how to sue. See id.;
POLICE DEFAMATION SUITS, supra note 94, at 676 n.5.
To increase the number of complaints, an atmosphere of easy access must be
created. See H. GOLDSTEIN, supra, at 173. A potential defamation suit detracts from this
process. However, the low level of complaints is also attributable to other factors. For
instance, it is often easier to submit, cooperate, or to sacrifice one's dignity than to stand
up for one's rights. See Stern v. United States Gypsum, Inc., 547 F.2d 1329, 1343 n.21 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 975 (1977). A general distrust of police and excessive red tape
can account for some self-censorship. POLICE DEFAMATION SUITS, supra note 94, at 680. One
commentator notes a number of other factors. Charges against a citizen are often dropped
if he agrees to drop his complaint. Many citizens believe that a complaint will not be
properly processed or seriously acted upon. The police are seen as a close-knit group that is
not subject to outside discipline. A possible investigation and hearing will deter others,
particularly because many individuals who experience police misconduct have something
to hide from the police. There are also practical considerations: a complaint may intensify
the prosecution of an arrested defendant and provoke countercharges such as perjury;
there is often a lack of witnesses and supporting evidence; and there is a fear of retaliation
and harassment since the complainant may have to deal with the police officer or his
friends in the future. Finally, there are many aggrieved citizens who are simply ignorant
of available procedures. A. BLACK, supra note 172 at 97-99. Thus, in the absence of
empirical data, of which there is none, it can be argued that a defamation suit has a de
minimis effect in promoting self-censorship, while correspondingly insuring that only
reliable information is received.
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may seek to punish unpopular views through the jury system.' 8 ' This is a
particularly grave concern given the empirical data showing that lower class,
minority members file a disproportionately large number of complaints about
police misconduct.' 8 2 Police-minority relations can be particularly volatile, and
any limitation, whether real or imagined, on the customary complaint procedure
may serve to generate additional hostility. Any decrease in the already low
volume of complaints may adversely affect law enforcement agencies in other
ways as well because the feedback from citizen complaints serves a critical
function in the development of effective police action. 83 In light of the
potentially far-reaching impact that this decision might have, a more careful
consideration of its ramifications was warranted. Judge Eldridge's dissent was
181. See e.g., Washington Post Co. v. Keogh, 365 F.2d 965, 968 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 1011 (1967).
182. P. CHEVIGNY, POLICE POWER: POLICE ABUSES IN NEW YORK CITY 286 (1969); A.
REISS, supra note 180, at 154. But see L. RUCHELMAN, supra note 180, at 37 (1973) (most
complaints come from middle class citizens, not the ghetto). The police image as the
repressive force in society is based in part on the lack of effective complaint procedures.
"[A] 'major source of Negro hostility to police is the almost total lack of effective channels
for redress of complaints against police conduct.'" Martin, The Police and the Black
Community, 3 POLICE L. Q. 22, 35 (July, 1974) (quoting REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY
COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 310 (1968)). See generally Comment, Reviewing Civilian
Complaints of Police Misconduct - Some Answers and More Questions, 48 TEMP. L.Q. 89,
100-10 (1974).
183. Complaints of police misconduct serve critical functions in defining the police-
citizen relationship. H. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 180, at 157-86; L. RUCHELMAN, supra note
180, at 36-37. A complaint informs superior officers of police misconduct. Police
Defamation Suits, supra note 94, at 677. The complaint procedure integrates minorities
into the social structure. L. RUCHELMAN, supra note 180, at 44. A complaint alerts the
police and allows them to take affirmative steps to prevent the outbreak of violence. Id. at
45; Police Defamation Suits, supra note 94, at 693 n.97. The complaint procedure acts as a
gauge of community attitudes. Id. The complaint procedure is reassuring to those who
know of it but never have to use it; L. RUCHELMAN, supra note 180, at 55; and it provides
especially useful information because it is not subjected to interdepartmental control; Id.
at 61.
The complaint procedure is also important because it identifies the unacceptable
components of two important sources of police power. First, a complaint directed at one
individual in effect can challenge a practice common throughout the agency. See H.
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 180, at 163. Complaints are often the best indicators of
longstanding practices in need of correction. Id. But see L. RUCHELMAN, supra note 180, at
37 (There is no evidence that the complaint procedure has generally served as a
significant vehicle for critical evaluation of existing police practices and the development
of more adequate policies.). Second, citizen complaints help define acceptable police
behavior by identifying specific offensive elements in the broad discretion wielded by a
policeman. Police Defamation Suits, supra note 94, at 677-78. Thus, complaints assist in
identifying officers with a propensity for wrongdoing. H. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 180, at
171-72. Even false complaints would assist in this process since the application of
appropriate statistical tests would identify those officers whose volume of complaints
significantly deviated from the norm. However, caution is advised since an abnormally
large number of false complaints might reflect many factors including community
prejudice, or an ambitious policeman rather than a lackadaisical one.
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quite properly worried about these "chilling effects" that the majority has
placed on the freedom of speech.1
8 4
The direct effect of this case will be to renew the strength of traditional
procedure for summary judgments. Unfortunately, this may exact an inordi-
nately large toll from the protection afforded first amendment rights in
Maryland. Lower Maryland courts will justifiably interpret this case as a
relaxation of the stringent New York Times requirements, but to this extent the
Berkey court may be in step with recent trends in the law of defamation." 5 Yet,
since the law of libel still requires a delicate balancing act by the judiciary, the
effect of Berkey on Maryland's summary judgment in defamation will turn on a
case-by-case determination of what constitutes knowing falsity or reckless
disregard of the truth.
The significance of this case may well be to point out some of the difficulties
inherent in making factual inferences when first amendment rights are
involved. The court seems to be striving for a new sense of justice in which the
balance between reputational interests and the right to a jury trial can very
well surpass the right to criticize vigorously. 18 6 To this extent, the Berkey case
may well serve to rejuvenate previously disfavored policy considerations and to
show that they are still quite viable in securing justice for a defamed public
official. However, the entire question of summary judgment in a defamation suit
remains a "complex" area.'8 The Maryland Court of Appeals may have
simplified some of the confusion, but only by derogating first amendment
protections.
184. 287 Md. at 333, 413 A.2d at 185 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
185. See Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157, 166-69 (1979) (limiting the
scope of the public figure concept); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 134-36 (1979)
(same); id. at 120 n.9 (raising doubts about the availability of summary judgment in a
defamation suit); Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 169-70 (1979) (overruling a lower court
decision that provided an absolute bar against discovery into the editorial process); Time,
Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 453-55 (1976) (limiting the scope of the public figure
concept); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974) (abandoning extension of
New York Times into issues of general public interest). See generally Comment,
Defamation and the First Amendment in the 1978 Term: Diminishing Protection for the
Media, 48 U. CIN. L. REV. 1027 (1979).
186. The Berkey decision might arguably be publicly received as just the sort of abuse
of rights that society will not condone. As such, it could serve to sensitize the informed
public that there are indeed limits to first amendment rights and that they will be
enforced. See Berkey v. Delia, 287 Md. at 331, 413 A.2d at 184 (quoting Bogen, The
Supreme Court's Interpretation of the Guarantee of Freedom of Speech, 35 MD.'L. REV. 555,
605-06 (1976)).
187. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 120 n.9 (1979) (dictum).
Vance v. Vance
The current trend among American courts has been to provide some degree
of legal protection to those who suffer emotional distress' caused by the
wrongful acts of others.2 While most jurisdictions have recognized an indepen-
dent cause of action for the intentional infliction of emotional distress,3 few have
allowed recovery of damages for emotional distress resulting from negligent
conduct, absent accompanying physical injury.4 In Vance v. Vance,5 the
Maryland Court of Appeals held that a plaintiff could recover for emotional
injury as an element of damages in a negligent misrepresentation action
provided that the emotional distress was manifested by a "physical injury."6 The
court defined "physical injury" as an injury capable of objective determination.7
Although it did not expressly hold that an action may be had for the negligent
infliction of emotional distress, the court may have greatly expanded the
Maryland plaintiff's ability to recover for negligently inflicted emotional injury.
Dr. Arnold and Muriel Vance participated in a marriage ceremony in 1956.'
Shortly thereafter, Dr. Vance learned that his divorce from his first wife had not
been final at the time of his marriage to Muriel Vance 9 and that consequently
his marriage to Muriel Vance was void.10 Evidence at trial indicated, however,
1. "Emotional distress" is difficult to define both medically and legally. It is used
interchangeably with such terms as mental suffering, mental anguish, emotional injury,
and emotional disturbance by courts and commentators. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 46, Comment j (1965).
2. See, e.g., Rodrigues v. State, 52 Hawaii 156, 174, 472 P.2d 509, 520 (1970) ("We
recognize that the interest in freedom from negligent infliction of serious mental distress
is entitled to independent legal protection."); Harris v. Jones, 281 Md. 560, 566, 380 A.2d
611, 614 (1977) ("We agree that the independent tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress should be sanctioned in Maryland. ). See also Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d 100, 106
(1959).
3. Cases are collected in Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d 100, 120-26 (1959). For a more recent
compilation of cases, see Harris v. Jones, 281 Md. 560, 564-65 n.1, 380 A.2d 611, 613 n.1
(1977). See generally 38 AM. JUR. 2d, Fright, Shock, and Mental Disturbance § 17 (1968)
and cases collected therein.
4. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 54, at 327-30 (4th ed. 1971).
5. 286 Md. 490, 408 A.2d 728 (1979).
6. Id. at 501 & n.4, 408 A.2d at 734 & n.4. The "physical injury" test was formulated
by the Maryland Court of Appeals in Bowman v. Williams, 164 Md. 397, 165 A. 182
(1933). See notes 70 to 73 and accompanying text infra.
7. 286 Md. at 500, 408 A.2d at 734. The court noted that its definition differed from
the ordinary dictionary meaning of the term "physical." Id. & n.3.
8. 286 Md. at 492, 408 A.2d at 729.
9. Dr. Vance married Muriel on Sept. 29, 1956. His divorce from his first wife
became final on Oct. 16, 1956. Id. at 493, 408 A.2d at 729.
10. On Nov. 6, 1956, Dr. Vance's lawyer mailed the final divorce decree to Dr. Vance's
address at University Hospital. Upon receipt of the document, Dr. Vance learned that his
divorce had not become final until Oct. 16, 1956. Id.; Joint Record Extract at 60-61,
78-80.
Under Maryland law, "(a] second marriage contracted while a first marriage
exists undissolved is a nullity without the passage of any judicial decree declaring it void."
Townsend v. Morgan, 192 Md. 168, 173, 63 A.2d 743, 745 (1949). See also MD. ANN. CODE
art. 16, § 24 (1981 Repl. Vol.).
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that Dr. Vance never told Muriel Vance that their marriage was void. 1' In 1974,
after Dr. Vance left her for another woman, Muriel Vance filed for and obtained
a decree for alimony and child support. 12 In response, Dr. Vance filed a petition
to strike the decree and to annul the marriage based on its invalidity. 13 Upon
learning that her marriage was void, Muriel Vance sued Dr. Vance for negligent
misrepresentation of his marital status in 195614 and for intentional infliction of
emotional distress for concealment of their true marital status.
15
At trial, evidence showed that when Muriel Vance learned that her marriage
was void, she went into a state of emotional collapse and depression.' 6 According
to her testimony, she reacted in the following manner:
I just - I couldn't function, I couldn't sleep. I was totally embarrassed by
the fact that he had filed this and it became public knowledge, once it's
filed. I consider it defamation of my character. I was too embarrassed to go
out and socialize with people that tried to be kind to me. And I just couldn't
function. I really thought I was going to have a nervous breakdown. And
even now I have the symptoms of an ulcer.
1 7
Muriel Vance's son testified that she was depressed, changed in appearance,
detached, and unaware of her own presence; she spent much time crying and
sobbing.' 8 Muriel Vance's mother testified that her daughter was in a state of
emotional collapse. 9 Mrs. Vance, however, presented no medical testimony to
prove her claim and no evidence to show that she was taking any medication.
20
At the close of the evidence, the trial court directed a verdict for Dr. Vance on
the intentional infliction of emotional distress count, and although the jury
returned a verdict of $50,000 for Muriel Vance for negligent misrepresentation,
11. See 286 Md. at 493, 408 A.2d at 729-30; Joint Record Extract at 38-42.
12. 286 Md. at 492, 408 A.2d at 729.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 492-93, 408 A.2d at 729. The elements of the cause of action for negligent
misrepresentation were outlined in Virginia Dare Stores, Inc. v. Schuman, 175 Md. 287, 1
A.2d 897 (1938). They include: 1) a negligently volunteered erroneous opinion; 2) intent on
defendant's part that the opinion be relied upon; 3) defendant knew or should have known
that plaintiff's reliance would be likely to cause loss or injury to plaintiff; 4) action in
reliance on the opinion by plaintiff. Accord, Piper v. Jenkins, 207 Md. 308, 113 A.2d 919
(1955); Holt v. Kolker, 189 Md. 636, 57 A.2d 287 (1948). See 35 MD. L. REV. 651 (1976).
15. Id. at 493, 408 A.2d at 729. Maryland recognized the tort of intentional infliction
of emotional distress in Harris v. Jones, 281 Md. 560, 380 A.2d 611 (1977). See notes 52 to
56, 130 & 131 and accompanying text infra.
16. See 286 Md. at 493-94, 408 A.2d at 730.
17. Id. at 493, 408 A.2d at 730. Muriel also stated that she was embarrassed about
the invalid marriage because when word of it got out, everyone knew about it and asked
her about it. Joint Record Extract at 35.
18. 286 Md. at 494, 408 A.2d at 730.
19. Id. at 493, 408 A.2d at 730.
20. Id. at 494, 408 A.2d at 730.
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the trial court entered judgment notwithstanding the verdict for Dr. Vance on
that count.
2 1
The Court of Special Appeals reversed both rulings. 22 It found that Muriel
Vance suffered emotional distress, that her claim came under the rule of
Bowman v. Williams,23 which permitted recovery for emotional distress if it
resulted in physical injury, and that the evidence was legally sufficient for the
jury to find that she was physically injured as a result of the mental distress.2 4
The court also held that there was legally sufficient evidence for the jury to find
the elements of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress25 under the
rule of Harris v. Jones.
26
On writ of certiorari, the Maryland Court of Appeals agreed that negligent
misrepresentation had been established. The court held that the evidence was
legally sufficient to establish symptoms of a mental state evidencing a physical
injury as required by Bowman and that Muriel Vance therefore could recover
damages for Dr. Vance's negligent misrepresentation of his marital status.
27
However, the Court of Appeals reversed the Court of Special Appeals on the
intentional infliction count. The court held that the evidence was not legally
sufficient to establish the elements of the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress under the principles of Harris v. Jones.
28
21. Id. On the intentional infliction count, the judge granted a directed verdict
because he found "no legally sufficient evidence to indicate, assuming that there was a
fraudulent representation as to the marital status of Dr. Vance at that time, that it was
done at that time with the intention of infliction of emotional distress upon Mrs. Vance."
Joint Record Extract at 123. The trial judge granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict
because "damages consisting solely of mental distress are not recoverable in an action for
negligent misrepresentation." Id. at 8.
22. Vance v. Vance, 41 Md. App. 130, 136-37, 396 A.2d 296, 300-01 (1979). In dicta,
the Court of Special Appeals considered that although most jurisdictions denied recovery
for negligent infliction of emotional distress, some jurisdictions allowed recovery if there
was a strong likelihood in light of the circumstances of the case that the emotional distress
was serious and genuine. Id. at 137, 396 A.2d at 301. The court found that the arguments
usually advanced against allowing recovery - the possibility of fictitious claims and the
potential for an increase in the number of lawsuits - were not compelling. Id. Therefore,
the court concluded:
We believe it is time that courts unbind themselves from the outmoded belief that
there can be no injury to the mind without overt manifestations of bodily harm. We
should recognize what the health professionals already know, that the psyche is as
susceptible of injury as the body, and that the absence of apparent physical damage
does not serve to lessen the extent of the bodily injury.
Id. at 138, 396 A.2d at 301 (citations omitted).
23. 164 Md. 397, 165 A. 182 (1933). See notes 70 to 74 and accompanying text infra.
24. 41 Md. App. at 137, 396 A.2d at 300-01.
25. Id. at 140-41, 396 A.2d at 303.
26. 281 Md. 560, 380 A.2d 611 (1977). See notes 52 to 56, 130 & 131 and
accompanying text infra.
27. 286 Md. at 501, 408 A.2d at 734. In a footnote, the court expressed its disapproval
of recognizing a cause of action for negligently inflicted emotional distress, absent
accompanying physical injury or physical consequences. See id. n.4.
28. Id. at 506, 408 A.2d at 737.
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The court first discussed Dr. Vance's contention that bodily injury was
necessary to satisfy the Bowman subsequent physical injury test. 29 After an
examination of the historical context within which the Bowman rule
developed,3 ° and some discussion of the Bowman case itself,3 ' the court
concluded that physical injury resulting from emotional distress could be proven
in one of four ways: by evidence of an external condition, through symptoms of a
pathological state, through symptoms of a physiological state, or by evidence
indicative of a mental state. 2 The court noted that a "physical" injury in the
context of the Bowman physical injury standard meant an injury "capable of
objective determination."3 3 Upon examining the evidence, the court found that
Muriel Vance suffered an "objectively manifested, definite nervous disorder." 34
Thus, the court held that the evidence was "legally sufficient to establish
symptoms of a mental state evidencing a physical injury within the meaning of
the Bowman standard. 35
Dr. Vance also contended that medical evidence was necessary to support
Muriel's claim. He argued that medical testimony was necessary both to
establish that Muriel suffered an actual injury36 and to prove causation between
the injury and his allegedly wrongful conduct.37 The court dismissed these
arguments, noting that because Muriel's injury was related to matters within
the common experience and knowledge of lay persons, its existence as well as
the causal link between it and Dr. Vance's negligence were within the
competence of ordinary lay persons to determine. 38 Hence, the court held that
29. See id. at 495-501, 408 A.2d at 731-34.
30. Id. at 496-98, 408 A.2d at 731-32.
31. Id. at 499-500, 408 A.2d at 732-33.
32. Id. at 500, 408 A.2d at 733.
33. Id. at 501, 408 A.2d at 734. The court noted that other jurisdictions had employed
this interpretation of "physical" and cited various cases to that effect, including: Petition
of United States, 418 F.2d 264, 267-69 (1st Cir. 1969); D'Ambra v. United States, 396 F.
Supp. 1180, 1182-84 (D.R.I. 1973); Espinosa v. Beverly Hospital, 114 Cal. App.2d 232, 249
P.2d 843 (1952); Toms v. McConnell, 45 Mich. App. 647, 207 N.W.2d 140 (1973); Daley v.
LaCroix, 384 Mich. 4, 179 N.W.2d 390 (1970); Netusil v. Novak, 120 Neb. 751, 235 N.W.
335 (1931).
34. 286 Md. at 501, 408 A.2d at 734.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 502, 408 A.2d at 734.
37. Id. at 503, 408 A.2d at 735.
38. Id. at 502-04, 408 A.2d at 734-35. Even though the Court of Appeals has held
that a medical witness is usually the only type of witness who can establish the existence
of a physical ailment, Galusca v. Dodd, 189 Md. 666, 668-69, 57 A.2d 313, 314, (1948), the
court has allowed non-experts to testify to facts relating to physical ailments that they
have observed, id. at 669, 57 A.2d at 314. To establish actual injury, expert medical
testimony may be "advisable," but is not "necessary." 286 Md. at 502-03, 408 A.2d at 735.
Similarly, to establish causation, lay persons may testify in certain situations. This rule of
proof was established in Wilhelm v. State Traffic Safety Comm'n, 230 Md. 91, 185 A.2d
715 (1962):
There are, unquestionably, many occasions where the causal connection between a
defendant's negligence and a disability claimed by a plaintiff does not need to be
established by expert testimony. Particularly is this true when the disability develops
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expert medical testimony was not necessary to establish either injury39 or
causation.4 °
Finally, the court addressed Dr. Vance's argument that there was no
evidence that he intentionally inflicted emotional distress on Muriel Vance in
1956.41 Relying on Harris v. Jones,42 the court agreed with Dr. Vance's
contention. 43 The court noted that Muriel's brief on appeal alleged that Dr.
Vance's wrongful conduct was his concealment in 1956 that his marriage to her
was void, not the filing of the pleading to annul the marriage in 1976.4 4 Because
Muriel Vance had no knowledge of Dr. Vance's misrepresentation in 1956 and
his subsequent concealment of their marital status, the court reasoned that
these actions by her husband could not have caused her to suffer emotional
distress. 45 To cause her to suffer emotional distress, Dr. Vance had to reveal
their true marital status to her under circumstances in which the situation
could not be remedied. Because Dr. Vance could not have anticipated that he
would tell Muriel Vance about the invalidity of their marriage twenty years
later when the marriage had deteriorated, the court reasoned that he had no
knowledge of what his concealment could cause. The court found that his
conduct in 1956 was neither intentional nor reckless, nor extreme and
outrageous, and that therefore his conduct failed to satisfy the requirements of
the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress.46
Due to a fear of vexatious litigation and false claims, 4v a belief that such
claims are trivial, 48 and an unwillingness to confront the difficulties of proof
coincidentally with, or within a reasonable time after, the negligent act, or where the
causal connection is clearly apparent from the illness itself and the circumstances
surrounding it, or where the cause of the injury relates to matters of common
experience, knowledge, or observation of lay men ...
Id. at 99, 185 A.2d at 719. Accord, Tully v. Dasher, 250 Md. 424, 244 A.2d 207 (1968).
However, if complex medical questions, purely subjective symptoms, or a significant
temporal lapse between plaintiff's injury and defendant's negligent act are involved in a
particular case, expert testimony is required. See 286 Md. at 503, 408 A.2d at 735.
39. Id. at 502-03, 408 A.2d at 735.
40. Id. at 504, 408 A.2d at 735.
41. Id. at 504-06, 408 A.2d at 735-37.
42. 281 Md. 560, 380 A.2d 611 (1977). See notes 52 to 56, 130 & 131 and
accompanying text infra.
43. 286 Md. at 504, 408 A.2d at 735.
44. Id. at 505, 408 A.2d at 736.
45. Id. at 506, 408 A.2d at 736.
46. Id. at 506, 408 A.2d at 736-37.
47. See, e.g., Spade v. Lynn & B.R.R., 168 Mass. 285, 290, 47 N.E. 88, 89 (1897) ("lIIt
is unreasonable to hold persons who are merely negligent bound to anticipate and guard
against fright .. .and . . . this would open a wide door for unjust claims which could
not successfully be met."); Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 110, 45 N.E. 354,
354-55 (1896) ("If the right of recovery in this class of cases should be once established, it
would naturally result in a flood of litigation in cases where the injury complained of may
be easily feigned without detection. ). See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 4, § 12,
at 50-51, § 54, at 328.
48. See, e.g., Espinosa v. Beverly Hospital, 114 Cal. App.2d 232, 249 P.2d 843 (1952)
(mother given wrong baby at hospital can not recover for her mental suffering absent
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involved,49 courts have been slow to provide legal protection to emotional
well-being. Traditionally, courts did not allow plaintiffs to maintain a cause of
action for the infliction of emotional distress.50 Recovery was allowed, however,
for mental distress as an element of damages attached to an independent,
t-aditionally recognized tort, such as battery or assault."1 Courts gradually
began to recognize an independent cause of action for the intentional infliction
of emotional distress.5 2 This movement culminated with the position taken by
the American Law Institute in the 1948 Supplement to the Restatement of Torts,
in which conduct intended to cause mental distress subjected the actor to
liability for such distress and any resultant harm.53 To restrict liability under
the new tort, the Second Restatement provided that a plaintiff had to show that
the defendant's intentional conduct was extreme and outrageous.5 4 Most
jurisdictions, including Maryland,55 follow the Restatement position and impose
liability for the intentional infliction of emotional distress.56
Courts have not provided those who suffer negligently inflicted emotional
distress with this same independent legal protection, and they have not allowed
recovery when mental distress alone results from negligence.57 Traditionally the
courts have reasoned that mental distress is too easily simulated, and that there
is no practical standard for measuring such suffering.5" However, an exception
physical injury); Swanson v. Swanson, 121 Ill. App.2d 182, 257 N.E.2d 194 (1970)
(plaintiff's mental distress allegedly caused by failure of plaintiff's brother to tell plaintiff
of his mother's death did not establish a "severe" emotional disturbance). See generally W.
PROSSER, supra note 4, § 54, at 329.
49. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896). See
generally W. PROSSER, supra note 4, § 12, at 50, § 54, at 328.
50. See W. PROSSER, supra note 4, § 12, at 49-50, § 54, at 327-28. It has been
observed that "[miental pain or anxiety the law cannot value, and does not pretend to
address, when the unlawful conduct complained of causes that alone." Lynch v. Knight, 11
Eng. Rep. 854, 863 (H.L. 1861).
51. See W. PROSSER, supra note 4, § 12, at 51-52.
52. For a history of the evolution of the tort, see Magruder, Mental and Emotional
Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARV. L. REV. 1033 (1936); Prosser, Insult and
Outrage, 44 CAL. L. REV. 40 (1956); Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A
New Tort, 37 MICH. L. REV. 874 (1939).
53. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 46 (Supp. 1948) provides: "One who, without a privilege
to do so, intentionally causes severe emotional distress to another is liable (a) for such
emotional distress, and (b) for bodily harm resulting from it."
54. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965) provides in part: "One who by
extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional
distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to
the other results from it, for such bodily harm." Extreme and outrageous conduct is
defined as that which goes "beyond all possible bounds of decency, and [is] regarded as
atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community." Id. Comment d.
55. See Harris v. Jones, 281 Md. 560, 380 A.2d 611 (1977); 38 MD. L. REV. 366 (1978).
56. See note 3 supra.
57. See, e.g., Spade v. Lynn & B.R.R., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897); Mitchell v.
Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896). See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 4,
§ 54, at 327-30.
58. 286 Md. at 497-98, 408 A.2d at 732.
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to the general rule allowed recovery for negligently inflicted emotional distress,
alone, in certain situations where the circumstances guaranteed the genuine-
ness of the claim.59 Representative situations included the negligent mishand-
ling of corpses and the negligent transmission of telegraph messages announc-
ing death.6s
When defendant's negligence caused both physical injury and mental harm,
rather than mental harm alone, courts were less reluctant to allow plaintiff to
recover damages for the mental harm inflicted.61 If defendant's negligent
conduct caused immediate physical injury, plaintiff could recover for the
physical injury and for the mental anguish or pain and suffering accompanying
the physical injury.62 However, if defendant's negligent conduct caused emotion-
al distress, which in turn resulted in physical injury, the courts developed two
rules to ensure that plaintiff's mental distress was objectively corroborated and
genuine. Under the earliest rule - the "impact rule" - the plaintiff was
allowed to recover damages for emotional distress if he suffered contempor-
aneous physical impact upon his person as a result of defendant's negligent
conduct.63 Courts reasoned that the impact requirement guaranteed that the
mental harm plaintiff suffered was genuine,64 but when courts applied the
impact rule they often stretched it to extreme limits.6 5 This led many courts to
reject the impact rule as arbitrary. 66 Many courts adopted the "subsequent
physical injury" rule in its place.67 The subsequent physical injury rule allowed
a plaintiff to recover for emotional distress if the defendant's negligent conduct
threatened some sort of physical violence that, instead of resulting directly in
bodily injury, resulted directly in emotional distress, which in turn caused
59. See W. PROSSER, supra note 4, § 54 at 330.
60. See id. See also Johnson v. State, 37 N.Y.2d 378, 334 N.E.2d 590, 372 N.Y.S.2d
638 (1975).
61. See W. PROSSER, supra note 4, § 54 at 330-33.
62. See id., § 54, at 330.
63. See, e.g., Homans v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 180 Mass. 456, 62 N.E. 737 (1902);
Bosley v. Andrews, 393 Pa. 161, 142 A.2d 263 (1958).
64. See W. PROSSER, supra note 4, § 54, at 331.
65. See, e.g., Christy Bros. Circus v. Turnage, 38 Ga. App. 581, 144 S.E. 680 (1928)
(sufficient impact found where horse evacuated bowels in plaintiff's lap); Morton v. Stack,
122 Ohio St. 115, 170 N.E. 869 (1930) (inhaled smoke was.sufficient impact).
66. See, e.g., Green v. T.A. Shoemaker & Co., 111 Md. 69, 73 A. 688 (1909);
Dziokonski v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555, 380 N.E.2d 1295 (1978) (overruling Spade v. Lynn
& B.R.R., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897)); Batalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d
729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961) (overruling Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E.
354 (1896)).
The impact rule has also been emphatically rejected by commentators, see
generally Bohlen, Right to Recover for Injury Resulting From Negligence Without Impact,
50 U. PA. L. REV. 141 (1902). See also Magruder, supra note 52, at 1035-39; Smith,
Relation of Emotions to Injury and Disease: Legal Liability for Psychic Stimuli, 30 VA. L.
REV. 193, 299-302 (1944).
67. See, e.g., Bowman v. Williams, 164 Md. 397, 165 A. 182 (1933); Hughes v. Moore,
214 Va. 27, 197 S.E.2d 214 (1973). See generally Throckmorton, Damages for Fright, 34
HARV. L. REV. 260 (1921).
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physical injury.6 8 Courts utilizing the test reasoned that the presence of a
physical injury sufficiently corroborated the mental injury to ensure that it was
genuine.
6 9
Bowman v. Williams7" is a leading Maryland case formulating the
subsequent physical injury test. In Bowman plaintiff watched as a coal truck
smashed into his house. Although he was not injured bodily by the impact, his
fright and alarm for the safety of his sons, who were in the basement of the
house, caused him to suffer severe emotional shock and distress.7' He became
weak and hysterical, and was under medical treatment for two weeks for his
condition. For the next six months, he was weak, nervous, and unable to work.
The Court of Appeals allowed him to maintain a cause of action without impact
based on the "reasonable grounds for apprehension of an injury to the plaintiff
and his children. 72 The court formulated the following test:
[A] plaintiff can sustain an action for damages for nervous shock or injury
caused without physical impact, by fright arising directly from defendant's
negligent act or omission, and resulting in some clearly apparent and
substantial physical injury as manifested by an external condition or by
symptoms clearly indicative of a resultant pathological, physiological, or
mental state.73
Almost fifty years later, the court in Vance based its holding that Muriel Vance
presented evidence sufficient to establish symptoms of a mental state evidencing
a physical injury on this test.74
Once the Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court and the Court of
Special Appeals that Muriel Vance had established the tort of negligent
misrepresentation, the court was faced with the problem of determining
whether Muriel Vance could recover for emotional distress as an element of
damages in an action based upon negligent conduct.75 In Maryland, a plaintiff
could recover damages for emotional distress only if a court found a subsequent
physical injury under the Bowman test.76 The Court of Appeals in Vance
reinterpreted the Bowman test to require an injury capable of objective
determination. 77 It found that there was legally sufficient evidence to satisfy the
redefined Bowman physical injury standard, and thus held that Muriel Vance
was physically injured and could recover for Dr. Vance's negligent
misrepresentation.
78
68. See W. PROSSER, supra note 4, § 54, at 332.
69. See, e.g., Niederman v. Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401, 261 A.2d 84 (1970).
70. 164 Md. 397, 165 A. 182 (1933).
71. Id. at 398-99, 165 A. at 182-83.
72. Id. at 402, 165 A. at 184.
73. Id. at 404, 165 A. at 184.
74. 286 Md. at 500-01, 408 A.2d at 733.
75. Id. at 496, 408 A.2d at 731.
76. See notes 70 to 73 and accompanying text supra.
77. 286 Md. at 500, 408 A.2d at 733-34.
78. Id. at 501, 408 A.2d at 734.
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The court's definition of physical injury as "an injury capable of objective
determination" represents a significant development for emotional injury cases
in Maryland. The rationale behind the subsequent physical injury rule was that
the presence of a physical or bodily injury sufficiently corroborated the
genuineness of the mental injury for which plaintiff was attempting to recover
damages.79 By defining physical injury as the court in Vance did, the court has
shifted the focus away from requiring a bodily injury to requiring an objectively
determinable injury under the Bowman rule. This shift of emphasis eliminates
the necessity for the court to make an arguably artificial or arbitrary decision
whether a physical injury or a mental injury is alleged."0 Under this new
definition of physical injury, a plaintiff seeking to recover damages for
emotional distress that is negligently inflicted should be allowed to recover if
the plaintiff can prove that the emotional injury is manifested by objectively
demonstrated symptoms, be they "physical" or "mental" in conventional terms.
For purposes of the physical injury rule, several other jurisdictions have
adopted a definition of physical injury similar to that set forth in Vance. In
Daley v. LaCroix,"' a Michigan court required that plaintiff prove that he
suffered a "definite and objective physical injury" in order to recover under the
physical injury rule. 2 The court in Daley held that one plaintiff could recover
damages for negligently inflicted emotional distress by alleging emotional
disturbance and nervousness,8 3 and that another plaintiff could recover by
alleging weight loss, inability to perform household tasks, extreme nervousness,
and irritability. 4 In Hunsley v. Giard,"5 the Supreme Court of Washington held
that the plaintiff could maintain an action based on negligently inflicted
emotional distress.8 6 The court cautioned, however, that the emotional distress
suffered must be manifested by "objective symptomatology,"8 7 and that recovery
was predicated on the existence of physical symptoms giving evidence to and
resulting from the emotional distress.8 8
Other courts have used a definition of physical injury similar to that
adopted in Vance to allow recovery for negligently inflicted emotional injury
under the impact rule8 9 or in third party bystander cases. 90 For example, in
79. See note 69 and accompanying text supra.
80. See Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Hawaii, 398, 402-07, 520 P.2d 758, 762-64 (1974);
Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 240, 176 N.E.2d 729, 730, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34, 36 (1961);
Comment, Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress: The Case for an Independent Tort, 59
GEO. L.J. 1237, 1240-41 & n.24 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Negligently Inflicted Mental
Distress].
81. 384 Mich. 4, 179 N.W.2d 390 (1970).
82. Id. at 12, 179 N.W.2d at 395.
83. Id. at 15, 179 N.W.2d at 396.
84. Id. at 15-16, 179 N.W.2d at 396.
85. 87 Wash.2d 424, 553 P.2d 1096 (1976).
86. Id. at 435, 553 P.2d at 1102.
87. Id. at 436, 553 P.2d at 1103.
88. Id. at 433, 553 P.2d at 1102.
89. See notes 63 to 66 and accompanying text supra.
90. In these cases, plaintiff witnesses a shocking event caused by defendant's
negligent conduct and suffers physical and/or emotional injury. Usually plaintiff is a
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Petition of United States,9' the First Circuit allowed a plaintiff to recover under
the impact rule by defining the physical injury required under the impact rule
as an injury capable of objective determination. 92 The court ruled that the
nervous disorder the plaintiff suffered, which manifested itself in depression,
emotional upset, and inability to continue working at sea, was a physical
injury.93 In D'Ambra v. United States,9 4 a federal district court in Rhode Island
allowed a bystander to recover for "physical ills," which were manifested by
psychoneurosis, loss of appetite, insomnia, and nightmares.95 The court stated
that it was "the objective manifestation of the injury which [was] crucial, not
whether the injury [was], in conventional terms, physical or mental."9 " Toms v.
McConnell97 followed Daley v. LaCroix98 and applied the Daley requirement of a
"definite and objective physical injury" for purposes of the physical injury rule99
to a bystander case. The court allowed recovery for a "physical injury"
mother who witnesses her child being killed or injured by defendant's negligent act.
Originally recovery was denied in these cases because plaintiff was an unforseeable
plaintiff to whom defendant owed no duty of care. See Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603,
258 N.W. 497 (1935). See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 4, § 54, at 333-34. Today, most
courts allow plaintiff to recover if plaintiff was in the "zone of danger," or area of possible
physical peril, when the negligent act occurred. See, e.g., Resavage v. Davies, 199 Md. 479,
86 A.2d 879 (1952); Niedermann v. Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401, 261 A.2d 84 (1970). A few
jurisdictions have rejected the "zone of danger" rule in bystander cases and have allowed
recovery for negligently inflicted emotional distress under traditional tort negligence
principles. The leading case is Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal.2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72
(1968). In Dillion, plaintiff-mother's infant daughter was run over and killed by
defendant, while plaintiff stood nearby and saw the accident. Plaintiff sustained emotional
shock and physical injury. Because plaintiff was a bystander, the Dillon court saw the
problem of the forseeability of the plaintiff as the chief obstacle to holding defendant liable
for plaintiff's emotional harm. The court held that defendant's liability depended on three
factors: 1) plaintiff's physical proximity to the negligent act; 2) whether plaintiff directly
observed the act or heard about it from a third party; 3) plaintiff's relationship to the
victim. Id. at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80. The court applied traditional
tort negligence principles and held that if the accident and risk of emotional harm are
reasonably forseeable, plaintiff establishes a prima facie case for negligently inflicted
emotional distress if that emotional harm is manifested by a physical injury. Id. at 742,
441 P.2d at 921, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 81. Dillon has been followed by a small but increasing
number of jurisdictions. See, e.g., D'Amicol v. Alvarez Shipping Co., 31 Conn. Supp. 164,
326 A.2d 129 (1973); Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Hawaii 398, 520 P.2d 758 (1974); Toms v.
McConnell, 45 Mich. App. 647, 207 N.W.2d 140 (1973); Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 404
A.2d 672 (1972); D'Ambra v. United States, 114 R.I. 643, 338 A.2d 524 (1975); Dave
Snelling Lincoln-Mercury v. Simon, 508 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
91. 418 F.2d 264 (1st Cir. 1969).
92. Id. at 269.
93. Id.
94. 396 F. Supp. 1180 (D.R.I. 1973).
95. Id. at 1182.
96. Id. at 1183.
97. 45 Mich. App. 647, 207 N.W.2d 140 (1973).
98. 384 Mich. 4, 179 N.W.2d 390 (1970).
99. See notes 81 to 84 and accompanying text supra.
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manifested by withdrawal from socialization, inability to function, and a
continued state, of depression. 1
00
These decisions indicate that by defining a physical injury as an injury
capable of objective proof, a court may allow recovery for a broad range of
injuries, many of which would be classified as mental injuries rather than
physical injuries in conventional terms. 10 ' In Vance, the Court of Appeals
allowed Muriel Vance to recover for essentially mental or psychological
symptoms which manifested themselves in very weak "physical" symptoms.
10 2
In effect, the court has raised the possibility of allowing recovery for purely
mental injuries that are negligently inflicted. Whether the court realized this
potential ramification of the Vance decision is not clear.10 3 Perhaps the court
hoped that by hiding behind the physical injury rule,0 4 it could compensate for
mental injuries without appearing to do so.
The next step in the development of Maryland tort law regarding
compensation for negligently inflicted emotional distress may be the elimina-
tion of the physical injury requirement altogether. Some commentators have
advocated the establishment of an independent cause of action for the negligent
infliction of emotional distress.10 5 Recently, some courts have recognized such a
100. 45 Mich. App. at 649, 207 N.W.2d at 142.
101. See, e.g., Espinosa v. Beverly Hospital, 114 Cal. App.2d 232, 249 P.2d 843 (1952)
(definite nervous disorder is classified as a physical injury); Netusil v. Novak, 120 Neb.
751, 235 N.W. 335 (1931) (nervous prostration is a physical injury).
102. See notes 16 to 20 and accompanying text supra.
103. In fact, the Court of Appeals denied that the Court of Special Appeals advocated
recognizing a cause of action for negligently inflicted emotional distress. See 286 Md. at
501 n.4, 408 A.2d at 734 n.4.
104. The physical injury test may not have properly applied to the Vance case because
Muriel Vance was in no danger of direct physical injury as a result of her husband's
wrongdoing. Arguably, the physical injury test was meant to apply to situations in which
plaintiff was actually in danger of physical injury as well as mental distress. Bowman v.
Williams, 164 Md. 397, 165 A. 182 (1933), makes it clear that plaintiff was in "imminent
danger of physical contact," which led to fear and subsequently to physical injury. 164
Md. at 403, 165 A. at 184. See notes 70 to 73 and accompanying text supra. The Bowman
test was reaffirmed in two later Maryland cases. In Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d
923 (1951), a child was forced to witness the murder of her mother and suicide of her
father. She was allowed to recover for emotional distress. Clearly, she was in danger of
physical harm. In H & R Block v. Testerman, 275 Md. 36, 338 A.2d 48 (1975), plaintiffs
claimed that defendants negligently prepared their tax return. Plaintiffs were obviously in
no fear of physical danger and were not allowd to recover. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 436A (1965). See generally Magruder, supra note 52, at 1035-39; Negligently
Inflicted Mental Distress, supra note 80, at 1240-41.
105. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 18.4, at 1039 (1965) ("[Those]
questions will be solved most justly by applying general principles of duty and negligence,
and [the] mechanical rules of thumb which are at variance with these principles do more
harm than good."); Brody, Negligently Inflicted Psychic Injuries: A Return to Reason, 7
VILL. L. REV. 232, (1961-62); Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress, supra note 80; Note,
Negligence and the Infliction of Emotional Harm: A Reappraisal of the Nervous Shock
Cases, 35 U. Ci. L. REV. 512 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Infliction of Emotional Harm].
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cause of action in bystander cases, 10 6 despite the "dangers" of unlimited liability
and fictitious claims.'0 7 At least two jurisdictions have eliminated the physical
injury requirement altogether in non-bystander cases. In Wallace v. Coca-Cola
Bottling Plants, Inc.,' Maine eliminated the physical injury requirement
entirely as a prerequisite for recovery of damages for negligently inflicted
mental distress.'0° The court adopted the rule that mental and emotional
suffering is compensable if it is substantial and manifested by objective
symptomatology." ° More recently, California recognized a cause of action for
negligently inflicted severe emotional distress in Molien v. Kaiser Foundation
Hospitals."' Plaintiff alleged that defendant's erroneous diagnosis of syphilis in
plaintiffs wife broke up his marriage. 112 The California Supreme Court held
that it was for the jury to decide whether defendant's misconduct foreseeably
caused plaintiff's emotional distress. 1 13 In discussing the Dillon physical injury
requirement, which was usually applied in emotional distress cases, the court
noted that in practice its application had been arbitrary and unreliable. The
court observed: "In our view, the attempted distinction between physical and
psychological injury merely clouds the issue. The essential question is one of
proof; whether the plaintiff has suffered a serious and compensable injury
should not turn on this artificial and often arbitrary classification scheme. ' '114
Courts that have eliminated the physical injury requirement have recognized
the importance of mental equilibrium and have shown a willingness to abandon
mechanical and restrictive tests, which may actually work to foreclose relief for
genuine claims of emotional distress. These courts have thereby facilitated the
legal protection of mental equilibrium." 5 While the Maryland Court of Appeals
has not actually recognized a cause of action for negligently inflicted emotional
106. See, e.g., Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Hawaii 398, 520 P.2d 758 (1974); Sinn v. Burd,
486 Pa. 146, 404 A.2d 672 (1979).
107. The court in Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 404 A.2d 672 (1979), outlined five policy
reasons usually advanced against allowing recovery for negligently inflicted emotional
distress. They included the difficulty medical science encounters in proving causation
between the alleged fright and the claimed damages, the fear of false claims, the fear of a
flood of litigation, the problem of unlimited liability, and the difficulty of circumscribing
the area of liability. The court in Sinn discussed these factors, but found none of them
sufficient to deny a cause of action for negligently inflicted emotional distress. See id. at
159-71, 404 A.2d at 678-85.
108. 269 A.2d 117 (Me. 1970). The court stated that plaintiff drank from a coke bottle
that contained an unpackaged prophylactic.
109. If there is "a proximate causal relationship between an act of negligence and
reasonably forseeable mental and emotional suffering by a reasonably forseeable plaintiff,
such proven damages are compensable even though there is no discernable trauma from
external causes." Id. at 121.
110. Id.
111. 27 Cal.3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980).
112. Id. at 920, 616 P.2d at 814-15, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 832-33.
113. Id. at 930, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
114. Id. at 929, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
115. But see Note, An Arbitrary Standard for Recovery in Negligent Infliction of




distress, it has indicated that it is at least moving in that direction by allowing
recovery for essentially mental injury in Vance.
The court in Vance clearly takes a liberal position with regard to the type of
proof necessary in an emotional distress case. Although proof of Muriel's claim
was based entirely on her own, her mother's and her son's testimony about her
emotional and physical symptoms, the court determined that the evidence was
legally sufficient for Muriel to recover damages for Dr. Vance's negligent
misrepresentation." 6 The court held that medical testimony was not necessary
to prove either injury or causation." 7 The court emphasized that lay persons
could testify to facts they observed in order to prove injury or causation, even
though such facts are ordinarily proven by expert medical testimony."1
8
Due to judicial apprehension that mental injuries in emotional distress
cases may not be genuine," 9 it would seem advisable to require sufficient proof
of the alleged mental injuries. 2 ° Either lay testimony in conjunction with
expert medical testimony or lay testimony in conjunction with proof of
circumstances that tend to prove the genuineness of the claim should provide
sufficient proof.12 1 Due to the rarity of the extreme circumstances situation,
medical testimony will generally be required to prove plaintiff's claim. From a
medical point of view, however, expert medical testimony may always be
warranted. 122 Other jurisdictions that have allowed recovery for emotional
116. 286 Md. at 503, 408 A.2d at 734.
117. Id. at 502-04, 408 A.2d at 734-35.
118. Id. See note 38 supra.
119. See W. PROSSER, supra note 4, § 54, at 328.
120. See text at note 114 supra. One commentator has noted that the main problem
with allowing recovery for negligently inflicted emotional distress is the problem of
ensuring adequate proof. W. PROSSER, supra note 4, § 54, at 328.
121. W. PROSSER, supra note 4, § 54, at 328.
122. From a medical point of view, emotional distress is defined as a reaction to a
traumatic stimulus. A traumatic stimulus is any impact, force, or event which acts upon
an individual for a period of time, and can be physical or psychic. In response to a
traumatic stimulus, two types of mental reactions occur: 1) a primary response, which is
immediate, automatic, and arises to protect the individual from the harm or stress
engendered by defendant's act; 2) a secondary response, which is a longer-lasting response
caused by the inability to adjust to the traumatic event. Primary responses include fear,
anger, grief, humiliation, and embarrassment. Secondary responses include the anxiety
reaction, the conversion reaction, and other neuroses. See Negligently Inflicted Mental
Distress, supra note 80, at 1248-50.
Due to their short and subjective nature, primary reactions are difficult to prove.
The court must rely on plaintiff's testimony and expert medical testimony to ascertain
their existence. Corroboration can be provided by various medical tests, eyewitness
accounts of plaintiff's behavior, comparisons of plaintiff's symptoms with known medical
facts about the injury alleged, and the use of common sense by the jury. See id. at
1258-60.
Generally, secondary reactions are manifested by physical symptoms. Thus, they
are more easily proved. For example, the anxiety reaction results in nervousness, weight
loss, stomach pains, emotional fatigue, weakness, headaches, and backaches. These can be
proved by observing plaintiff's behavior and comparing it to that before the reaction. In
addition, a psychiatrist can determine whether the trauma was a precipitating cause of
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distress on the ground that it was physical injury capable of objective
determination have generally relied upon expert medical testimony to prove
injury and causation. 123
By not requiring expert medical testimony, the court in Vance seems to
have assumed that the severity of Muriel Vance's situation assured that her
emotional distress was genuine. The court must have determined that the
circumstances of the case were sufficient to corroborate the subjective lay
testimony of Muriel Vance and the other interested witnesses.124 At least one
other jurisdiction, however, has found that a plaintiff stated a cause of action for
emotional distress resulting from defendant's negligent conduct based on lay
testimony alone. 125 The only real danger in not requiring expert medical
testimony in emotional distress cases is that a plaintiff's recovery may not be
medically justifiable. 26 This in turn leads to the problem that the emotional
harm suffered may not be serious or severe enough to require compensation,
which raises the whole range of judicial fears regarding recovery for negligently
inflicted emotional distress. 27 Perhaps Vance represents a policy decision by
the neurosis and can examine plaintiff's psycholgical history to determine the probable
effects such a negligent act would have had on plaintiff. See id. at 1260-61.
See generally Smith, Problems of Proof in Psychic Injury Cases, 14 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 586 (1963).
123. See, e.g., Hunsley v. Giard, 87 Wash.2d 424, 553 P.2d 1096 (1976). Cf Molien v.
Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 27 Cal.3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980)
(plaintiffs must present valid, believable medical evidence to prove their emotional
distress).
124. The other witnesses were her son and her mother. See notes 18 & 19 and
accompanying text supra.
125. Daley v. LaCroix, 384 Mich. 4, 15, 179 N.W.2d 390, 396 (1970). A car struck a
utility pole, which snapped a high voltage line and caused an electrical explosion in
plaintiffs' house. Timothy Daley claimed emotional disturbance and nervousness as a
result of the explosion. He offered only lay testimony to support his claim. Although the
trial court found that the evidence was "vague," the appellate court decided that he stated
a cause of action.
126. W. PROSSER, supra note 4, § 54, at 332.
127. Courts have dealt in various ways with the problem of determining whether the
emotional harm suffered is "severe" enough. Cf. Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals,
27 Cal.3d 916, 616 P.2d 831, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980) (jury determines whether plaintiff
has suffered severe emotional distress). One court has advocated limiting recovery to
claims of serious mental distress, which is found where "a reasonable man, normally
constituted, would be unable to adequately cope with the mental stress engendered by the
circumstances of the case." Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Hawaii 398, 408, 520 P.2d 758, 764-65
(1974) (adopting standards set forth in Rodrigues v. State, 52 Hawaii 156, 472 P.2d 509
(1970)).
One commentator has defined emotional harm as mental harm that is serious
enough to require medical attention. For example, it would include shock, continuing
nervousness, sleeplessness, nausea, and more serious harms such as neuroses, psycho-
somatic disabilities, and other serious illnesses. Infliction of Emotional Harm, supra note
105, at 517.
Another commentator has suggested defining mental distress as "any traumati-
cally induced reaction which is medically detrimental to the individual." Plaintiff must
demonstrate a medically provable mental injury, and then the court will decide if it is
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Maryland's highest court that recovery may be warranted in some situations
that are not medically justifiable. If so, the court should have considered more
fully the objective limitations to be ascribed to recovery for emotional distress.
The Maryland Court of Appeals also considered whether Dr. Vance's
conduct was sufficient to establish the tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress,' 28 which was the alternative basis of liability suggested by the Court of
Special Appeals.1 29 In Harris v. Jones, 130 Maryland adopted the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress and outlined its elements: "1) the
conduct must be intentional or reckless; 2) the conduct must be extreme and
outrageous; 3) there must be a causal connection between the wrongful conduct
and the emotional distress; 4) the emotional distress must be severe. ' 31 In
general, courts have been more willing to allow a plaintiff to recover for
intentionally inflicted emotional distress, rather than negligently inflicted
emotional distress, because the circumstances of aggravation and intent
involved in the intentional tort are likely to ensure that the emotional harm
plaintiff suffers is genuine, serious, and reasonable, and serve to attenuate the
courts' fears of false claims.
132
The Court of Appeals held that the evidence was not legally sufficient to
support a claim for the intentional infliction of emotional distress. 133 In her
brief, Muriel Vance alleged that Dr. Vance's intentional wrongdoing occurred in
1956 when he made the negligent misrepresentation and then concealed his
knowledge of the invalidity of their marriage from her.33 The court in Vance
found that Dr. Vance had no knowledge in 1956 of what his concealment of the
void marriage at that time would be likely to occasion in the future.' 35 Thus, by
the court's reasoning, Dr. Vance's conduct was neither intentional or reckless,
nor extreme and outrageous, and failed to satisfy the required elements for the
intentional infliction of emotional distress. 136
The court's emphasis on Dr. Vance's lack of knowledge and his consequent
lack of culpability suggests the possibility that Muriel could have recovered had
she pleaded that the tort occurred in 1976. In 1976, Dr. Vance knew that he had
revealed to Muriel Vance that their marriage was void. By contrast, in 1956 he
"severe" mental distress so as to warrant compensation. Negligently Inflicted Mental
Distress, supra note 80, at 1254 & n.102. This commentator has also suggested that the
failure of the courts to examine the medical problem of the nature and severity of mental
distress is the main deficiency in the leading opinions that grant legal protection to
mental equilibrium. Id. at 1247-48 & n.61.
128. See notes 52 to 56 and accompanying text supra.
129. Vance v. Vance, 41 Md. App. 130, 141, 396 A.2d 296, 303 (1979).
130. 281 Md. 560, 380 A.2d 611 (1977).
131. Id. at 566, 380 A.2d at 614. See 38 MD. L. REV. 366 (1978).
132. See W. PROSSER, supra note 4, § 12, at 52; Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental
Suffering: A New Tort, 37 MICH. L. REV. 874, 878 (1939).
133. 286 Md. at 506, 408 A.2d at 735.
134. Id. at 505, 408 A.2d at 736.
135. Id. at 506, 408 A.2d at 737. See notes 45 & 46 and accompanying text supra.
136. Id. at 505-06, 408 A.2d at 736-37.
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did not and indeed could not know that he would ever reveal the information.
While Muriel Vance emphasized that the wrongful conduct was the
concealment, 137 the court indicated that the revelation of what had been
concealed was the wrongful conduct. 3 ' This suggests that the first two elements
of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, which were what the
court found lacking, may have been established to the court's satisfaction if
Muriel Vance had pleaded that the tort occurred in 1976.1'9
In Harris v. Jones,4 ' Maryland adopted the Restatement position that
recovery was to be allowed for both the reckless and the intentional infliction of
emotional distress.' 4' In Vance, Dr. Vance obviously had no actual knowledge in
1956 that he would reveal the invalidity of the marriage, but it is arguable that
he was at least reckless in concealing the information in 1956. By not allowing
Muriel Vance to recover for what was arguably the reckless infliction of
emotional distress, the Vance court may be disallowing recovery for reckless
infliction of emotional distress in general. If so, the Vance opinion has cut back
on the potentially broader liability for both the intentional and reckless
infliction of emotional distress formulated in Harris v. Jones.
142
In effect, the Vance decision has made it easier for plaintiffs to establish
severe emotional distress when it is negligently inflicted than when it is
intentionally inflicted. If the court has indeed written "recklessness" out of the
tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, Maryland now has more
stringent requirements for the intentional tort, but very liberal requirements
for recovery of damages for emotional distress in a negligence action. This result
seems to run counter to the history of compensating emotional distress in tort
action, because courts have hesitated to allow recovery for negligently inflicted
emotional distress when they probably would have allowed recovery if the
infliction were intentional. 4 3 The circumstances of aggravation and intent
present in the intentional tort are thought to ensure the genuineness of the
claim."'44 While the Court of Appeals' liberal position in regard to negligently
137. Id. at 505, 408 A.2d at 736.
138. See id. at 506, 408 A.2d at 736-37.
139. But cf. Weicker v. Weicker, 22 N.Y.2d 8, 237 N.E.2d 876, 290 N.Y.S.2d 732 (1968)
(plaintiff's mental distress claim denied because it was based on marital difficulties).
140. 281 Md. 560, 380 A.2d 611 (1977).
141. Id. at 566-67, 380 A.2d at 614. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, Comment i
(1965) provides: -
The rule stated in this section applies where the actor desires to inflict severe
emotional distress, and also where he knows that such distress is certain or
substantially certain, to result from his conduct. It applies also where he acts
recklessly, as that term is defined in § 500, in deliberate disregard of a high degree of
probability that the emotional distress will follow.
142. See Alsteen v. Gehl, 21 Wis.2d 349, 357-58, 124 N.W.2d 312, 316-17 (1963)
(recklessness or gross negligence can not be a basis of liability for intentional infliction of
emotional distress).
143. See W. PROSSER, supra note 4, § 54, at 327-28; Prosser, supra note 132, at 878;
Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress, supra note 80, at 1243-44.
144. See note 132 and accompanying text supra.
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inflicted mental distress may not be philosophically consistent with its position
in regard to intentional infliction, the two positions may be pragmatically
consistent. The court may have been attempting to delineate clearly the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress from recovery of damages for
emotional distress in an action based on a defendant's negligent conduct. In the
negligence situation, the tort has been established and the issue is whether
damages may be recovered. With intentional infliction, the tort itself must be
established.
The Vance decision may have far-reaching effects on tort law in Maryland.
The case clearly establishes that a plaintiff has a right to recover damages for
emotional distress in a negligent misrepresentation action. If the Vance opinion
is interpreted broadly, a plaintiff may have a right to recover damages for
emotional distress in any negligence action. In addition, the court's new
definition of physical injury and its liberal standard of proof for physical injury
may each have some impact on negligence actions and on actions for the
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Although the long-range significance
of the Vance decision is difficult to gauge, the Maryland Court of Appeals has at
least recognized that legal protection may be extended in some situations to
protect a plaintiffs emotional well-being from a defendant's negligent conduct.
[VOL. 40
